The nature, causes, consequences, and mitigation of corruption : a new paradigm and role for accounting by Al Zadjali, Mahir Khamis Sumar
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Lincoln University Digital Thesis 
 
 
Copyright Statement 
The digital copy of this thesis is protected by the Copyright Act 1994 (New Zealand). 
This thesis may be consulted by you, provided you comply with the provisions of the Act 
and the following conditions of use: 
 you will use the copy only for the purposes of research or private study  
 you will recognise the author's right to be identified as the author of the thesis and 
due acknowledgement will be made to the author where appropriate  
 you will obtain the author's permission before publishing any material from the 
thesis.  
 
The Nature, Causes, Consequences,
and Mitigation of Corruption: A New
Paradigm and Role for Accounting
A thesis
submitted in partial fulfilment
of the requirements for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy in Accounting
at
Lincoln University
by
Mahir Khamis Sumar Al Zadjali
Lincoln University
2010
ii
This thesis is dedicated
to my Mum and Dad.
iii
Abstract of a thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the
requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Accounting
Abstract
The Nature, Causes, Consequences, and Mitigation of
Corruption: A New Paradigm and Role for Accounting
By
Mahir Khamis Sumar Al Zadjali
Corruption is increasingly seen as a pivotal issue on which, depending on their response to it,
societies rise, decline, or (even) collapse. Accounting’s 10 millennia role in generating trust
and information for decision makers makes it a natural social institution for suppressing
corruption or at least mitigating its harm. Corruption, a furtive act (needing darkness,
deception, denial and treachery), is incompatible with good accountability, because it does not
long survive exposure of its infidelity, betrayals and defalcations. However, accounting has
few effective anti-corruption tools and (as many studies show) accountants are themselves
subject to being corrupted. While much has been written on corruption and its consequences,
accounting studies on corruption have mostly either relied on extant definitions of corruption
or focused on how some accountants have betrayed the trust of their clients and profession by
facilitating the corrupt. After reviewing such well-trod paths, this thesis uses a mixed-methods
research approach to: 1) consider why accounting and other control measures have tended to
be ineffective after centuries, if not millennia, of application; 2) re-examine corruption from a
first-principles perspective; 3) evaluate the socio-economic harm generated across a range of
corruption (i.e. is corruption ever beneficial or trivial?); 4) propose a shift in the extant
corruption paradigm, as a means to make the anti-corruption efforts of accountants and others
more cost-effective.
While morality and ethics are vital considerations in any review of corruption, they are too
culturally and context sensitive to yield an unambiguous definition of corruption, needed to
shape and form operational anti-corruption efforts. Efforts to contain corruption via tools
arising from extant definitions and/or legal semantics are all too often a day late and a dollar
short. In its review of the literature on corruption, this study found that all the reviewed
iv
definitions of corruption focus on attributes of the perpetrators of corruption, most include the
intent to obtain a self-regarding wrongful gain, and many are restricted to public office. This
thesis contends that the current paradigm of corruption imposes attributes on the corruption
definitions that unnecessarily make prosecution of the corrupt nearly impossible, unless those
who are being prosecuted are inept or very unlucky. This thesis proposes a new paradigm of
corruption where the focus is on victims of corruption—in particular, on the harm they suffer
as a result of a breached duty of care. This paradigm fits corruption within the tort breach of
duty of care and proof of that tort rest on three legs that are individually necessary and, in
combination, sufficient to define any and all types of corruption. This paradigm side-steps the
emotive and cultural baggage found in most definitions of corruption and, as such, gives a
focus to attack this ancient social evil at its root, instead of the thousands of current attacks on
its branches, twigs, and leaves.
Social attitudes to corruption range from tolerance to revulsion. This study seeks to focus the
struggle against corruption by using quantitative analyses of the output and indices from a
range of studies to count the socio-economic cost of corruption and to illustrate how it always
harms society. The analysis suggests that businesses use a variety of ways to ameliorate the
harm of corruption, however, those means are never fully effective, and the cumulative effects
of their competitive bidding for the services of the corrupt eventually precipitate multiple
cascading failures in the infrastructure and foundations of society. This study suggests that an
accounting of the socio-economic consequences of corruption should include measures of:
increased violence, reduced satisfaction with life, and reduced growth, all of which perpetuate
or deepen poverty. Thus, corruption despoils the means to increase and maintain wealth and
social well-being.
Six cases were developed to test the proposed paradigm. It was found that if the new
paradigm had been applied, the corruption in the case would have been cleaned with little or
no effort by the government or its institutions—also, the deterrent effect on those considering
a gain from corruption would likely be greater than the current anticorruption approach.
This study concludes that corruption can be cost-effectively resolved if a new paradigm of
corruption is developed where corruption is seen as a breach of a duty-of-care and the civil
courts are used to impose retribution on the guilty and provide their victims with restitution.
Keywords: Corruption, Tort, Duty of care, Economic growth, Violence, Social well-being,
Corporate social responsibility, Social responsibility accounting, Trust,
Transaction cost, Morality, Ethics.
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Chapter 1
Introduction and Initial Literature Review
1.1 Introduction
Increasingly corruption is seen as a pivotal issue on which societies rise, decline or even
collapse, depending on their success in mitigating it, or at least the worst aspects of its
harm. Accounting was established as a Social Institution over 10 millennia ago to
facilitate transactions and trade, by providing information and trust (Wright and Sayed,
2003). The success and importance of the Social Institution of Accounting can be seen
in how society seems to stall in its development until Accounting methods catch up with
and mitigate a particularly pernicious limiting issue (e.g. agency issues in multi-city
empires; Wright and Sayed, 2003). At a recent CPA Australia workshop, where CPA
members were informed about the current struggle against corruption and the role of
Accounting in that struggle, it was noted that:
“Corruption is a serious challenge in the contemporary world. It undermines good
government, fundamentally distorts public policy and leads to the misallocation of
resources. Controlling it is only possible with the cooperation of a wide range of
stakeholders.” (Lindsay, 2010).
This thesis seeks to contribute to the Accounting anti-corruption role by reviewing and
developing an understanding of: the nature of corruption; common extant definitions of
corruption; the socio-economic consequences of corruption; and how the focus in the
accepted definitions of corruption influence or limit design choices in anti-corruption
tools. The understanding is used in an inductively reversed-engineer definition of
corruption that can be used to shape and inspire cost-effective anti-corruption tools. The
definition and the anti-corruption approaches that it inspires are tested deductively via
five cases that include three well-known instances of corruption plus an extension into
two well-known situations that may be perceived as corrupt under the proposed new
1 “And eat not up your property among yourselves in vanity, nor seek by it to gain the hearing of the
judges that ye may knowingly devour a portion of the property of others wrongfully.” The Qur’an, Al-
Baqara: Verse 188.
2definition/paradigm reverse-engineered in this thesis. The following initial literature
review begins the journey.
1.2 Common Extant Views of ‘What is and is not Corruption’
Corruption is at least as old as human society (Rider, 1997; Bardhan, 1997, Campos,
and Bhargava, 2007), may (per many religions; see, for example., the Qur’an citation, in
note 1) be as old as humanity, and it blights every-day life in developed and developing
countries at a macro- and a micro-level. As asserted by Amundsen (1999, p. 1)
corruption “...eats into the culture, political and economic fabric of society, and destroys
the function of vital organs”. In addition, Wolfensohn (1996, p. 27) asserts:
“Corruption is a problem that all countries have to confront”. Mauro (1995) and
Lambsdorff (1999) found that corruption is an obstacle for investment and it reduces the
economic growth rate (see, also, Campos, et al., 1999). A high-level of bribes to civil
servants ultimately reduces the productivity of public investment, which then
saps/sandbags growth (Tanzi and Davoodi, 2002). In addition, Myrdal (1968) asserts
that corrupt officials cause unnecessary bureaucratic delays and increase transaction
costs in doing business.
Mauro (1998a) posits that corruption, in conjunction with other (often related) forms of
institutional inefficiency (e.g. political instability, red tape, weak legislative and judicial
systems), leads to low levels of economic growth. As Myint (2000), Rose-Ackerman
(2002 and 2004), Habib and Zurawicki (2002), and Weber and Getz (2004) assert, there
is a need to resolve the issue of corruption and its negative impact on domestic and
international business. Pantzalis, et al. (2008, p. 388) state that “corruption has become a
prominent issue of concern within international institutions and with firms active in
foreign markets”. Tanzi (1998) added that corruption reduces public revenue and
increases public spending. Laffont (1998, p. 21) suggests that: “...corruption entails a
favouritism that can be very costly because it induces an inefficient allocation of
resources. An inefficient contractor may be selected simply because he is willing to pay
bribes.”
Corruption acts as sand in the gears of an economy (Myrdal, 1968; Braguinsky, 1996;
Lambsdorff, 1999; Méon and Sekkat, 2005; Zarb (2005); Goolsarran, 2006), and its
control and/or eradication “...has become the focus of more intensive research efforts as
the world economies became more globalized” (Wu, 2003, p.3). However, these studies
3have left such unanswered questions as how corruption is generated or how it can be
successfully fought (Clarke and Xu, 2004)? Levi, et al. (2007, p.389) assert that:
“More needs to be done to encourage cross-border cooperation and to protect those who
report and investigate corruption and money laundering. However, we lack solid
information on which techniques are most effective.”
The importance, scope, and scale of the harm caused by corruption is evidenced by the
large number of government, nongovernment and other independent organizations
actively involved in curing this blight—e.g. the World Bank, International Monetary
Fund (IMF), Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD),
World Trade Organization (WTO), United Nations (UN), Human Rights Watch (HRW),
Transparency International (TI), and Interpol. Much of the interest from development
agencies arises because empirical studies indicated that corruption distorts the allocation
of resources by diverting funds toward activities where bribes and illegal commissions
can be more easily made—e.g., from recurrent expenditures to capital investments (see,
e.g., Tanzi and Davoodi 2002; Mauro 1998).
The ancient and pervasive phenomenon of corruption has drawn the interest of
academics from a wide array of disciplines—e.g. Political Science, Sociology, Criminal
Law, Economics, and Ethics. These disciplines have overlapping but unique insights on
the nature, consequences, causes and control of corruption. Accounting has, from
ancient times, had a unique role in the struggle against corruption that is reviewed in the
following subsection.
1.3 The State of Knowledge, in Accounting, on Corruption
Accounting (along with other disciplines) is a key player in the anticorruption struggle.
"Most national organizations of accountants, as well as the International Federation of
Accountants, have developed a variety of standards that are designed to combat
corruption" (Anonymous, September, 1999, p. 96).
Accounting is often seen as a guardian in the struggle against corruption and many
accountants and accounting academics accept that role (Zarb, 2005: Everett, et al., 2007,
p. 514). Throughout the book “The Many Faces of Corruption” (Campos and Pradhanl,
2007), contributors asserted that improved accounting was vital to reduce corruption—
perhaps naively, none of them saw accounting as a cause or as adding to corruption. A
similar situation was found for the book “Performance Accountability and Combating
Corruption” (Shah, 2007). The accounting researchers Malagueño, et al. (2010) share
this benign view of accounting, as evidenced by their assertion that:
4“If an effective accounting system is in place, the likelihood that someone can engage in
corrupt acts without being discovered decreases. As a result, Jain’s [2001] probability of
detection is increased, the misallocation of assets is more readily brought to light, and
less corruption should be the result” (Malagueño, et al., 2010, p. 374).
Thus, while many non-accountants put great faith in control systems, accountability and
accountants as guardians against corruption, as Zarb (2005, p. 6) notes, accounting,
“...on both the national and international level, has not escaped unscathed" from neither
the depredations nor the influence of corruption. Further, while “...accounting rules can
play a key role in curbing corruption” (Heimann, 1997, p. 159), the current accounting
tools, control systems and its underlying paradigm appear to be insufficient to sustain a
guardian role against corruption. These insufficiencies are apparent in Khan and St
Petersburg (2006, p. 4) assertion that the “...rules, regulations, procedures and
operational standards ... often leave lacunae [gaps], which create opportunities for
corruption or at [the very] least protect corruption”. And as Kreikebaum (2008, p. 82)
notes, “...even companies applying sophisticated control measures experience a fairly
high amount of yet unknown corruptive actions and actors.” Auditor independence is a
well-known concern in the private sector with recent rules requiring a change in
auditors every five to seven years. Gendron, et al. (2001) put a new twist on this issue
by noting that with value-for-money auditing, the government audit office become so
closely associated with the public management they advocate, that it is difficult for
them to sustain the claim of being independent of the public-sector administration that
they audit.
Asien and Nuri (2010, p. 3), in their study on the “Effects of Institutional Structures on
Accounts Manipulation” suggest that accounting has not contributed significantly to the
literature on controlling corruption. The outcome of a review of ProQuest (2011) titles
(in their ABI/Inform Complete database) is illustrated in Figure 1-1 and shows a rapid
increase interest in the Accounting-Corruption interface that starts in the mid-1990s and
flattens out for academic journals in the second decade of the 21st Century, but
continues rising rapidly for popular interest.
Figure 1-2 separates out, by topic, the 20,905 titles published from 2000-09 (inclusive)
and indicates a massive interest in Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR), significant
interest in forensic aspects of Accounting, but little interest in accountants facilitating/
participating in corruption and little or no interest in Accounting as a guardian against
corruption. The majority of reviewed articles that saw accounting as a guardian against
corruption were economic or political in nature, not accounting.
Source: ProQuest, 2011.
In all the reviewed titles on accounting and corruption, the definition of corruption was
a serious limiting factor in the discussion of how corruption might be controlled. The 30
definitions of corruption (listed in Table 2
Forensic
Accounting,
13.1%
Figure 1
-1, Chapter 2 of this thesis) are generally
CSR
80.6%
Facilitates
Participates
1.7%
Earnings
Management
4.6%
-2: Focus of the 20,905 titles (2000-09) with
Accounting and Corruption on the Title
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6representative of the definitions used in 2,000 of the 4,691 journal articles with
accounting and corruption in their title and published between 2000 and 2009, inclusive.
More articles would have been checked, except by 1,800 articles the definitions were
essentially represented by the 30 selected for Table 2-1 (i.e. a few words changed but
the meaning and content remained covered by the 30 definitions). It is obvious from this
outcome that accounting scholars, like many other scholars, tend to use earlier accepted
definitions for thorny issues like corruption. A quick review found a similar outcome
for the non-academic titles containing accounting and corruption and published between
2000 and 2009, inclusive. This finding also appears to be consistent for non-accounting
academic journal articles on corruption (please note, the review sample in this later case
was very much smaller—only a few hundred).
In Figure 1-3, the 30 reviewed definitions of corruption (listed in Table 2-1, Chapter 2,
this thesis) are linked into a Phylogenetic Tree to illustrate the flow of the notions they
represent. It is clear in Figure 3-4 that all of the notions in the reviewed definitions of
corruptions arise from a single paradigm/(root-stock definition) where corruption is
defined and/or identified by the attributes of perpetrator(s) and gain(s) of corruption.
Figure 1-3: A Phylogenetic Tree Depiction of Reviewed Corruption
Definitions
When ethical/Moral definitions are considered, it is clear in Figure 1-3, that the
common practice of defining/identifying corruption by the attributes of perpetrator(s)
7and gain(s) of corruption is ancient. Given that this approach has (over many thousands
of years) had little joy in stemming the tide of corruption, it is likely time to formulate a
new paradigm/(root-stock definition) of corruption. Corruption has at least two sides—
the perpetrator(s) and the victim(s). In developing a new paradigm of corruption, this
thesis flips the old paradigm and defines corruption in terms of the victim(s) and
consequences of corruption.
Stapenhurst and Dye (1998) assert that, for it to meaningfully contribute to the struggle
against corruption, accounting must move from its traditional observer/historian role.
However, as Belkaoui (2004) notes, the levels of accounting quality and corruption are
highly correlated—which suggests that, if well implemented, the supporting
observer/historian role of Accounting may well prove to be decisive in the struggle
against corruption. Pearson (1995, p.23) posits that "... the law will never be wholly
effective in eliminating transgressions, and even where it does seem appropriate—for
example, in cases of fraud—its application is often extremely cumbersome and
expensive." A well-developed and received literature by Critical Accounting Theorists,
Positive Accounting Theorists and others, suggests that at least some corruption is
created, facilitated, ignored or abetted by accountants (Hooper and Pratt, 1995; Neu,
2000; Wyatt and Gaa, 2004; Christensen, 2007; Sikka, 2008, 2010, and 2001; Mitchell,
et al., 1998). While this area of study is important to accounting, it is far outside the
stated scope of this thesis.
As discussed above, an overview of 2,000 of 4,691 journal articles (42.6 percent) with
the words accounting and corruption in their title and published during 2000-09 showed
that all relied on definitions that were derived from a root focus on the attributes of the
perpetrator of corruption and ignored the attributes of and/or harm to the victims (see
Figure 1-3). In many cases, the definitions are variants of a definition developed by the
World Bank (1997, p. 8) and International Monetary Fund (2005) with corruption being
"the misuse (or abuse) of public office for private ends (or gain)". As discussed in the
next subsection and developed in detail later in this thesis, crucial limitations and flaws
in this family/paradigm of corruption definitions unnecessarily limit the scope of what
is seen as corrupt and can make the prosecution of corruption onerous to the point of
being nearly impossible.
Given the outcome illustrated in Figures 1-1 through 1-3 and in Table 2-1 (Chapter 2), it
became apparent that no gap in the accounting literature was going to provide a venue
8to research a solution to corruption. As a result, the focus of the research shifted away
from accounting literature on corruption to a detailed exploration of corruption
definitions in other disciplines and a review of the nature and effects of corruption.
Eventually, this expanded search would lead to the conclusion that the current
corruption paradigm was deeply and fundamentally flawed and that another study using
that paradigm would only add another log to the current log-jam on anticorruption
research—a new paradigm on corruption is needed. As McSweeney and Duncan (1998)
note, an understanding of something is profoundly shaped by the prior images of those
seeking the understanding. If the prior image is fundamentally flawed, a new paradigm
is needed to facilitate a new understanding of, and approach to, corruption.
1.4 Defining Corruption
Much of the literature on corruption suggests that its study must be a multidisciplinary
phenomenon (Ijiri 1973; Jain, 2001; Lee-Chai and Bargh, 2001). Working from that
premise, this study reviews and considers a range of corruption paradigms (from and
across an array of disciplines) so as to penetrate the heart of corruption and, from that
vantage point, develop a broad, general and sufficient definition of corruption.
Fraud is broadly defined as using deceit (by commission or omission) to alter the mix of
entitlements, either in one's favour or to the disadvantage of another individual or group.
However, that definition is far too vague to be a decisive contribution to the struggle
against corruption—a more rigorous and inclusive paradigm on corruption is needed to
focus the effort to cost-effectively control corruption. The search for such a paradigm,
in this thesis, begins within the accounting discipline and rapidly branches out into the
wisdom and experience of other disciplines.
While the quest for a definition of corruption has a long history in many disciplines
(especially moral philosophy), few researchers explicitly examine its nature or details
(Bac, 1998; Aidt, 2003; Miller, 2004; Calderón-Cuadrado and Alvarez-Arce, 2006). As
noted by Leys (1965, p. 215) “...the general problem in writing about corruption was
that the facts cannot be discovered, or that if they can, they cannot be proved.” Further,
there are suggestions that broad and fuzzy “...definitions of corruption may be one
reason why [effective] prosecutions are so low...” (Glossaries, 2008, p. 21). As Klaus-
Henning (2007, p. 9) notes:
9“Audits can be successful only if auditors [and prosecutors] understand the nature
of corruption, recognize circumstances suggestive of corruption, and know how to
proceed if clues are identified”.
Setting a “...need to define concrete results might appear to be a tall order in an area
where quantification is difficult” (Mauro, 1998b, p. 14). However, Calderón-Cuadrado
and Alvarez-Arce (2006) assert that, because the complexity of corruption contributes
greatly to gaps, discrepancies, and failures in how it is resolved, there is a desperate
need to understand that complexity. Deflem (1995, p. 244) added that “most studies of
corruption begin with some definition of corruption, often indicating how difficult it is
to ascribe a clear-cut meaning to the term.” Thus, a corruption paradigm that can
encompass or subsume its complexity (Khan and St Petersburg, 2006) is an essential
requirement for accounting to develop cost-effective tools to fulfil its anticorruption-
guardian role.
One way of considering why Accounting might need a new paradigm of corruption is to
review Kuhn’s (1996) concept of a paradigm shift. Hairston, (1982, p. 77) states that:
“Kuhn believes that because these shifts are so disruptive, they will occur only
when the number of unsolved problems in a discipline reaches crisis proportions
and some major figures in the field begin to focus on those un-solved problems.”
The literature on corruption contains several definitions derived by looking at specific
examples or defining it relevant to the researcher’s area of interest (Jain, 2001) and, as
noted by Jain (1998, p. 13) “...almost everyone who writes about corruption attempts to
first define it”. However, these definitions often stand alone and there appears to be
little or no first principles review of why and how corrupt acts came about or how the
extant definitions were developed or are related. Further, as asserted by Tanzi (1998, p.
564) corruption “...has been defined in many different ways, each lacking in some
[critical] aspect”. As illustrated by Friedrich (1972) that:
“Any attempt to analyze the concept of corruption must contend with the fact
that in English and other languages the word corruption has a history of
vastly different meaning and connotations.”
Seeking to better understand the nature of corruption and the relationship between
various definitions of corruption, a few economics studies (Becker and Stigler, 1974;
Banfield, 1975; Rose-Ackerman, 1975, 1978, 2008a; Klitgaard, 1988, 1991) have
sought to extend the principal-agent model. Other researchers analysed the demand-
and/or supply-side of corruption in making a contribution to the analysis of the nature of
corruption (Andvig and Moene, 1990; Pacini, et al., 2002; Mohtadi and Roe, 2003;
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Bose, et al., 2008; Gorodnichenko and Sabirianova, 2007). However, these studies all
defined corruption using variants of the World Bank definition—that corruption “...is
the abuse of public power for private benefit”. This very widely used definition of
corruption leaves open the issue of just what is meant by abuse, suggests that corruption
occurs only in the public sector (i.e. is not present in private sector transactions) and
does not tie-down what constitutes a private benefit (e.g. it leaves open the possibility
that corruption is tolerable or even acceptable if it provides significant benefits to many
at a small cost to a few). The obvious existence of corruption within private
corporations (domestic and/or international) shows the first part of this definition to be
fatally flawed. As asserted by Tanzi (1998, p. 564) that “...corruption clearly does exist”
in the private sector. Svensson, (2005, p. 21) suggests that “...corruption can also take
the form of collusion between firms or misuse of corporate assets that imposes costs on
consumers and investors” (see also Argandona, 2003). Thus, the World Bank definition
of corruption focuses only on a small subset of the range of situations where corruption
can and does exist—as such, it is fatally and irretrievably flawed.
Transparency International provides an operating definition of corruption as “the misuse
of entrusted power for private gain”. Although this definition is not as limiting as the
World Bank definition of corruption, it is also fatally flawed because, like the World
Bank definition, it makes private gain a required outcome for there to be corruption.
Specifically, private gain does not always eventuate from corruption, even though it is
often the likely original intent of corruption. Further, as Tanzi (1998, p. 564) notes,
corruption in the form of “...the abuse of public power is not necessarily for one's
private benefit but for the benefit of one's party, class, tribe, friends, family, and so on”.
Shleifer and Vishny (1993) distinguished two kinds of corruption (with- theft and
without- theft) within a government arena. With theft corruption occurs when a
government official takes a bribe in exchange for reducing payments which the briber
owes to the government (i.e. taxes or tariffs). Whereas, corruption without theft occurs
when a government official takes some additional money from the briber—who is
willing to pay—to get the goods or services. In the case of corruption without theft, it
happens when the markets are competitive. Although, Rose Ackerman (2008b, p. 334)
argued that “competitiveness reduces corruption” (see, also, Ades and Di Tella, 1999;
Sandholtz and Koetzle, 2000; Blake and Martin, 2002). In counterpoint, Pearson (1995)
argues that competition, by its very nature, often creates a morally ambiguous business
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environment. Kulik, et al. (2008, p. 720) concluded that “there are limits to the benefits
of competition in organizations”. Shleifer (2004, p. 418) added in his description of
relationship between unethical and consequences of market competition is that
“...competition is likely to promote ethical behaviour in the long run”.
Klitgaard (2010, p. 3) suggests that “we must understand corruption as a phenomenon
of systems, rather than (just) of immoral individuals.” The Theory of Planning
Behaviour asserts that the individual person or firm is dedicated to winning and if an
individual expects to lose, s/he may immediately espouse the behaviour of the winner,
even if that stance involves the acceptance of unethical behaviour.2 Sethi and Sama
(1998) argue that corporate actions are not only influenced by internal considerations,
but that those actions are also significantly affected by alternative external market
conditions (such as the competitive conditions). They were searching for “the types of
actions that might be more effective in improving business ethical conduct under
varying sets of markets based competitive conditions.” Kulik, et al. (2008, p. 720) posit
that “...while it may be that beneficial effects of competition can be observed in inter-
organizational interactions, intra-organizational competition at the individual level may
instead negatively affect an organization’s efficiency, effectiveness and ethical climate”.
Etzioni (1982, p. 26) argued (from a social science perspective) that “a more effective
approach is prevention grounded in an understanding of the constituencies involved in
constituency analysis can identify the constellations of social and political power that
sustain existing opportunities for fraud and abuse, and those that will support
countermeasures”.
As suggested above, and as asserted by Svensson (2005, p. 21), no current widely
accepted “...definition of corruption is completely clear-cut”. Further, as Sandholtz and
Koetzle (2000, p. 3) note “...a definition of corruption that is portable across cultures
[and/or situations]” is very much needed.
The relationship between accounting (traditional, social and environmental) and social
problems (e.g. poverty, race, corporate social responsibility and corruption) are
relatively new notions in accounting literature (see Kamla, 2008 and Spence, 2009).
Accounting and accountants are major contributors to how society functions, via their
process, practices and profession. Critical accounting provides insight into some of
these issues. Laughlin (1999, p. 73) defined the critical role of accounting as:
2 For comprehensive surveys of this literature, see Ajzen (1985, 1987, and 1991).
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“A critical understanding of the role of accounting processes and practices and the
accounting profession in the functioning of society and organisations with an
intention to use that understanding to engage (where appropriate) in changing
these processes, practices and the profession”.
In addition, Laughlin (1999) argues that, in its role in resolving social problems,
accounting requires intellectual borrowings from other disciplines to give theoretical
and methodological perspectives to address these complex agendas. Similarly, Ijiri
(1973, p. 23) suggests that in considering unsolved issues within accounting, it is “...an
accountant’s responsibility to [search]...for useful theories in the...” disciplines
surrounding accounting. Shleifer and Vishny (1993, p. 604) added that “...the first step
to reduce corruption should be to create an accounting system that prevents theft from
the government”. Laughlin (1999, p. 74), also, asserts that accounting should “...look
outwards to other 'mature' disciplines for...guidance on how to address the complexity
with which they are dealing”. In recognition of the effects of accounting on society, Ijiri
(1973, p. 24) asserts that “accounting changes cannot be made without due
consideration of their effects upon the interest of various parties [stakeholders]
involved”. Lehman (2005, pp. 675-676) posits that “Accounting is a social practice with
people, cultures, and myths performing the dance and concert that create relationships,
collaborations, harmonies, and conflicts”. Wright and Sayed (2003, p.125) state that
“instability in accounting should not be an issue—rigidity in the face of change is a
liability. Specifically, in a changing social climate, social institutions evolve to meet
challenges or disappear via replacement, irrelevancy, or the collapse of the society they
failed”. Verschoor (2010, p. 14) added that “...corruption also hinders companies from
acting as good corporate citizens.” While Accounting has over the last ten millennia
evolved to meet society’s information and trust needs as they arose, over the next
decade it must raise its game. Specifically, in a rapidly changing society (Wright, et al.
2008), Accounting must shift from a reactive response to corruption to a proactive one.
This thesis seeks to aid that process by helping Accounting develop via the formation of
a new paradigm of corruption. That paradigm should define and challenge corruption at
its root, rather than reacting to the ever mutable categories, variants, and individual
instances of corruption that in response to limited responses to corruption evolve away
from those limits into new but equally pernicious forms.
The emergence of a new paradigm in defining corruption is needed because current
definitions of corruption have not helped to find an appropriate means to mitigate it.
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Thus, this study will continue its search for a workable definition of corruption by
following approaches from several disciplines and using a descriptive studies format.
1.5 Exploring the Nature of Corruption
Corruption has been defined differently, depending on where and when it occurred, or
was investigated. This study found those definitions to be generally excessively over-
informative. Specifically, they provide more perspective than understanding and offer
little in the way of a working solution. In accounting, as Sterling (1975, p.28) observed,
problems are often defined in such a way as to make them "unresolvable". In the case of
corruption, the most widely accepted definition of corruption being the misuse (or
abuse) of public office for private ends (or gain) creates significant problems—e.g.:
 The phrase “public office” is too limiting—corruption can occur outside such
roles,
 Gain is a red herring—while gain is a common intent of corruption, corruption
does not always lead to gain, and not all gain is corrupt, and
 Proof of intent places an unfair and excessive burden of proof on an accuser—
such proof is almost always difficult to obtain, especially in a corrupt
environment.
Corruption tends to be so twisted, convoluted and confused that the struggle against it
needs a general and unambiguous definition of corruption. A key thesis developed in
detail later in this study, and its major contribution to accounting, is that the notion of
tort provides such a definition. When conceived of as a tort, corruption has three legs
that must all stand for a given situation/action to be deemed corrupt. Specifically, an
accusation of corruption requires proof that:
i. A duty of care existed,
ii. The duty of care was breached, and
iii. Harm arose from the breached duty of care.
The first two legs of proof (immediately above) are mostly involved with the merit of an
accusation of corruption—as questions of fact they are reasonably easy to prove or
disprove. Harm and its cause (as the third leg of proof) have some involvement with
merit but are mostly to do with measuring quantum. There is extensive debate on the
harm of corruption and a few researchers even claim that low levels of corruption may
even foster economic growth (Leff, 1964; Huntington, 1968; Yoshihara, 1988; Coppier
and Michetti, 2006). However, most academic research is critical of the perceived
negative effects of corruption on economic growth and social development. Until
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recently, few researchers believed there were any beneficial effects from corruption.
Recent corruption research has been increasingly inclusive of the possibility that
corruption may have redeeming elements (Tanzi, 1998). However, governments in most
developed and developing nations condemn any and all forms and levels of corruption.
Corruption has been a popular subject of research over the last two decades because the
expansion of the global markets and global citizenship has increased awareness that
different cultures can have different views on the nature, consequences and tolerability
of corruption. Based on the assumption that development best proceeds in a trustworthy
environment, some researchers have focused on the negative effects of corruption, while
others are reconsidering the effect of corruption.
Many corruption definitions focus on the divergence between the principal’s interests
and those of the agent (e.g. “Corruption occurs when an agent betrays the principal’s
interests in pursuit of her own”; Klitgaard, 1988, p. 24); Corruption is behaviour which
deviates from the duties of public role (elective or appointive) to serve private-interest
(Gillespie and Okruhlik, 1988). In a fine tuning of this definition, the World Bank
(1997, p. 8) and IMF (2005) defined corruption as "the misuse (or abuse) of public
office for private ends (or gain)". Fundamental problems with this definition of
corruption are:
1) It is far too narrow, in that it restricts the definition of corruption to public
office (e.g. if a government function is privatized the corruption remains
but has been defined away);
2) It requires an accuser to prove the defendant gained via corruption;
3) It requires an accuser to prove the defendant intended to gain via
corruption.
Kingshott and Dincer (2008, p. 70) suggest that “...by understanding the variety of
antecedent conditions leading to corrupt acts our managers and policy makers can take
necessary remedial action”. Lehman and Okcabol (2005, p. 614) assert that “accounting
practice has always been concerned with fraud, and has always been effected by
financial collapses, management transgressions, and misstatements by corporate
officers.” Therefore, this thesis seeks to develop a corruption definition that will be
sufficiently unambiguous, general and broad in scope to help accountants focus their
struggle to reveal and/or contain and control corruption.
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1.6 The Purpose of this Research
It was not possible to define the purpose of this study until the initial literature reviews
were complete and were integrated into an over-view of corruption. The overall purpose
of this study is to develop an understanding of corruption, its nature, and its socio-
economic consequences—the ultimate intent is to develop or improve anti-corruption
controls, to enhance the ability of Accounting to meet its perceived social obligation to
identify and contain, control, and/or mitigate corruption. The first hurdles to attaining
these goals are the lack of a viable extant definition of corruption and the complexities,
ambiguities and cultural imperatives that tend to make developing a general definition
of corruption very difficult. If accounting is to develop general and cost-effective anti-
corruption solutions, the discipline must move from being reactive to apparent social
needs, to search out a more proactive means to define and fight corruption. This thesis,
to contribute to this process, is organised to:
 Illuminate the nature of corruption via a literature review, speculative thought,
analysis, and case-studies.
 Propose an effective, general, and unambiguous definition of corruption.
 Quantify the economic consequences of corruption via related indices.
 Quantify the social consequences of corruption and its effect on the well-being of the
societies concerned.
 Examine moral and ethical issues associated with corruption and determine whether
an ethical/moral solution is practical for corruption.
 Propose how accounting and law can provide a cost-effective control of corruption.
 Validate the thesis by applying its notions and conclusions in case studies.
1.7 The Research Questions Being Investigated
Yin (2003) and Maxwell (2005) posit that the research question defines/limits what a
researcher wants to learn or understand. They suggest that these questions establish an
overall guide for the conduct of the research. As Yin (2003) notes, the literature review
for a case study is intended to develop relevant and insightful research questions about
the topic being researched. The initial review of research literature in this study resulted
in the thesis being re-structured and re-directed to resolve:3
1) What is corruption?
2) How have others defined corruption—what are the strengths and weaknesses of
those definitions? (See question 5, below).
3) How this study defines corruption?
4) What are the socio-economic and political consequences of corruption?
3 While this study recognises the importance of the history of accountants facilitating and otherwise
engaging in corruption, that issue is outside the research question of this thesis and is mostly left to
future research.
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5) What are the ideal attributes of a cost-effective solution to corruption?
6) Can a solution be developed that achieves most of those attributes?
1.8 The Relevance and Significance of this Research
This research is important, from both an academic and practical perspective, because:
– From an academic standpoint it:
 Provides a source of reliable and valuable secondary data for researchers.
 Devises an alternative definition/paradigm of corruption.
 Allows future researchers and academics to be aware of some consequences
of corruption and its relationship to socio-economic development.
 Is consistent with an international accounting focus, in that it seeks a
principles-based, not a procedures-based definition of corruption.
– From a practical standpoint it:
 Enables organizations to enhance their awareness of their duty of care and
consequences that may arise from a failure in that duty.
 Enables government and non-government organizations to be aware of the
potential consequences of corruption on their constituencies and on society in
general.
 Warns that even the richest countries may suffer great harm and/or reduced
wellbeing from corruption.
 Enables organizations which conduct surveys to have a more practical means
of measuring the existence and level of corruption.
 Proposes a viable practical solution to corruption.
1.9 The Contribution of this Research
This research considers various aspects of corruption so as to discover/create insights to
benefit academics, accounting practitioners and the general populous. It seeks to make a
contribution to the literature by synthesising a review of the literature on corruption
within accounting and several other disciplines. That synthesis (see Chapter 4) suggests
that:
1. The battle against corruption is often fought on moral rather than economic grounds.
However, reality frequently shows that economic factors are important elements in the
struggle against corruption, in terms of both motivation and consequences.
2. A review, discussion and synthesis of extant literature on corruption combine to form a
reasonable base for further research.
3. Summarization and categorization of different corruption measurements and indices
help researchers (new to the study of corruption) become aware of possible limitations
to measurement in their studies.
4. There is a strong negative correlation between corruption and socio-economic growth
and development. The correlation is strong enough that developed and developing
countries need to be aware of the harmfulness of corruption and need to be proactive in
mitigating corruption if they want continued, strong economic growth.
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5. A study of the economic and social development costs of corruption may be more
meaningful than the common simplifying portrayal of corruption as a cancer within
society. It is noted that a key cost/consequence of corruption is its disruption of trust
and the resulting increase in transaction costs.
6. The ultimate aim of this thesis is to facilitate the anti-corruption role of accounting by
introducing a new paradigm on corruption that may assist in the development of cost-
effective means to resolve or mitigate corruption.
1.10 Structure of the Thesis
This research investigates the nature of corruption to provide insights and a definition
that may assist in the development of a cost-effective accounting/legal resolution to
corruption. Results from this study are presented: starting with a statement of the
problem, a literature review on the received knowledge on corruption; a gathering of
information about the nature of corruption and a framework of how the research
methodology was selected. An analysis of the various published indices considered the
cost and consequences of corruption on the economy and the well-being of society.
Then five case studies are used to evaluate the validity of the thesis findings and
suggested solutions. The chapter arrangement is as follows:
Chapter 1 provides an introduction, a summary of the initial literature reviews, an over-
view of the purpose, research questions, and relevance of the research, and an
outline of the structure of the thesis.
Chapter 2 summarises and analyses the literature review performed concerning the
debate surrounding the various definitions of corruption that for one reason or
another have been unable to overcome their shortcomings in dealing with
corruption. Also, this chapter reviews literature on the cost and consequences of
corruption on socio-economic factors. Additionally, it provides a brief description
on two corruption indices (CPI and FFC) that are used widely in the literature and
applied throughout this study.
Chapter 3, after summarising the research problem, explains why a mixed-methods
research approach are chosen and presents various procedures that are considered
for use in this study (to resolve the research problem). The reasons behind the
choice of method used to select, collect and analyse data are explained, and the
research problem is discussed/analysed in terms of the research methodologies
chosen.
Chapter 4 summarises the literature review to illuminate the nature of corruption and set
requirements that any definition of corruption must meet (if it is to provide the
basis of a cost-effective anti-corruption solution). Extant definitions of corruption
are gathered from a wide array of disciplines and evaluated against the proposed
set of requirements, and a corruption definition is refined to meet the proposed
requirements.
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Chapter 5 provides a rationale for why corruption should be resolved, an analysis of the
cost/consequences of corruption on the economy and wellbeing of society. This
chapter provides an analysis of corruption indices and other macroeconomic,
political, social and other data, and a discussion of how that data was reorganised,
to facilitate various regressions to investigate the causes and consequences of
corruption on those countries.
Chapter 6 details and discusses a literature review of moral, ethical, and socio-cultural
aspects of corruption. Recognising that this line of enquiry is likely to remain
ineffective for a generation or so, this study shifts its focus to the search for an
interim solution, via accounting and law.
Chapter 7 provides an application of the research to five selected case studies
(WorldCom, Enron, Goldman Sachs vs. Bear Stearns, British Petroleum’s (BP)
Deep-water Horizon oil-spill debacle in the Gulf of Mexico, and Bofors-India
Scandal) to illustrate the relevance and usefulness of the proposed paradigm shift
and to contrast the effect of the new paradigm against the actual outcome of the
current paradigm.
Chapter 8 draws conclusions, highlights the contribution of the research, considers the
policy implications arising from the research, presents limitations which became
apparent during the process of this study and provides suggestions for future
research.
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Chapter 2
The Debate on Corruption as a Phenomenon
2.1 Introduction
While the terms corruption and fraud are often used interchangeably, they are far from
being synonyms. Khan and St Petersburg (2006, p. 4) assert that “'corruption' takes
place in the form of bribery, kickbacks, commissions, or other benefits without leaving
any trace in the official records”. Khan and St Petersburg (2006, p. 4) also claim that
“...fraud consists of deriving undue benefit by bypassing some controls or bending some
rules”. Many other common definitions of corruption were enumerated, evaluated and
compared in the previous chapter. However, those definitions of corruption tend to
show it as a more general notion; whereas, definitions of fraud tend to suggest that fraud
is a subcategory of corruption. Also, corruption is almost always considered to be a
social wrong, but it is not always unlawful. In contrast, fraud is almost always seen as a
breach of law. This study focuses on the more general (e.g. root) concept of corruption.
Corruption has been a popular subject of research over the last two decades because of
expanding global markets. Based on the assumption that development best proceeds in
uncorrupted environments, some research focuses on the negative effects of corruption
and other reconsider the effect of corruptions. The literature review, consistent with the
findings of Klitgaard (1988), found the field to be relatively tentative and thin, with few
theoretical frameworks, international comparisons, or careful case studies.
The remaining sections of this chapter: investigate the nature of corruption; separate and
allocate corruption into rational classifications; debate the nature of corruption; provide
a detailed discussion on 30 extant definitions of corruption; highlight socio-economic
consequences of corruption; discuss how corruption can be measured; and provide a
summary of, and conclusion to, the chapter.
2.2 Nature of Corruption
The literature on corruption contains several definitions derived by looking at specific
examples or defining it relevant to the topic for the research study (Jain, 2001).
Corruption has existed for ages, and it appears in various forms in different periods or,
within a given era, with a variety of faces. Corruption is connected to administration,
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politics, economics and society (Tiihonen, 2003). Corruption is as old as government
itself (Klitgaard, 1988).
All the above statements and others examined but not included in this study are answers
to the question: “...how can corruption be defined?” However, as asserted by Jain (1998,
p. 13) “almost everyone who writes about corruption attempts to first define it”. There
is no theory of why and how corruption arose or how the development of World Bank
definition of corruption as “misuse of public office for private gain” came about.
However, the World Bank definition of corruption has become very dominant even
though it is limited to wrongful acquisition of economic benefits from the institutional
power inherent in political and bureaucratic appointments and excludes corruption
involving other relationships.
This study, to understand the nature of corruption and the relationship between different
definitions of corruption, initially extended the principal-agent model. Many researchers
have advocated the principal-agent model of corruption (e.g. Becker and Stigler, 1974;
Banfield, 1975; Rose-Ackerman, 1975 and 1978; Klitgaard, 1988 and 1991). The next
focus was to understand the relationship between corruption and demand-and-supply
models which analyse the nature of corruption via demand and supply dimensions. The
following sections briefly view these models and their contribution to the understanding
of corruption.
2.3 Review of Studies that Define/Examine Corruption’s Nature
The literature review starts with studies giving a general discussion and/or analysis of
the causes and the consequences of corruption on a country’s economy, on society and
on humanity. Studies articulating the nature and effects of corruption were gathered,
compared and contrasted. Common, well known, and general definitions of corruption
include ‘the misuse of power for private gain’ or ‘the misuse of public office for private
benefit or private interest’. Much of the literature on the consequences of corruption is
from economics and tends to focus more on the economic consequences of corruption
than considering the nature and/or definition of corruption. This dearth of first-
principles research on corruption redirected this study into a focus on the nature of
corruption, the purpose being to develop a taxonomy for corruption to act as a focus in
the search for its costs, consequences and cure and led to the development of Figure 1-3.
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Ambiguity present in extant definitions of corruption tends to create major confusion in
the literature and research as to what is and is not corruption. That confusion is reflected
in the diversity of attitudes to corruption (e.g. is it a problem for an agent to receive a
benefit/gift if the agent still serves the principal’s best interests?). Further, weak and
situation-specific definitions of corruption greatly add to the complexity that cultural
norms and values add to corruption and, as a result, confound corruption control efforts.
A more general definition of corruption is needed to transcend culture and situation and
to make corruption an unambiguous bad. As such, a clear definition is an important part
of focusing efforts to measure and mitigate the costs and consequences of corruption.
Ambiguity, confusion and stealth facilitate the corrupt by frustrating efforts to regulate,
document, and control the use of power and authority. The author has personal
experience where accounting rules and regulations were met in terms of the
documentation processes and authorization signatures, but ambiguity remained in the
actual process—as a result, projects were finalized and completed without a tender
being issued and/or payment was made on fictitious projects. Thus, ambiguity frustrates
the proof of the discharge of a duty of care and/or an accounting of the harm and
consequences arising to individuals and society from a breach of a duty of care. As
asserted by Everett, Neu, and Rahaman, (2007, p. 514):
“The open-ended nature of the term, the ambiguity surrounding just what it is exactly that
constitutes a corrupt act, should be of concern to anyone involved in attaining the status
of ‘improver’, that is, to anyone wishing to ‘fight’ corruption”.
A trans-national and trans-cultural review of corruption and attitudes on corruption
provides a path to a general understanding of corruption’s nature and consequences.
Different forms and definitions of, and attitudes to, corruption appear in different
countries, and each of these countries has its own approach to dealing with corruption—
including it being an accepted norm.
Funded organizations (e.g. World Bank, IMF) and scholars of many fields (economics,
anthropology, criminology, sociology, etc.) have long espoused an interest in resolving
corruption—as can be seen in the works of Aidt (2003), Jain (2001), Lambsdorff
(1999), Tanzi (1998), Kaufmann (1997), Mauro (1995), Alatas (1990), Klitgaard
(1988) and Rose-Ackerman (1978 and 1999). While such assertions and efforts have not
deterred corruption, they have succeeded in highlighting the problems of corruption.
A major failing in the above studies is their focus on symptoms of corruption, rather
than the developing of a practical and workable definition of corruption. The common
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definition of “a misuse of public office for private gain” focuses on gain while a
modified version includes the “intent to gain”. Both these common definitions are
fatally flawed because (in part) the gain to the corrupt is often a mere fraction of the
harm caused and (mostly) intent is almost impossible to prove, unless the corrupt are
very stupid, ignorant, or naive. Thus, these definitions add ambiguity to the issue of
corruption and make it harder to prosecute and/or control.
Focusing on the harm created by corruption is suggestive of corruption being defined
as: a breach of duty of care resulting in harm to those whom one owes that duty of care.
Having found an effective operating definition of corruption, the next step is to analyse
corruption’s cost and consequences on business, the economy and society. Corruption
has multiple complex paths of harm—Alatas (1990, p. 9) suggests that corrupt act
corruption cascades into “….numerous other kinds of corruption, leading to crime, vice,
anti-society practices and other harmful consequences”.
The use of secondary data sources (e.g. corruption, mortality, satisfaction-with-life,
natural-resources, and oil-production indices from official websites of the UN, WHO,
TI, CIA, Heritage Foundation, World Bank, etc.) greatly expanded the scope, range, and
time coverage of this study.
The literature review, in the initial stages of this research, found a plethora of studies on
the effects and morality of corruption, but a dearth of literature on its general nature and
causes. While detailed empirical research via questionnaires would be useful, it is
important to note that because corruption is a sensitive, shameful and potentially
criminal issue, it is difficult, potentially offensive, and often risky to conduct interviews
or ask people why they choose to be corrupt. This study examines reviews from a
variety of disciplines and the results of world surveys (done or funded, at enormous
cost, by various think-tanks and world bodies) to identify and collate commonalities and
trends into a new overarching perspective of corruption. The intent of this research is to
organise an array of views on corruption into an archetype-template, from which future
research can draw and coordinate effective ways to resolve corruption.
The literature review of moral, ethical, and socio-cultural aspects of corruption was
over-informative—i.e. it provided more perspective than understanding or solutions.
Weick (1989) provided insight into the information overload problems with such a
review when he noted “...theorists both choose the form of the problem statement and
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declare when their thought trials have solved the problem they pose”. The literature on
the moral, ethical, and socio-cultural notions on corruption is prodigiously fruitful.
However, as suggested in the Figure 3-1 framework (synthesized during the literature
review to organise the moral and ethic issues raised about and/or associated with
corruption) this super-abundance of often cultural- and situation- imperative outcomes
can be problematic when seeking to formulate a generally acceptable, cost-effective,
solution to corruption.
After extensively reviewing literature on the moral and ethical aspects of corruption and
developing the above framework, it became apparent that these aspects of corruption are
so intangible and situational and culturally-specific that it will likely take generations to
develop an operational definition and solution to corruption. This realisation shifted the
focus in this study from morality and ethics to how economic, behavioural, legal, and
accounting principles might be used to develop a cost-effective interim means to control
corruption—until a more permanent moral, ethical, and socio-cultural solution is found.
Figure 2-1: Outline of key elements contributing to moral and ethical decision making
As will be discussed in chapter 4, in terms of its effects and legal remedies, corruption
is a form of tort. Advanced content analysis will be used in chapter 4 to develop logic
for the grounded theory that corruption can be treated as the tort failure of a duty of
care. Content analysis is a methodology to:
 Structure, summarise, and analyse written materials,
 Provide knowledge, new insights into the representation of facts, and a guide to
practical action,
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 Sift through large volumes of data with relative ease in a systematic fashion (General
Accounting Office, 1996); however, the technique can only be applied to data that
are durable in nature, and
 Accentuate the attitude or perception of the author of the material under review.
2.3.1 Principal-Agent Relationship Approach
Principal-agent relationship is examined and derived from several disciplines such as
law, finance, accounting, and economics. In addition, this model is the basis for a large
set of corruption-related studies, as mentioned above. Perrow (1986, p.224) asserts:
“In its simplest form, agency theory assumes that social life is a series of contracts.
Conventionally, one member, the “buyer” of goods or services, is designated the
principal, and the other, who provides the goods or service is the agent... The
principal-agent relationship is governed by a contract specifying what the agent
should do and what the principal must do in return.”
As an example of how this model works, Kautilya (a head of adviser of an ancient king
in India) wrote that “…it is impossible for one dealing with government funds not to
taste, at least a little bit, of the king’s wealth” (Kaufmann, 1997, p. 114).
Figure 2-2: Moving from Traditional Village toward complex Society.
Laffont (2006, pp. 161-162) suggests that opportunities arise out of the need for
complex societies—e.g. Per Figure 2-1, the chief (the principal) in a traditional village
can directly monitor the behaviour of the members of the village (the agents), and has
the right to impose, and collect directly, the penalties to reduce behaviour that benefits
individuals but harms the village as a whole. As the village grows into a city, the chief’s
direct control is eroded by the need to delegate authority to an increasing number of
administrators (e.g. a police force and tax collectors) to set, monitor, and enforce rules.
As a result, the chief suffers information asymmetries as the administrators have
Traditional
Village
Complex
Society
Principal Agent Principal Agent Clients
Members of
VillageChief Members
of
Society
Chief
(Government) Police force and Tax
collectors and others
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increasing discretion as to whether and/or how to report issues and may choose to sell
that discretion for personal gain.
Much of the corruption literature defines corruption in term of the divergence between
the interests of the principal and those of the agent. For example, corruption occurs
when an agent betrays the principal’s interests in pursuit of his/her own (Klitgaard,
1988); Corrupt behaviour deviates from the found duties of public role (elective or
appointive) because of private-regarding (personal, close family, private clique) wealth
or status gains. Johnson, et al. (1998) added their contribution to define corruption as the
abuse of public roles or resources for private benefit (Robinson, 1998). Wherever an
agent is given discretionary authority, corruption provides a way for the objectives of a
higher authority to be undermined (Rose-Ackerman, 1978, p. 2).
As noted by Shleifer and Vishny (1993, p. 599) models of corruption mainly focus:
“...on the relationship between the principal...and the agent..., who takes the bribes
from the private individual interested in some government-produced good”.
In addition, Lane (2005, p. 59) notes that a primary concern is where an agent abuses
power via a hidden action—so the government (as principal) must find ways to stop or
at least reveal such hidden actions. Brown (2006, p. 71) suggests that “no agent will
ever behave entirely altruistically but will always be motivated towards maximising
private gain”. Thus, as Lancaster and Montinola (1997, p. 190) suggest “from ... a
principal-agent perspective, corruption occurs when agents renege on their agreements
with a principal in favour of their personal interests.”
2.3.2 Demand and Supply Side of Corruption Approach
In a demand-oriented perspective, conceptualising corruption focuses on one side of the
corrupt act and on the corrupted. However, as Stevulak and Campbell (2008, p. 34)
note, corruption “can be described in terms of both supply and demand dimensions”
where the demand side asks for (and/or received) a bribe, to deliver an illegal or legal
service to the supply side. The supply side of corruption (the corrupters) mainly offers
(and/or pays) bribes, so as to gain unwarranted advantages. As Beets (2005, p.66) notes:
“A corrupt transaction typically involves a supply side, i.e. the payer of a bribe, and
a demand side, i.e., the recipient of the bribe.”
Some studies focus on supply side of corruption, to analyse and investigate corruption
or to develop an anti-corruption strategy (e.g. Erard and Feinstein, 1994; Weber and
Getz, 2004; Beets, 2005; Stevulak and Campbell, 2008; Cleveland, et al., 2009). Other
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researchers focus on the demand side of corruption, in an effort to create appropriate
anti-corruption tools (e.g. Krueger, 1974; Besley and McLaren, 1993; Bliss and Tella,
1997; Ades and Tella, 1999; Burguet and Che, 2004). However, George, et al. (2000, p.
486) note that focusing on only one side of corruption is unlikely to yield an effective
solution. Thus, as part of developing a cost-effective multifaceted strategy to address
corruption, this thesis considers the supply and demand sides of corruption.
2.3.3 Plato’s Ring of Corruption Approach
Philosophical models have been formulated to create clarity in a conceptual framework
of corruption. Spence (2007, p. 36) applied a philosophical approach and “an analysis of
the myth of Gyges in Plato’s Republic, [to identify]...essential features that characterise
corporate and other types of corruption”.
By clarifying the Myth of Gyges – as related by Glaucon to Socrates in Book II of
Plato’s Republic, five essential features emerge that characterise corruption:
1. The possession of power: Power defined “as the possession of the ability or
capacity to act in a manner capable of bringing about a certain intended desired
outcome” (Spence, 2007, p. 37).
2. A disposition to exercise that power: the willingness to purposefully exercise
that power.
3. An opportunity to exercise that power: the opportunity to engage in some
activity.
4. Invisibility or concealment: the ability to keep the motives and identity of
actions invisible.
5. Self-regarding gain: monetary or non-monetary gain to the agent and/or a
member of his/her group, resulting from an action s/he or they perpetrated.
Spence argued an additional feature – drawn from Gyges model – that should be added
to the above five features is: “...a socially pre-established fiduciary relationship of trust
between the corrupt person or group and the person or persons or group who are harmed
in some way by the corrupt person’s or the corrupt group’s action” (Spence, 2007, p.
39). This last feature is a critical element in the definition developed in this thesis.
2.3.4 Habermas’ Communication-Theoretical Approach to Society
A social-science concept of corruption is developed using the Habermas (1981) theory
of communicative action. The linking of Habermas’ concept to the vague issue of
corruption, considered corruption “...as a type of social interaction circumventing legal
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procedures through the monetarization [sic] and bureaucratization of social relations”
(Deflem, 1995, p. 244). The theoretical concept of rationality and social action, and
Habermas’ two-level approach to society were used in the model to clarify the notion of
corruption.
Rationalizing societies is a core focus in Habermas’ theoretical approach—“...the
problem of rationality offers the best entry into the study of society because it reveals
the way in which statements on social reality can be grounded (i.e. how social order is
possible)” (Deflem, 1995, p. 245). As Habermas asserted, based on his approach, that
society’s “...actions are guided by the rational motivation to (dis)agree with speech acts
in relation to any of the validity claims” (Deflem, 1995, p. 246). In addition, the
validation of the claims should be based on truth, rightness, and truthfulness.
On the basis of communication-theoretical terms, corruption is “...strategic action in
which two or more actors undertake an exchange relation by way of successful transfer
of steering media (money or power) which sidesteps the legally prescribed procedure to
regulate the relation” (Deflem, 1995, p. 248).
Corruption is considered as falling within one of two types of social action:
1) Monetary corruption via a transfer of money in which “the exchange relation is carried
out by way of a successful transfer of the steering medium of money, in particular, a
transfer of a sum of money in return for a service or commodity, which bypasses the
legal procedure to acquire that service or commodity” (Deflem, 1995, p. 248);
2) Bureaucratic corruption, involving a transfer of power, “ in which the exchange relation
is carried out by way of a successful transfer of the steering medium of power, in
particular, a transfer of a position of power (an office) in return for power-supportive
behaviour (loyalty), which bypass the legal procedure to acquire the position” (Deflem,
1995, p. 249). In these cases, the victim of the corruption is unaware of the harm done to
him or her, and corruption is considered as a strategic interaction.
2.4 Alternative Classifications of Corruption
Each of the many definitions of corruption found within the literature affects the choice
of anti-corruption intervention strategies that government might utilize—i.e., public and
private corruption, grand and petty corruption, political and bureaucratic/administrative
corruption, and facilitation of corruption. A brief description of each follows.
2.4.1 Public and Private Corruption
The World Bank (1997, p. 8) defines corruption as “...the abuse of public office for
private gain.” This definition of corruption can be related to the combination of private
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corruption and public corruption, so public-government-corruption is the breaking of
trust by a public person—for the sake of private financial or political gain—of the rules
of conduct in public affairs prevailing in a society in the period under consideration
(Neild, 2002).
As added by Shleifer and Vishny (1993, p.599), corruption is defined as “...the sale by
government officials of government property for personal gain”, according to marginal
cost of transaction corruption classified into corruption with- and without-theft (i.e.
government receives the price of its good or services, whereas, in case of corruption
with theft, little or nothing is paid to the government). In Private-Business-Corruption, a
corrupt act occurs in the private sector, between corporate agents and stakeholders.
2.4.2 Grand and Petty Corruption
Petty corruption occurs when there is more demand and less supply (e.g. corruption is
widely distributed among government officials). Mostly, as asserted by Matsheza
(2007), it happens in less developed countries where public officials often supplement
their often inadequate salaries via bribes. Although it is called petty and the amounts
involved are often small, the accumulated amount often reaches billions of dollars.
Grand corruption occurs when demand is much greater than supply (e.g. often with a
powerful decision-making individual, in the private or public sector, with significant
influence over contracts and other services). While an instance of grand corruption can
involve a huge amount of money, the cumulative effects may be less than that of petty
corruption.
2.4.3 Political and Bureaucratic/administrative Corruption
Løvseth (2001, p. 3) defined political corruption as “...illegal actions with private gain
as the main goal, performed by public employees or holders of elected positions”. Also,
politicians using their position for private benefit may use their power to ensure that
they will remain in office for an extended period (Tanzi, 1994; Rose-Ackerman, 1978).
Goudie and Stasavage (1997, p. 11) defined administrative or bureaucratic corruption as
involving “...the use of public office for pecuniary gain”. Thus,
bureaucratic/administrative corruption is often defined as being restricted to a public
employee who has responsibilities or duties to the public interest. Deflem (1995, p. 243)
suggests that bureaucratic corruption involves the “transfer of power.”
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2.4.4 Facilitation Corruption
This type of corruption involves assistance in the obtaining of a service or good. The
form of corruption can occur when an individual pays to obtain a legitimate benefit to
which s/he is entitled, but is having difficulty obtaining it due to either bureaucratic
procedures or other entanglements. On the other hand, it can occur when an individual
wants to obtain something to which he/she is not entitled (e.g. bribing a government
official to put you in running for a contract even though you do not fulfil the required
attributes and/or conditions).
2.5 Definitions of, and Debate on the Nature of, Corruption
The significant definitions of corruption that have been developed over the past three
decades by scholars, in a variety of disciplines, have all struggled to capture the nature
of corruption and have failed to encompass all of the natural complicity, ambiguity and
potential variability of various forms of corrupt acts. Many researchers have sought to
overcome the vague nature of corruption. However, as Lyles (1981, p. 74) suggests,
“...the more ill-defined the nature of the problem, the more political will be the problem
formulation process.” Lancaster and Montinola (1997) assert that corruption essentially
denotes a deviation from, or a perversion of, some ideal state or natural condition.
However, scholars appear to have a variety of notions on that ideal.
An ideal definition of corruption needs to transcend cultural and timing components and
issues (i.e. it must be usable worldwide with slight amendments that leave the essence
of the definition unchanged). As suggested by Sandholtz and Koetzle (1998, p. 3) an
ideal “...definition of corruption [must be] ... portable across cultures.”
Roy (2005, p. 6) maintains that “...traditional definitions of corruption in literature do
not reflect the far reaching consequences of corruption in business.” Thus, the current
definitions of corruption are too narrow and so focused on particular things that they are
one-dimensional and lack clear and operational descriptions of what does and does not
constitute corruption. Leijonhufvud (1999, p.127-8) in describing potential government
to government corruption (see also, Andreski (1969), Klitgaard (1988), and Theobald
(1990)) noted that:
“Officials within the organization can take undue advantage of their position. A
bigger problem yet is constituted in the fact that the responsible authorities in a
Member State may turn a blind eye to irregularities, or submit their own mis-
representations, so that the Member State will receive too big a share of the EU
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funds. In relation to the EU the governments of the Member States have a position
similar to that of a national authority vis-à-vis its national government.”
A most important limitation of corruption definitions is that private benefit is not always
the nucleus of a corrupt action (e.g. the intent of the action may be to benefit either a
family member or a friend or a peer). In addition, the claim that corruption only occurs
in public office (either elected or appointed) is not sufficient in that corrupt acts can
occur in private-sector transactions. Leijonhufvud (1999, p. 131) added that “A closer
look at the phenomena that are regarded as corruption in the public sector does not
make the picture clear-cut and unambiguous.” Goudie and Stasavage (1997, p. 11)
noted that:
“Corruption is most commonly referred to as a public sector phenomenon, but it is
also an important fact of life in the private sectors of both developed and developing
countries.”
In addition, variance in the culture norms from one country to another mean that what is
considered corrupt in one country may not be seen as corrupt in another. As suggested
by Lancaster and Montinola (1997, p. 188) “...not all illegal acts are corrupt, and
conversely, not all seemingly corrupt acts are illegal”. In other words, a public official
could receive a gift or a favour for one of their family members and this act might be
seen as corrupt in one culture, but be acceptable in another—different societies tend to
have different norms.
Some definitions of corruption simplistically assume that corruption is always due to
behavioural issues. However, because corruption is almost always a hidden action, it is
difficult to prove intent. Roy (2005, p. 6) asserts that “...corruption needs to be
redefined in terms of the resulting implications of a corrupt act on part of a decision-
making manager.” However, corrupt behaviour is almost never provable by behaviour
(especially if intent must be proved), but is more easily proven in terms of action, out-
comes, and/or consequences. Any definition of corruption must be operationally viable.
The common restriction of corruption to public office is far too limiting and a less
restrictive definition is needed (e.g. corruption in a private firm involves the resources
of a business and/or the rights of stakeholders). Lancaster and Montinola (1997, p. 188)
note that one of “...definitional problems is rooted in the fact that the term [corruption]
is meaningless without its positive referent.” However, even a massively inclusive
listing of corrupt acts is still insufficient in that it is unwieldy, difficult to apply, and
given the infinite variability in corruption, non-exhaustive. Thus, there is a need for a
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root definition of corruption that encompasses the infinite variability in corrupt acts.
Such an idyllic definition is likely to spawn anti-corruption controls that are sufficiently
broad as to prevail over all the potential variability and dimensions within which a
corrupt act can occur.
The overwhelming issue of extant definitions of corruption centres on ambiguity and
vagueness. Where a definition avoids this central issue, it usually falls afoul of being
too specific to be of value in unexpected and/or unspecified situations. Efforts to
overcome the twin issues of too specific and too ambiguous usually involved creating a
clear listing and definition of the various factors involved in a corrupt act. For example,
corruption defined as an ‘abuse of public power for private benefit is vague about what
is really meant by public power and private benefit is far too narrow as the potential
beneficiaries of corruption. Kreikebaum (2008, p. 82) claims that “the term corruption
covers a wide range of elements...” and Leijonhufvud (1999, p. 131) adds that “...
phenomena that are regarded as corruption in the public sector do not make the picture
clear-cut and unambiguous.”
Other published definitions have included moral and ethical issues within the context of
definitions listed by Kreikebaum (2008, p. 85) in his assertion that corruption “...is
deeply rooted in personal greed [and in the] prevailing methodological individualism.”
Morality and ethics are vague in their effectiveness and their meanings; therefore, using
them in definitions of corruption increases the fuzziness of those definitions and limits
the use of those definitions to specific nations, cultures, or situations.
Corruption occurs on a daily basis all around the world in developed and developing
countries. A CEO or farmer might be involved in a corrupt act (as perpetrator or
victim), regardless of their culture. Thus, it is important to establish a generalisable and
broad definition that transcends differing social and cultural norms. Current definitions
lack this trait in that they may pinpoint particular areas but do not cover others (i.e.
public office is the core focus of most of many extant definition that ignore the private
sector). Other definitions assert that government resources are the only asset being mis-
used. You and Sanjeev (2005, p. 137) note there is no “...reason to exclude corporate
embezzlement.” Fraud in the not-for-profit sector and NGOs must be a part of the
definition which must also transcend national borders to capture a fuller range of
corruption. While some researchers provide some elements within the context of their
definition, they have not stated how such factors are linked to one another in an
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integrated whole. There is a critical need for a clear relationship between all elements
included within a definition of corruption, so that it will be easier to understand and
correlate them to one another. Ideally, there should be an integrated relationship
between each element in a definition so that all elements must occur for an act to be
deemed corrupt.
Corruption is the outcome of a corrupt act. Previously, the corrupt act was described as
simply a behavioural aspect involving the misuse or abuse of power. However, power,
misuse, and abuse are ill-defined and many potentially corrupt actions are not high-
lighted as being corrupt. It is important for an ideal definition of corruption to identify
and highlight corrupt acts as corrupt. This can best be done by examining a large variety
of corrupt acts and searching for a common root. If corruption is seen as a breach of
law, then a basic principle of most criminal laws is that, to be found guilty, an offender
must have intended the act that breached the law—if intent could not be formed (e.g.
under age or drunk) or if an offender’s intent cannot be proven beyond a reasonable
doubt (i.e. 90 to 95 percent confidence) then they must be found not guilty. Thus, fuzzy,
ambiguous, culturally-focused, or situationally-fixed extant definitions of corruption
make criminal prosecution of corruption very difficult and costly.
An ideal definition of corruption will benefit society by allowing victims of corruption
to more easily identify that they were harmed, who harmed them, how they were
harmed, and the quantum. That definition will also allow those who are in a position of
power to identify and avoid actions that might be deemed as corrupt and to document
how they discharge their duties. Thus, the most important contribution of an effective
definition of corruption is (by making both parties aware of their responsibilities and
obligations) it reduces the opportunities for, and the risks of, corruption.
The key desirable attributes of an ideal definition of corruption are derived from the
forgoing discussion and outlined below:
1) Unambiguous (clearly differentiates corrupt and non-corrupt situations),
2) Transcends Cultural Differences (i.e. not reliant on inferred cultural values),
3) Generally Applicable Across most Situations,
4) Clear Linkage between Actions and Outcomes,
5) Considers Actions and Outcomes rather than Intent,
6) Quantum (i.e. the harm must be measurable), and
7) Retribution and Restitution Solutions must be available for Victims.
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Thirty extant definitions of corruption plus the definition developed in this thesis are
judged in Table 2-1 against the above desirable attributes (in terms of each desired
outcome, a “X”, “”, or “n” denote, respectively, a failure, a success, and neutral).
Table 2-1: Evaluation of 30 Extant Definitions of Corruption against Seven Desirable
Attributes of an Ideal Definition of Corruption
Extant Definition of Corruption Desirable Attribute FatallyFlawed Flawed Viable1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1) “A public official is corrupt if he accepts money or
money's worth for doing something that he is under
duty to do anyway, that he is under duty not to do, or
to exercise a legitimate discretion for improper
reasons.” McMullan (1961, pp. 183-184)
X X X X X X X X
2) “A corrupt civil servant usually regards his public
office as a business through which he will seek to
maximize payments for favors given related to his
position. The office then becomes a maximizing unit.
The size of his income depends upon the market
situation and his talent for finding the point of
maximal gain on the public's demand curve” Van
Klaveren (1963).
X X X X X X X X
3) “Corruption is an extra-legal institution used by
individuals or group to gain influence over the
actions of the bureaucracy. As such, the existence of
corruption per se indicates only that these groups
participate in the decision-making process to a
greater extent than would otherwise be the case.” Leff
(1964, p. 8)
X X X X X X X X
4) “behaviour which deviated from the normal duties of
a public role because of private-regarding (family,
close private clique), pecuniary or status gains, and
violated rules against the exercise of certain types of
private-regarding influence.” Nye (1967)
X n X X X X X X
5) “A corrupt act violates responsibility toward at least
one system of public or civic order and...A system of
public or civic order exalts common interest over
special interest.” Rogow and Laswell (1970, p. 54)
X n X X X X n X
6) “Corruption, we would all agree, involves a deviation
from certain standards of behaviour.” Scott (1972, p.
3)
X X X X X X X X
7) “the abuse of public power and influence for private
ends.” Waterbury (1973, p. 533) X X X X X X X X
8) “An agent is a person who has accepted an obligation
to act on behalf of his principal in some range of
matters and, in doing so, to serve the principal's
interests as if it were his own. An agent is personally
corrupt if he knowingly sacrifices his principal's
interest to his own. He is officially corrupt if, in
serving his principal's interest, he acts illegally or
unethically albeit in his principal's interest.” Banfield
(1975, pp. 587-588).
X n n X  X X X
9) “Corruption is defined as the moral incapacity of
citizens to make reasonably disinterested
commitments to actions, symbols and institutions
which benefit the substantive common welfare.”
X n n X X X X X
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Extant Definition of Corruption Desirable Attribute FatallyFlawed Flawed Viable1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Dobel (1978, p. 958)
10) "… (1) the sacrifice of the principal’s interest for the
agent’s, or (2) the violation of norms defining the
agent’s behavior." Alam (1989)
X n n X  X X X
11) “an immoral and unethical phenomenon that contains
a set of moral aberrations from moral standards of
society, causing loss of respect for and confidence in
duly constituted authority.” Gould (1991, p. 468)
X X X X X X X X
12) “transactive corruption, were there is a mutual
arrangement to the advantage of the agent and the
party directly served.” Alatas (1991)
X X X X X X X X
13) “the sale by government officials of government
property for personal gain.” Shleifer and Vishny
(1993, p.599)
X X X X X X X X
14) “corruption is a colonization of social relations in
which two or more actors undertake an exchange
relation by way of a successful transfer of the
steering media of money or power, thereby
sidestepping the legally prescribed procedure to
regulate the relation.” Deflem (1995, p. 243)
X n n X X X X X
15) “...is the abuse of public power for private benefit”.
World Bank (1997) X X X X X X X X
16) “...deviation (for private gain) from bidding rules, the
arbitrary exercise of discretionary powers and
illegitimate use of public resources.” Shihata (1997,
p. 257)
X X X X X X X X
17) “the use of public office for private gains.” Bardhan,
P. (1997) X X X X X X X X
18) “the improper use of public office for private gain.”
Sandholtz and Koetzle (1998, p. 4) X X X X X X X X
19) "Corruption involves an exchange between
individuals or groups in violation of an obligation
or duty.” Carvajal (1999, p. 139)
X n n X  X X X
20) "the abuse of power, most often for personal gain or
for the benefit of a group to which one owes
allegiance" Stapenhurst and Kpundeh (1999)
X X X X X X X X
21) “…use of official position, rank or status by an office
bearer for his own personal benefit.” Myint (2000) X n n X X X X X
22) “...illegal actions with private gain as the main goal,
performed by public employees or holders of elected
positions.” Løvseth, T. (2001, p. 3)
X X X X X X X X
23) “corruption refers to act I which the power of public
office is used for personal gain in a manner that
contravenes the rules of the game.” Jain (2001, p. 73)
X X X X X X X X
24) “Corruption is behavior of public officials which
deviates from accepted norms in order to serve
private ends” Huntington (2002, p. 253)
X X X X X X X X
25) “The misuse of entrusted power for private gain.”
Transparency International (2004) X n n X X X X X
26) "the abuse of public roles or resources for private
benefit" Zarb (2005, p. 6) X X X X X X X X
27) “as the misuse of public office for private financial
gain by an elected official.” Kunicova and Rose-
X X X X X X X X
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Extant Definition of Corruption Desirable Attribute FatallyFlawed Flawed Viable1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Ackerman (2005, p. 577)
28) “Corruption occurs amongst the networks of
professional managers and their associates, who use
their positions of power and authority for their own
collective and individual political and economic
interest.” Ayius (2007, p. 1)
X n n X X X X X
29) “Corruption is operationally defined as the abuse of
entrusted power for private gain.” Transparency
International. (2010)
X   X X X X X
30) "Corruption is generally defined as abusing
governmental positions for serving personal
interests." Ahmadi and Homauni (2011, p. 119)
X n X X X X X X
31) Corruption is harm arising from a breached duty of
care (this Thesis, 2010)        
In Table 2-1, 20 of the 30 extant definitions reviewed are fatally flawed and 10 flawed
in terms of seven desirable attributes of an ideal definition of corruption. As a result,
these definitions are unable to provide a solid working basis for anti-corruption tools—
of the 30 extant definitions of corruption reviewed, Transparency International’s (2010)
definition is the closest to being viable. However, its use of private gain in the
definition is a serious flaw that makes the identification and prosecution of many types
of fraud difficult or even impossible. The definition of corruption developed in this
thesis (that corruption is harm arising from a breached duty of care) provides all seven
of the desired attributes.4
The lack of clarity in extant definitions of corruption allows the corrupt to operate in the
dark and grey places that are poorly illuminated by those definitions and victims of
corruption have had difficulty in seeking retribution for those who harmed them and
restitution for that harm. In some cases, ambiguous definitions of corruption may lead to
those creating the harm failing to realise that their actions are wrong. Such ignorance is
all the more likely, given that, as Upton Sinclair (1935) noted:
“It is difficult to get a man to understand something when his salary [/living]
depends upon his not understanding it.”
Thus, the very virtues of defining corruption as a tort may make acceptance of that
approach more difficult, as it may prove inconvenient to those who profit from the
current definition of corruption being ambiguous. Further, what constitutes successful
problem formulation? Although a number of investigators have examined factors that
4 The capacity of a definition to achieve a desirable attribute was determined by logical inspection of
the definition.
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impact on problem formulation (e.g., Boland, 1978; Niederman and DeSanctis, 1995;
Volkema and Gorman, 1998), clear criteria by which to establish successful problem
formulation have not yet emerged (Mason and Mitroff, 1981).
2.6 Socio-economic Costs and Consequences of Corruption
Corruption has long been condemned as being wrong on a moral basis. This subsection
considers the socio-economic consequences of corruption. Key economic factors (e.g.
growth, investments and government expenditure) are considered and then the impact of
corruption on social factors is reviewed. Original empirical research in this area is far
outside of the scope of this thesis and would be prohibitively costly and possibly very
dangerous—it would also waste resources (it would be a very inadequate duplication of
existing studies were and are being performed by teams of well resourced researchers).5
Instead, this thesis reviews, draws from, and coordinates this wealth of literature into an
over-view of the socio-economic costs and consequences of corruption.
2.6.1 Economic Costs and Consequences of Corruption
Corruption acts as a cancer (Batalla, 2000; Dwight, 2000; Harrison, 2004; Onwuka, et
al., 2009) and damages the wealth creation potential of a country. In addition, it reduces
the confidence and the trust of stakeholders of the public and private sector in both
developed and developing countries. A comprehensive research assessment produced
by Mauro (1995) suggests there is a significant negative relation between corruption
and rates of growth. See also: Mauro (1997 and 2004), Campos, et al., (1999). Mauro
(1997, p. 87) concluded that:
“...improvement in the corruption index causes investment to rise by 5 percent of
GDP and the annual rate of growth of GDP per capita to rise by half a percentage
point.”
Corruption appears to negatively affect levels of investment (Mauro, 1995)—when high
levels of corruption are evident, investment is low. Although, corruption may raise the
level of public investment, it has a negative impact on government efficiency and
competence (Tanzi and Davoodi, 2002). As stated by Del Monte and Papagni (2001,
p.2) “...corruption also has strong negative effects on economic growth by lowering the
amount and quality of public infrastructure and services supplied to the private sector.”
5 For comprehensive surveys of the literature on corruption, see Rose-Ackerman (2006), Lambsdorff
(1999) and Jain (2001).
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Devarajan, et al. (1996) found high public investment is associated with low growth,
with the growth rate also being negatively correlated with the level of corruption and
the level of corruption being positively correlated with the level of public expenditure.
There is also a significant correlation between corruption and the consistency of foreign
direct investments (Wei, 1997; Alesina and Weder, 2002; Habib and Zurawicki, 2002).
Goel and Nelson (1998) using the number of public officials convicted for abuse of
their authority as an indicator of corruption in some states of USA, argued that public
spending can encourage corruption from rent-seeking activities. However, the use of
convictions as a corruption-index indicator is, per Lambsdorff (1999), an inadequate
indicator for the actual levels of corruption—as it also is a reflection of the efficiency of
the legal and judiciary system.
Many studies have evaluated the correlation between a nation’s economic development
and the quality of its institutions (e.g. Ades and Tella, 1997; Johnson, et al., 1998). A
significant number of these studies have found that corruption indices are negatively
related with many socioeconomic factors in general and with the quality of the legal
system, in particular. Thus, while corruption greases the wheel, it does little for the
country as a whole. This notion was also asserted by Babalola (1994), Mauro (1995),
Harriss-White and White (1996), Buscaglia (2001), Herzfeld and Weiss (2003),
Abdiweli and Hodan, (2003). A few studies found a positive correlation between
corruption and the unofficial economy—i.e. corruption greases the wheel (Leff, 1964;
Treisman, 2000; Coppier and Michetti, 2006). Leff (1964) views corruption as grease
money to lubricate the squeaky wheels of a rigid administration (Coppier and Michetti,
2006). Others have also asserted that corruption may aid growth by relaxing the rigidity
of bureaucracy (Huntington, 1968). This claim is widely criticized by Tanzi (1998),
who suggests that “...when rules can be used to extract bribes, more rules will be
created.” Thus, the actual causal relationship between corruption and institutional
quality remains vague and continues to be debated.
Low wages are likely to encourage individuals whose main role is to collect tax and/or
perform other administrative duties to either supplement their incomes with bribes or to
dally in the performance of their duties (Gould and Amaro-Reyes, 1983; Goode, 1984;
Besley and McLaren, 1993). Chetwynd, et al. (2003, p. 7) suggest that “...firms and
activities are driven into the informal or gray sector by excessive rent taking and taxes
are reduced in exchange for payoffs to tax officials”
38
Most of the studies on the effects of corruption use various types of indices and the
ready availability of such indices encouraged debate on the relationship of corruption
with key socioeconomic indicators. However, some of the indicators are misleading, or
confusing, or fail to mean what they purport to mean. Also, some of the indices have an
indirect rather than a causal relationship with corruption (i.e. both run in a cycle that
may be driven by a third factor). Thus, there is still a need for clear evidence on the
socio-economic effects of corruption. However, as the World Bank (2007, p. 259) notes
“...measuring the quality of ...corruption... is difficult and often subject to margins of
error, whether based on objective or subjective information.”
2.6.2 Social Costs and Consequences of Corruption
Over the years it has been difficult to accurately gauge the effects of corruption on
society. However, because of the role corruption plays in many societies, there is a need
to reveal the extent and cost of corruption on society. As Deflem notes (1995, p. 243):
“...corruption is a long-standing topic of sociological reflection, and numerous studies
have demonstrated the extent to which corruption continues to be an important issue in
contemporary society.”
Awareness of the socio-economic consequences of corruption is increasing and with
that rising awareness has been an increase in the number of corrupt acts prosecuted and/
or publicly documented. As a result, the struggle against corruption is becoming ever
more important to most societies as they seek to improve the quality of life of their
members. An example of a direct social cost of corruption can be found in the mis-
allocation of natural resources. As Charlick (1993) notes:
While corruption is manifest in every society, and in democratic as well as
authoritarian regimes, systematic corruption is a deadly sign that a society can no
longer effectively manage its resources for public purposes.
Bhargava (2005, p. 3) suggests that “...this diversion of resources typically comes at the
expense of the less corruptible social sectors, such as health and education, and thus at
the expense of the country’s development.” Further, in societies where corruption is
rife, it is also likely that violent crime is also rife. Maetens and Anstey (2007, p. v) note
that “...murder and robbery rates are higher in countries with low economic growth...”
Huntington (2002, p. 257) maintains that “...the society which has a high capacity for
corruption also has a high capacity for violence.” Furthermore, Bhargava (2005, p. 3)
suggest that countries “...with high levels of corruption can become targets for crime
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networks, as has happened, for example, in Russia and Ukraine.” Thus, corruption
contributes to two indicators of social misery—violent crime and unemployment.
Corruption must be clearly and easily identified if it is to be fought. As Margaret (1997,
p. 158) notes “...the greater the ability to corrupt, the greater the ability to remain
invisible, or to be seen to be legitimate – unless the entire system is blatantly corrupt
and has redefined payoffs and the like as publicly recognized business procedures.”
Margaret (1997, p. 158) further suggests that, at its “...most sophisticated integrated
level, the ability to corrupt enables one to control the definitions of what is or is not
defined as corruption.” Stier and Richards (1987, p. 65) observe that:
“In its most advanced form organized crime is so thoroughly integrated into the
economic, political, and social institutions of legitimate society that it may no
longer be recognizable as a criminal enterprise. Such integration represents the
most serious potential for social harm that can be caused by racketeers. However,
the criminal justice system is least effective in dealing with organized crime when
it reaches this level of maturity.”
Fisman and Gatti (2006, p. 137) claim that “predictable bribes that permit the avoidance
of regulations may be socially damaging.” Thus, corruption begets violence and both do
more than break the rules of society—they degrade the trust, institutions and confidence
that bind a society together (e.g., corruption driven degradation of trust, institutions and
confidence increases the cost of transactions and those rising costs will increasingly
diminish the number of successful deals). Arrow (1972, p. 357) posits that:
"...virtually every commercial transaction has within itself an element of trust,
certainly any transaction conducted over a period of time. It can be plausibly
argued that much of the economic backwardness in the world can be explained by
the lack of mutual confidence."
Thus, rising trust and confidence lead to more economic activities and eventually more
social stability and loops back to more trust and confidence to form a virtuous cycle of
rising growth and social well-being. Whereas, in low or no trust environments, deals
cost more, citizens feel little or no obligation toward the future of their society and this
can loop back into falling trust and confidence to form a vicious cycle of falling living
standards and social well-being. Bhargava (2005, p. 3) suggests this pattern by asserting
that “...widespread corruption ... undermines the shared values of the society and the
mutual trust that makes social and economic relationships possible.” Further, declining
trust and confidence increases the alienation of citizens with their government and with
each other.
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Corruption can be perceived differently, depending on the cultural background of the
viewer. Some forms of corruption may be accepted as a cultural norm in one culture
while being considered an illegal act in another. As Lo (1999, p. 63) notes in his study
on the political-criminal nexus (PCN), “corruption became entrenched as an acceptable
social norm in the community, paving the way for the development of the PCN.”
Tänzler (2007) asserts that “Corruption is primarily a problem of definition that differs
from time to time, from place to place, and even between social (sub) groups of a single
society.” Johnson (1985) suggests that while bribery is regarded with great aversion in
US, in other countries it is considered to be a culture norm (see, also, Hofstede, 1997;
Tsalikis and Nwachukwu, 1991).
It has been debated via few studies that corruption leads to poverty such as Gupta, et al.
(2000). However, corruption produces poverty as a result of corruption’s impact on
economic and governance indicators. Chetwynd, et al. (2003, p. 5) assert “...countries
experiencing chronic poverty are seen as natural breeding grounds for systemic
corruption due to social and income inequalities and perverse economic incentives.”
You and Sanjeev (2005, p. 136) argue there is a relationship between corruption and
inequality:
“Inequality fosters a norm of corruption as acceptable behavior, that corruption is likely
to reinforce or widen existing inequalities, and that vicious circles of inequality-
corruption-inequality are thus likely to manifest.”
You and Sanjeev (2005) were also concerned that extant definitions of corruption do not
capture the important and necessary elements needed to precisely describe its nature.
In summary, as claimed by Deflem (1995, p. 243), corruption research “...has generally
failed to develop a clear theoretical perspective of what corruption is and how its social
implications can be illuminated.” A viable definition of corruption is critical, because
(as noted by Margaret, 1997, p. 169) “...the societally approved of, or at least socially
ignored, forms of corruption will be missed in the debate.”
2.6.3 Various Indices
Over the last decade, empirical research on corruption has dramatically increased; as
have efforts to determine the causes and socio-economic consequences of corruption. In
main, these studies performed cross-country analysis on the relationship between the
level of corruption in a country and other factors (e.g. macroeconomic, political or
social outcomes). The next section in this thesis will highlight the corruption perception
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indices and use them as a key driving-variable in modelling the effects of corruption.
This section will briefly describe other variables used in previous studies to investigate
the causes of corruption and its socio-economic consequences.
Although, many current studies on corruption use the corruption perception index (CPI)
as the independent driving variable, a few use other indices—e.g. Brunetti and Weder
(1998) use the Political Risk Service (PRS) data cross-section regression study of 122
countries. Other examples of indices and data sources include the World Economic
Forum (WEF), the Harvard Institute for International Development (HIID), and
Kaufmann and Wei (2000) use of the 1997 Global Competitiveness Report (GCR97),
1996 Global Competitiveness Report (GCR96), and 1997 World Development Report
(WDR97). Kaufmann and Wei (2000) used these sources to examine the relationship
between bribe payment, management time wasted by bureaucrats and the cost of capital.
They concluded from the analysis that firms that face more bribe demands are also
likely to spend more (not less) time with bureaucrats to negotiate regulations and face
higher (not lower) costs of capital.6 However, Lambsdorff (1999, p. 1-2) cautioned that
because “...many other explanatory variables are absent ... such correlations risk being
misleading, in that they present spurious relationships.” Johnston (2001) noted that
these perception-based indicators are very blunt when he asserted that:
“Perhaps the most serious drawback of the CPI [Corruption Perception Index] and similar
indices is what might be called the “single-number problem.” It is a precision issue, but
one with validity and reliability implications as well. Actual corruption varies in many
ways: there are many forms and contrasts within most societies. No single national score
can accurately reflect contrasts in the types of corruption found in a country.” (Johnston,
2001, p. 163)
2.7 Measuring Corruption
As a complex phenomenon, corruption is difficult to measure accurately and, even more
so, because of difficulties in obtaining precise information on the corruption level in a
country. However, as noted by Wei (1998, p. 4), “...one can still get useful information
on the seriousness of corruption in a country by surveying experts or firms in that
country”. Further, as Weber (2007) notes:
“Given the influence of indices based on perceptions on the public opinion of each
particular country and even on informing policies from governments and donor
6 For a comprehensive literature about alternative indices used in various studies in the analysis of
causes and consequences of corruption, see Lambsdorff (1999).
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agencies ... [however]... testing the matter using only the data leading to those
indices is impossible, because they are limited to opinions.”
Lambsdorff (2006, p. 81) notes that few areas are “...as complex and controversial as
corruption.” Most surveys on corruption are perception surveys, across many countries.
While such perception-based indices have made vital contributions to understanding the
pervasiveness of corruption, they are, however, not problem free. “One issue refers to
the fact that these indices do not relate directly to factors that are responsible for causing
corruption” (Dreher, Kotsogiannis, and Mc Corriston, 2007).
Two survey-based measures of corruption indices commonly used, in the literature on
corruption, are the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) and the Freedom from Corruption
(FFC) index. This study uses both indices because of their coverage and their extensive
use in previous research. A brief description of them follows in the next subsection.
2.7.1 Transparency International: Corruption Perception Index
Business International (BI) was one of the first organizations to provide a cross-country
index of corruption. Mauro (1995), using that early index to investigate the impact of
corruption on investment over a cross-section of countries indices, concluded that
corruption negatively impacts the ratio of investment to GDP. After its inception in
1995, Transparency International (TI) established the cross-country Corruption
Perception Index (CPI) and it is among the most widely accepted indices. TI has also
been involved in facilitating research into the causes and consequences of corruption
and into finding cures for it. The goal of TI is to raise awareness about corrupt activities
within a country or from one country to another. The CPI index is based on a weighted
average survey (it consists of credible sources using diverse sampling frames and
different methodologies) of varying sources; such as the Asian Development Bank
(ADB), World Bank (IDA and IBRD) African Development Bank (CPIA), Political and
Economic Risk Consultancy (PERC), United Nations Economic Commission for Africa
(UNECA), and World Economic Forum (WEF). The CPI ranks countries on a scale
from zero to ten; where 10 is (low corruption) and 0 is (high corruption).
However, corruption as the misuse of public power for private benefit is generally used
in all the sources. Further, each of the sources also assesses the extent of corruption
among public officials and politicians in the countries. Because the CPI consists of
varying forms of survey year to year, the latest correlation process may introduce new
measuring errors. Thus, it is better to use the index in cross-sectional studies and may
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not be advisable to use time-series studies to measure changes in corruption over time
for a particular country. Also, the number of surveys used to assess a country’s
performance can be variable. For example, per Table 2-2, from 3 to 11 surveys were
used—three surveys was the lower limit for a country to be included in the CPI
assessment, for years 2007, 2008, and 2009.
Table 2-2: Number of Surveys used to determine the CPI for 2007, 2008 & 2009.
No. Country/Territory SurveysUsed 2007
Surveys
Used 2008
Surveys
Used 2009
1 Angola 7 6 5
2 Australia 8 8 8
3 Bangladesh 7 7 7
4 Belarus 5 5 4
5 Belgium 6 6 6
6 Benin 7 6 6
7 Chad 7 6 6
8 China 9 9 9
9 Canada 6 6 6
10 Denmark 6 6 6
11 Dominica 3 3 3
12 Gabon 5 4 3
13 India 10 10 10
14 Indonesia 11 10 9
15 Sweden 6 6 6
16 United Kingdom 6 6 6
17 United States 8 8 8
18 Uruguay 5 5 5
19 Yemen 5 5 4
20 Zimbabwe 8 7 7
Data Source: Transparency International (TI) – Corruption Perception Index (CPI) 2007 2008
and 2009. http://www.transparency.org/
2.7.2 Heritage Foundation – Index of economic freedom: Freedom
from Corruption (FFC)
The index of economic freedom is the average of 10 individual freedom indicies (i.e.
business freedom, trade freedom, fiscal freedom, government size, monetary freedom,
investment freedom, financial freedom, property rights, freedom from corruption, and
labour freedom).
The Freedom from Corruption (FFC) index combines quantitative data to assess the
perception of corruption in the business environment (includes: governmental, legal,
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judicial, and administrative corruption).7 The Freedom from Corruption index is used in
this study.
2.8 Chapter Conclusion
As Svensson (2005) emphasised “...no [current] definition of corruption is completely
clear-cut”. As this chapter and other chapters in this thesis show/indicate, there are
serious limitations in the reviewed extant definitions of corruption (e.g. the reviewed
definitions were ambiguous, situationally specific, limited to the abuse of public office,
focused on the gain that perpetrators received or intended to receive). As it became
increasingly clear that such flaws compromised the capacity of extant definitions of
corruption to foster the formulation of cost-effective anticorruption solutions, this thesis
became a search for a definition of corruption that had the capacity to form the basis for
anti-corruption tools.
7 This factor relies on Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) in scoring
freedom from corruption, FFC is a convert of each these raw CPI data to a 0 to 100 scale by
multiplying the CPI score by 10. For countries that are not covered in the CPI, the freedom from
corruption score is determined by using the qualitative information from internationally recognized
and reliable sources such as, U.S. Department of Commerce, Country Commercial Guide, 2004–2007;
Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Commerce, Country Profile, and Country Report, 2004–2007;
Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, 2007 National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade
Barriers; and official government publications of each country. Source: Heritage Foundation. Web:
http://www.heritage.org/index/.
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Chapter 3
PHILOSOPHY AND METHODOLOGIES
3.1 Introduction
The purpose of this thesis is to assist accounting in its anticorruption role. The research
began with a review of accounting literature to find a research gap that can explain the
observed current and historic lack of success in the struggle against corruption. During
that review, over 20,000 recent titles were examined and 4,691 recent journal articles
were considered (see Figure 1-1). The review of those items and of earlier accounting
articles indicates that accounting draws its corruption definitions from other disciplines.
A greatly expanded review of literature from multiple disciplines (including references
to sources centuries and millennia old), revealed a profoundly disturbing pattern that
suggests why anti-corruption efforts have been generally ineffective. Specifically, the
corruption definitions in the reviewed literature appear to all be focused on and/or be
derived from attributes of perpetrators of corruption—including, in a majority of cases,
a focus on the creation of and/or intent to create a wrongful gain. It was found during
the literature review on corruption that the 30 definitions listed in Table 2-1 effectively
represent the vast majority of corruption definitions in the thousands of titles reviewed.
While a detailed statistical content analysis of the definitions used in those titles would
yield a useful quantification of the phenomena, it is outside the intended scope of this
thesis, peripheral to accounting research, and is left for future research. However, this
phenomenon, as illustrated by Figure 1-3, suggests that the current corruption paradigm
is so widely applied, developed, and accepted that there are few over-looked niches/
gaps within the paradigm. Thus, filling a gap in the accounting literature gap is unlikely
to provide cost-effective-anti-corruption ideas nor are such ideas likely to be found by
filling a gap in the literature of other disciplines. As such, the search for cost-effective
solutions to corruption is likely to be more fruitful within a new paradigm and finding
and exploring new paradigms for corruption became the overarching theme of this
thesis. While this search is difficult and risky, Brown’s (1983, p. 68) caution that
insanity “...is doing the same thing over and over again but expecting different
results...” suggests that the need for such a search is both clear and pressing.8
8 Variants of this statement have been attributed to Albert Einstein or Benjamin Franklin, but (unlike the
Brown citation) there is no firm evidence for those attributions.
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The search for a new corruption paradigm involved extensive use of grounded theory to:
explore existing notions and research on corruption and to combine that knowledge into
a meaningful story, from which speculative thought can be used to draw out and infer
coherent archetypes for viability testing as a new paradigm on corruption. Once a
candidate paradigm was selected, quantitative analysis of current and historic data sets
was used to ascertain if corruption is still a socio-economic problem under the new
paradigm. Thus, the methodology of this thesis is best seen as a mixed-methods
approach with grounded theory serving as a foundation that enables forays into specific
enquires via content analysis to identify areas of interest and followed-up with
quantitative methods to explore the areas and notions identified via speculative thought
as being of interest. Grounded theory is then used to draw the various pieces into a
coherent paradigm that is tested for validity and utility using a case approach.
3.2 Overview of the Literature Reviews
The literature review in this study was done in following three stages:
 The first literature review examined the perceived role of accounting in combating
corruption. This review was most disturbing in that it suggested an excessive optimism
about the capacity of accounting to resolve corruption (e.g. the informative role of
financial accountants was all too often confused with the review and guardian role of
auditors). Another concern arising from this review was that (consistent with the next
literature review) all the reviewed literature used definitions that were related to (i.e.
derived from) a definition developed by the World Bank (1997, p. 8) and International
Monetary Fund (2005) with corruption being "the misuse (or abuse) of public office for
private ends (or gain)". As discussed in Chapter 2, several serious flaws in the World
Bank and IMF corruption definitions makes their operationalisation, as a means to control
corruption, impractical and makes prosecution of corruption nearly impossible.
 The second literature review considered the available literature on corruption published in
soft disciplines such as social science, socio-economics, psychology, etc. The content of
this literature was found to be over-informative in that it tended to contain poorly-
supported and often debatable statements that did not flow into practical conclusions. A
review of that research was, however, useful in that it provided general insights into the
nature, scope, and consequences of corruption.
 The third literature review looked for solutions to corruption but found that the use of the
vague and ambiguous World Bank and IMF definition of corruption had flowed through
into many proposed solutions. As a result, those solutions are neither clear nor effective.
Several studies took the supply side of corruption – i.e. a corporate or individual
(corruptor) who bribes to obtain an unlawful service or receive goods without having a
clear right to them. Researchers have focused mainly on the supply side to tackle
corruption and this focus has resulted in an increase in the cost of fighting corruption
without obvious gain. On the other hand, the demand side of corruption (i.e. those who
ask for or receive bribes to provide an unlawful service or goods) is considered to be a
difficult approach to fight corruption. Consequently, there is an imbalance in the
strategies to control the supply and demand side of corruption (Everett, et al., 2007).
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3.3 Overview of Methodology and Research Design
This thesis is designed to be like the chambers of a nautilus shell—while each section is
mostly self-contained, each section draws key elements from the previous section(s) and
then leads into and is a key part of the integrity of the next section(s). All sections are
integrated into a pattern that forms the whole of the thesis. This study subsumes four
papers into four chapters, with significant intentional overlap, that are integrated via
chapters that provide an introduction, an overview of the thesis philosophy and
methodology, case studies and conclusion. Redundancy occurs frequently to: emphasise
and reiterate difficult concepts, enhance understanding and readability, and to reduce
the frequency of having to refer to earlier parts of the thesis. While some readers
(especially those reading it from beginning to end) may find the repetition/redundancies
excessive others (especially those who are periodically referring to isolated sections)
will find them useful—the author apologises to the former and is happy to be of service
to the latter. As the author’s supervisors are among the latter, it was expedient to have
more, rather than less, repetition.
The research design is an inductive illustration of some examples with embedded study
where multiple sources are used to expand the breadth and depth of data collection and
combine the richness of often diverse data into an apex or archetype of under-standing
via triangulation (see, Scholz and Tietje, 2002; Yin, 2003). A strength of this approach
is its capacity to combine a wide variety of qualitative and quantitative information
sources. An embedded methodology allows the development of richer and more
accurate models by a step-wise uncovering of aspects of a phenomenon being studied.
Corruption is a vague and complex phenomenon that is unlikely to be defined by, or
within, a preconceived theoretical framework. The main data source for this study is
developed using an archival approach were data is drawn from the database sources, of
various disciplines, such as ABI Inform and Science Direct (a comprehensive repository
of articles for items from economics, business ethics, accounting, law, crime and
criminology, social sciences and other disciplines. The archival sources were also
complemented by well-known and widely-used finance and economic magazines to
provide insight into current public concerns and trends. While academic sources are
more respected in academic works, they are often out of date by two or more years by
the time they are published.
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The process of formulating research problems is done simultaneously through the
overlap of four activities (see,Van de Ven, 2007):
1) Recognizing and situating a problem,
2) Gathering information to provide a grounding for the problem and its setting,
3) Diagnosing the information to ascertain the relevant characteristics/symptoms, and
4) Deciding what actions or questions should be pursued to resolve the research problem.
The first activity seeks to recognise and define the problem under study and the nature
of corruption being illuminated. This activity follows the archival research approach
whereby numerous sources, such as historical documents, texts, journal articles,
corporate reports, company disclosures and the like, are used to answer research
questions or to generate and/or develop a theory (Smith, 2003).
The second activity seeks a correlation between different socio-economic factors, via a
search of extant data collections—through content analysis, which is about using a set
of sources to produce inferences and/or an answer to the research question(s). The main
focus in this activity is corruption and the data is drawn from the Transparency
International (TI) Corruption Perception Index (CPI) and from the Heritage Foundation
Freedom from Corruption (FFC) index.
Other variables used in this study are gathered from government and non-government
sources or NGOs or other organizations. The main economic development index is GDP
per capita and some other economic, accounting, legal, and other socio-economic
development indices from CIA World Fact book, Nation Master, World Bank Group,
World Health Organization and from literature Review on Corruption (economic,
accounting, legal, and other socio-economic development).
The third activity reviews and analyses alternative literature and other studies in a
search for a cost-effective operating solution for corruption. A great deal of effort was
invested in the areas of morality and ethics. However, the intangible and contextual
nature of morality and ethics was found to be so ambiguous that, even though they may
eventually provide a major contribution to the struggle against corruption, that
contribution may take a generation or more to become viable. Consequently, this thesis
shifted the search for a more immediate, pragmatic interim solution to the disciplines of
accounting and law.
The fourth and final activity seeks to evaluate the validity and effectiveness of the
interim solution (to mitigating corruption) via case studies of three well-publicised
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allegations of corruption (WorldCom, Enron, and Goldman Sachs vs. Bear Stearns). A
fourth case study considers if the corruption appellation can and should be applied to
British Petroleum’s (BP) Deepwater Horizon oil-spill debacle in the Gulf of Mexico.
The fifth case study considers the Bofors-India Scandal. These case studies provide a
means to test the corruption paradigm, practical definition, and proposed corrective
actions suggested in this thesis.
This study accesses data from a large number of studies to leverage its power and reach.
As noted in preceding sections, if enough scientists become convinced that the new
paradigm works better than the old one, they will accept it as the new norm. As claimed
by Hairston (1982, p. 77) “...most of the resistance to the new paradigm will dissipate
when its advocates can demonstrate that it will solve problems that the traditional
paradigm could not solve”. Therefore, five cases in this study seek to illustrate that the
new definition of corruption and the analysis of its nature in this study when applied to
those cases will open new cost-effective paths to resolution. Thus, if this study sees
further “...it is by standing on the shoulders of giants” (Weber, 1973, p. 192).9
3.4 Grounded Theory
Unlike most traditional modes of research, Grounded Theory does not begin with a
hypothesis. The intent is to let data that has been collected through a variety of methods,
speak to the researcher without the corrupting influence of hypotheses. As the data is
gathered and reviewed, the key traits and attributes are noted and grouped into similar
concepts (so as to make them more workable). From these concepts,
categories/archetypes are formed and become the basis for formulating a theory. Thus,
in Grounded Theory, the intent is to reverse engineer a hypothesis from trends observed
in data gathered and correlated from a variety of sources and/or methods. This approach
is particularly useful if a long period of applications of traditional methods have failed
to yield a useful outcome. As Brown (1983) noted, expecting a different outcome from
repeating the same thing again and again is a sign of madness.
Grounded Theory is not a descriptive method, instead it seeks to conceptualize complex
processes and/or patterns of behaviour by asking such questions as: “What is going on?”
and “What are the central concerns of the participants and how do they seek to resolve
9 Paraphrased in 1676, by Sir Isaac Newton from John of Salisbury (in 1159), who was likely
paraphrasing even earlier philosophers from Classical Greece.
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them, irrespective of time and place?” In most variants of behavioural research, the unit
of analysis is individuals or group; In Grounded Theory, the incident (in this case the
act of corruption) is the unit/focus of analysis.
While Grounded Theory was founded by Glaser and Strauss (1967) in the mid1960s,
there was a serious split between the founders—as evidenced by Strauss (1987), Strauss
and Corbin (1990), and Glaser’s (1992 and 1998) rebukes. Given that this thesis is
working from an accounting perspective (rather than a sociological view), does not use
a well-defined quantitative coding paradigm and is looking for general trends rather
than a systematic examination of the data, the Grounded Theory approach in this thesis
is closer to that of Glaser than of Strauss and/or Strauss and Corbin. Given the sheer
size of the data being reviewed (e.g. see Figure 1-1), the open coding approach
suggested in the original Grounded Theory work and continued by Glaser is more
practical than the more detailed quantitative coding proposed by Strauss and Corbin.
While Grounded Theory can be useful as an inductive and systematic approach to
theory building, in this thesis, it is used to foster a theory/paradigm of corruption via the
process of problem formulation through the gathering of data and knowledge about
corruption (the phenomena under consideration; see Alvesson, 2004; Van de Ven,
2007).
3.5 Inductive and Deductive Research in Accounting
Grounded Theory is mostly an inductive research approach. The main characteristic of
the inductive research approach is that it is free from a hypothesis. Harrast (1999, p. 13)
asserts that “inductive research is hypothesis free allowing the data to speak and reveal
underlying relationship that might go unnoticed because they are unexpected.” The
evolution of inductive research allows accounting researchers to apply it within
accounting concepts.
The methodology involved in inductive research is complicated and time consuming, as
it consists of the researchers searching for relationships in a near limitless amounts of
data. However, it “...can highlight an important aspect of the empirical systems that may
otherwise be neglected” (Ijiri, 1975). A notable difference between inductive and
deductive methods is that an inductive method induces hypotheses from direct
observation of the data, whereas, a deductive method deduces hypotheses from theory
(that was often formed in earlier inductive research). An inductive methodology is
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categorised as an exploratory analysis. This analysis starts by gathering data and during
the process discovers something previously unknown. In contrast, deduction (as a
confirmatory analysis) either confirms or rejects existing hypotheses.
Many accounting scholars currently use a deductive approach to their research and
many accounting journals do not welcome inductive research (Ou and Penman, 1989).
Reforms initiated by the Ford Foundation in 1953, caused a paradigm shift that
encouraged many academics to embrace the scientific method and, as a result, to be
more comfortable with deductive rather than inductive research approaches. Before that
shift, many theories articulated in accounting literature were generally descriptive and
normative in nature (Zeff, 1984).
This study is inductive and normative in nature as its main aim is to search for, or
develop, a new paradigm of corruption. In Normative-Inductive research, the use of
hypotheses can be highly corrupting, as it may limit or otherwise prejudice the scope of
the researcher’s choice of research question, methods and/or the data reviewed. In his
review of the Philosophy of Science, Margenau (1966, 1983) suggests an initial general
review by inductive means opens the vistas of a researcher’s mind to choosing an
optimal question to research, often by deductive means; reversing the process risks a
researcher either being overwhelmed by minutia or surrendering to using a locally-
rather than a globally-optimal question.
Another critical advantage of the inductive approach is its encouragement of the use and
incorporation of existing research on the topic under research. This approach is
consistent with, as Jain (2001) notes, the increasing number of academic articles now
being published across disciplines. The search for a new paradigm of corruption in this
study begins with the accounting discipline and expands into the enquiries and thoughts
on corruption posited by other disciplines. As Tanzi (1998, p. 587) notes “...corruption
is a complex phenomenon that is almost never explained by a single cause. If it were,
the solution would be simple.” Therefore, this study’s search for a precise definition of
corruption must consider the phenomena from a variety of perspectives.
3.6 Research Objectives
After investigating the literature on debate surrounding the nature of corruption and its
definition, the following research questions were established.
1) How have others defined corruption?
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2) What are the attributes of an ideal definition of corruption?
3) Given item 2, what are the strengths and weaknesses of the extant definitions?
4) What are the socio-economic and political consequences of corruption?
5) Using the above information, what is an ideal definition of corruption?
6) How can an ideal definition be used to develop anti-corruption tools?
7) Are the chosen ideal definition and the anti-corruption tools derived from it relevant to
actual cases of corruption and how does that relevance contrast with the relevance of
the existing paradigm?
This study addresses the above questions by illuminating the nature of corruption via a
literature review, inductive analysis, and five case-studies. The goal of this study is to
create a new paradigm on corruption that allows an effective, general and unambiguous
definition of corruption to be formulated along with cost-effective anti-corruption
accounting tools.
3.7 Procedures Employed in this Study
An outline of how components in this thesis are integrated, and how previous discussed
methods are integrated in each stage of the research, is presented in Figure 3-1. A
commentary to Figure 3-1 is provided below. One of the issues with inductive research
is that the Philosophy and Methodology chapter is almost inevitably descriptive (e.g.
what was done, where it was done, and what it lead to—by its nature, inductive research
is difficult to pre-plan).
The introduction (Chapter 1) provides an over-view of the research, initial literature
reviews, discusses the purpose of the research and the questions asked, and summarises
the coverage in each chapter. Chapters 2, 4 and 5 discuss corruption in ever increasing
detail, including the socio-economic consequences of corruption.
Chapter 3 discusses the philosophy and mix of methodologies used in the thesis,
including Grounded Theory (Glaser variant), archival approach, speculative thought,
thought experiments, inductive vs. deductive research, quantitative methods, and case
study approaches. Chapter 6 re-introduces moral and ethical approaches to resolving
corruption and suggests that such solutions are likely to continue being ineffective for
many more generations and then pulls the work from earlier chapters together to suggest
an alternative approach to resolving corruption. Chapter 7 applies the new paradigm of
corruption to four well-known case studies on corruption and to a fifth case that the new
paradigm suggests is corruption. Chapter 8 summarises the thesis and suggests avenues
for future research.
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Figure 3-1: Visualization of the thesis concepts and processes
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3.8 Chapter Conclusion
This chapter describes how others have defined corruption by synthesising literature on
corruption and in particular literature on Accounting and corruption. While extensive
literature was found on Accounting and corruption (Figure 3-2), most of that literature
tended to focus on CSR and the Forensic aspects of Accounting (Figure 3-3) and very
little accounting literature discusses what is needed for Accounting to participate in the
control of corruption. Much of the research on corruption is done from an Economic or
a Socio-political perspective. It was found that all of the reviewed literature employed a
definition of corruption that flowed from a single paradigm (root-stock definition) that
focuses on the attributes/gain of the perpetrator. Given that this definition lineage has,
over the several millennia it has been evolving, had little joy in resolving corruption, it
is an opportune time to shift to another paradigm of corruption. This thesis proposes to
flip the old corruption paradigm from its traditional focus on perpetrators and their gains
to re-define corruption in terms of the victims and consequences of corruption. It is
hoped that, over the next few decades, a framework for resolving corruption will evolve
from this new paradigm. The United Nations (2011) Global Compact discusses the need
for transparency and anti-corruption efforts by business but its efforts appear to be
focused on CSR rather than on the victims and consequences.
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Chapter 4
Corruption, Corporate Social Responsibility, and Social
Responsibility Accounting
4.1 Introduction
In common English, corruption, decay and rot are synonymous and to corrupt is to
infect with decay and rot. Consistent with this pejorative view, most studies see socio-
economic and political corruption as an unclean, unmitigated social ill. Research on
corruption tends to focus on the perceived negative impact it has on socio-economic
growth and development—for example, the preamble to the UN Convention against
Corruption (UN, 2003, p. 1) noted harm to “sustainable development” in two of three
listed concerns. Recently, a few researchers have been more inclusive of the notion that
some types and/or levels of corruption may have a modicum of redeeming value (Tanzi,
1998). Despite such research, the majority of governments and researchers continue to
condemn all forms and levels of corruption. This majority view appears to have
responded to the more inclusive corruption research (e.g. less critical of corruption) by
expanding its criticism of corruption to encompass the more inclusive studies of
corruption as an unwarranted obstruction to the crusade against corruption, e.g.:
“…the diverging opinion of the global community regarding the definition of
corruption and what constitutes its externalities, as well as the written work of several
academics suggesting that corruption has positive ramifications for society, have
significantly contributed to the lengthy delay [in its resolution]” (Feng, 2004).
Corruption is as old as humanity (Rider, 1997, p. 1) and, in one guise or another, is
likely to always be with us. Efforts to distinguish different variants of corruption appear
to be a confusing waste of time (Alatas, 1990, p. 3) that misdirects much of the effort to
eradicate, or at least contain, this ancient and pervasive evil, i.e.:
“There are a thousand hacking at the branches of evil to one who is striking at the
root…” (Thoreau, 1854, p. 80).
The intent of this study is to identify and expose the root of corruption so that, from an
understanding of its nature and effects, appropriate pan-cultural approaches to its
mitigation can be devised and applied.
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4.2 Common Perspectives on Corruption
Corruption is often defined as a misuse of power, against the public interest, for private
gain, where public interest is defined widely to include the master-servant and agency
relationships found in both the public and private sectors. This general definition
encompasses the varied specific definitions found in the academic and professional
literature such as:
 “...deviation (for private gain) from bidding rules, the arbitrary exercise of
discretionary powers and illegitimate use of public resources” (Rider, 1997, p. 257),
 “…use of official position, rank or status by an office bearer for his own personal
benefit” (Myint, 2000, p.35), and
 “…acts in which the power of public office is used for personal gain in a manner
that contravenes the rules of the game” (Jain, 2001, p.73).
Wu’s (2003, p. 3) suggestion that most theoretical and empirical work on corruption
done over the last 15 years drew from previous work that focused on defining
corruption and delimiting its scope is confirmed by this study. Literature on corruption
tends to define it via specific examples, classes of examples, or in terms of a specific
area being researched—however, until this study, little effort had gone into tracking the
taxonomy of corruption to a common root (see Figure 3-4, p.49; for a phylogentic tree
of 31 extant corruption definitions..
Corruption is as old as government itself (Klitgaard, 1988)—it appears in various forms
and guises in all ages and cultures. Its parochial definition and how it is perceived
depend on the customs, history, and social mores of each time and place (Tiihonen,
2003). Public corruption, as a crime, has been defined as the illegal use of public office
for private gain (Ghosh, 2007). Current corruption definitions often focus on a
divergence between the interests of the agent and those of the principal—e.g.
“Corruption occurs when an agent betrays the principal’s interests in pursuit of her own
[interests]” (Klitgaard, 1988) and corrupt behaviour deviates from the expected duties
of a public role, either to serve a private regard for wealth or status gains or to otherwise
violate rules against the exercise of private interest (Gillespie and Okruhlik, 1988).
Robinson (1998) similarly defines corruption as the abuse of public roles or resources
for private benefit. Neild (2002) sees public corruption as a breach of trust by a public
person, for the sake of a private financial or political gain, but acknowledges that the
rules of conduct in public affairs can be affected by local customs and social mores.
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This idea of private benefit gained at unwarranted cost to a principal has been the focus
of much of the struggle against corruption (see Figure 1-3 and Table 2-1). This study
considers that approach to be unsound: while a private gain may be the intent of
corruption, the actuality may prove otherwise, and intent is harder to prove than the
associated act or outcome. Thus, definitions of corruption with a focus on intent leave
enormous unenforceable grey areas, in which the corrupt can operate with impunity and
from which they can strike back at those who have accused them of corruption, but
were unable to meet the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt burden of proof. The struggle
against corruption requires a definition that is easy to operationalize to a clear beyond-a-
reasonable-doubt standard of what is, and is not, corrupt. Such a definition must focus
on the provable facts of obligations and outcomes, rather than the fuzzy, shifting
vagaries of intent.
Figure 4-1: Examples of Dichotomy in Classifying Corruption
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A first step to an inclusive definition of corruption is a clear understanding of what
gives rise to corruption. Corruption occurs when a person of little or no integrity has
power or authority allowing them to offer “...the ability or capacity to act in a manner
capable of bringing about a certain intended desired outcome” (Spence, 2007, p. 37).
One way for such authority to arise is for an agent to be given discretionary authority.
Corruption then provides a way for an agent to profit by selling frustration of the intent
of his/her principal (Rose-Ackerman, 1978, p. 2). Shleifer and Vishny (1993) suggest
that public authority gives control over the sale of government assets, authority and
influence: any resulting corruption then occurs with-theft or without-theft (i.e. the
government either does or does not receive a fair price for its goods or services). Other
dichotomies can be applied to an understanding of corruption—per Figure 4-1,
corruption occurs in many forms, it can be classified via the arenas in which it occurs
and/or by its magnitude (i.e. as grand or petty). Corruption can also be seen in terms of
influence peddling or facilitation.
4.3 What is Corruption?
“If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred
battles. If you know yourself but not your enemy, for every victory gained you will also
suffer a defeat. If you know neither the enemy nor yourself, you will succumb in every
battle” (Sun Tzu, 6th Century BCE, p. 34).
Many documents dealing with corruption tend to define it inductively via a descriptive
listing of acts considered corrupt (e.g. UN, 2003). However, this approach, in a variant
of Peer’s Law (i.e. the solution to the problem, changes the problem; Lyall, 1986;
Rawson, 2002), runs a real risk of being a perverse prescriptive roadmap of how to be
corrupt, while staying within the pale of the law and social mores. As suggested by
Baer, et al. (2008, p. 17), an understanding of the formulations that encompass the root
causes of a problem is likely to engender the discovery of more valuable solutions to
that problem. Thus, a root definition of corruption is needed to encompass all variants
of corruption and focus anticorruption efforts on the root causes of corruption. All of the
reviewed extant definitions appear to flow from a common root-stock that focuses on
the attributes of the person who is corrupt. Recognising that this focus has not yielded a
cost-effect solution to corruption, this study proposes shifting the focus from the
perpetrators to a definition that focuses on the victims and consequences of corruption.
Consistent with an international accounting focus, this study seeks a principles-based,
not a procedures-based, definition of corruption. The former succinctly encompasses
any and all variants of corruption and the latter is an ever
defined, overlapping and often conflicting descriptions/prescriptions that have, in
practice, been a day late and a dollar short
4.4 Corruption Defin
A review of literature from an array of disciplines suggests the concept that became the
keystone of this thesis –
1) A duty of care, that
2) Is breached by intent or negligence
3) Directly and/or indirectly harms an individual, group, and/or society that had
reasonable expectation they would not be so harmed.
These elements (harm via commission or omission which breaches a duty of care) form
the three legal legs of a tort
individually necessary
violated duty of care is what emotes the view of corruption as being heinous.
Figure 4-2: Illustration of Corruption as a Tort with Three Legs
The oft-applied criminal offence definition of corruption is a
corruption is always a social wrong that needs redress. However, only a few variants of
corruption are legislated into being criminal acts. Also, proof of criminal corruption
10 Tort is a legal term for a tortuous
-expanding morass of ill
in the struggle against corruption.
ed in Terms of Victims and Direct Harm
that corruption is a tort that flows from:
(e.g. a reckless disregard), that
.10 This study argues that corruption is a tort (with three legs,
and in combination sufficient, to define corruption) and the
red herring
act (e.g. causing an injury or other harm).
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requires (in countries following an English-based jurisprudence) evidence beyond a
reasonable doubt of criminal intent. A claim of stupidity is often an effective defence
against a charge of criminal corruption (for example Premier Vander Zalm of British
Columbia, Canada, in the 1990s, successfully claimed a defence that amounted to an
admission he was too stupid to know that being given $10,000 in an unmarked envelope
in return for a favour from his office, was a bribe; (Pynn, 2007 and personal memory).
As noted previously, a root definition of corruption needs to encompass all variants: the
associated three legs must, in combination, always correctly signal the presence of
corruption, and the absence of one or more of these legs must always correctly signal
the absence of corruption. The definition in this study can only be validated via time
and experience but, as part of that process, several more examples of corrupt acts are
considered, from a variety of perspectives:
1. Shleifer and Vishny (1993) cite an example of a bottle-labelling machine bought in
Mozambique, even though it was several times the price of another equally good
machine. Allegedly, the decision was made because “…buying a fancier machine
offered the manager (and the ministry officials) much better opportunities for
corruption”. This example fits neatly into the notion of a breach of a duty of care.
2. Tanzi (1998), in defining corruption as the misuse of power for private gain, gave
examples in procurement and hiring where authority was misused for personal
gain—again these are breaches of a duty of care.
3. Ghosh’s (2007, p.270) definition of corruption as “…the illegal use of public office
for private gains” is consistent with public corruption being a breach of a public
sector duty. However, the harm is often more dispersed and less clear than it would
be in the private sector corruption. In some cases, the corruption is of second or even
third order where a person, harmed by earlier corruption, must pay to regain what
has wrongfully been taken from them and/or to gain what should rightfully be given
to them.11
4. Tazni (1998) gave as an example of corrupt abuse of a public position: a public
employee who claims to be sick but goes on vacation. This is clearly a breach of
trust with resulting harm which can apply equally well to private sector employees.
However, in both the public and the private-sector situations, quid pro quo issues
need to be considered.
5. A president of a country, or a senator, who has an airport built in his small town, is
breaching a national duty-of-care to serve the interests of local constituents—local
politicians (mayors or aldermen) do not face this conflict of interest or opportunity
for corruption.
6. The Thai Supreme Court (criminal division for holders of political positions), found
Wattana guilty of abuse of power in connection with the 1992-1993 purchase of land
at a wastewater site that was resold to the government at highly inflated prices
(Associated Press, 2008).
11 It is likely second- or third-order public corruption that gives rise to the notion that some corruption
can be beneficial. However, corruption that reduces hardship from prior corruption is not proof that
low levels of corruption benefit society. Also, competition for corrupt-favours can often precipitate
cascading failure though society.
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Having defined corruption as being, at root, harm arising from a breached duty of care,
the next step is to validate that definition by showing that it can transcend cultural
differences and can suggest cost-effective ways to combat corruption. The definition is
invariant across all cultures in that any and all harm arising from a breached duty of
care is corrupt. However, the concept/details of what is a duty of care may vary across
cultures—thus, the definition transcends culture but details of its implementation may
vary. Three refinements should be considered in future research: 1) the consideration of
how the concept of duty of care varies across culture; 2) the choice of which duty of
care definition prevails when transactions cross borders (NB: the issues of which law
prevails has been extensively debated and could provide insights); 3) the capacity to
form a duty of care should be carefully considered—can those who lack such a capacity
be considered corrupt via the breach of a duty they cannot form?
4.5 Corruption Defined in Terms of Social Harm
As an alternative paradigm to the traditional one (i.e. a focus on attributes of the corrupt
and/or a focus on a wrongful gain) this thesis proposes a paradigm that focuses on the
victims and/or direct harm. An alternative to these paradigms is to consider corruption’s
harm to society as a whole. Such harm is clearly shown to exist and to be potentially
very large in Chapter 5 of this thesis and in a host of other research. However, much of
the social harm from corruption is so dispersed that very few of those harmed by this
process are likely to be aware of the harm. Harm to direct victims of corruption tends to
be more concentrated and those victims are more likely to take action against those who
have harmed them, if the tools are provided to enable them to take action. Thus, the
paradigm of corruption as harm to society is an interesting concept that is worthy of
future research and is likely to reinforce the need/desire for society to contain and
control corruption, but it is unlikely to yield much in the way of tools or precepts to
fight corruption. In the rest of this thesis, social harm arising from corruption will be
used to reinforce the need and duty of society to punish the corrupt and provide for their
victims via the tort process.
4.6 Corruption and Social Responsibility Accounting
Corruption has been re-defined in this thesis as being essentially a breach of trust, with
harm resulting where a duty of care was owed. This breach becomes possible because in
“…a social relationship in which one person makes herself vulnerable to another who
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can do her harm if the trust is misplaced....[,the] second person is either trustworthy or
not” (Levi, et al., 2001).
Trust is a fundamental prerequisite to commerce, trade, and other transactions that
underpin a civilized society. From a social perspective, the harm accruing from
corruption to individuals, groups, and organizations is, in net terms, mostly zero-sum
(i.e. offset by benefits accruing to the corrupted, the corruptor, and/or mostly innocent
third parties). The net social harm from corruption is, therefore, mostly in reduced
allocative efficiency and increased transaction costs, resulting from trust being fouled.
As Figure 4-3 illustrates, corruption always harms business performance and it only has
market value to a corruptor if it is rare and unexpected. As it becomes commonplace, its
value declines exponentially and the net total harm to the economy increases (at a
declining rate) toward the total potential value of the economy. Validation of these
assertions is in Figure 4-3, where the Business Freedom Index falls exponentially (in the
form of Y = c(1-e-b(X-a))) as Freedom from Corruption falls.
Ultimately, corruption without an underlying threat of violence is madness: how can
those who accept bribes to breach trust be trusted? One of the many ways in which
corruption harms business activity is seen in Figure 4-4, where the time it takes to start a
business rises exponentially toward infinity (in the form of Y = a(x-c)-b - g), as
corruption rises.
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Figure 4-3 clearly shows that rampant corruption begets a vicious downward spiral of
declining value in which even the market value of corruption becomes exhausted. The
way corruption is defined in this study (i.e. a breach of trust giving rise to harm where a
duty of care was owed) suggests that most social harm associated with business
(bribery, environmental harm, human rights violations, shoddy/dangerous products,
etc.) would be greatly curtailed if corruption in businesses was controlled.
This tautology appears to be an unstated driving force behind a new class of legislation
and declarations of fundamental human, social, and environmental rights (Epstein and
Hanson, 2006) that are likely to transform business and accounting—for example:
 Section 172 of the UK Companies Act of 2006, redefines fiduciary duties by
requiring that for directors to act in good faith in promoting the success of their
firm they must have regard as to “…the impact of the company’s operations on the
community and the environment.” A caveat in an earlier version of this legislation,
intended to limit this responsibility to “…so far as reasonably practicable”, was
removed—signalling intent of the government to rigorously enforce compliance.
(Cook and Prescott, 2007; Lipton and Schwartz, 2008)
 The intent and expectations of the UK Government in its Companies Act of 2006
is set out in more detail by the [UK] DTI (2004). The UK Government clearly
believes there is a business case for Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) and
that, as corporations are made aware of this case, the world will become better for
everyone, as businesses all move to Best Practices.
 The UN Proposal Defining Corporate Social Responsibility for Human Rights
(Lipton and Schwartz, 2008) is urging Nation States “…to improve their
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protection against corporate human rights abuses by fostering corporate cultures in
which respect for rights is an essential part of doing business ….[via an expansion
of] fiduciary duties to include the obligation to consider the human rights impact
of corporate activities.”
However, legislating Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) is likely to
generate interesting unintended consequences for example:12
 The ideals expressed in the DTI (2004) document indicate that it was framed by
people with a left-of-centre economic view—however, a very similar policy
approach was promulgated by the ultra-right-wing Chicago School of Economics in
the 1970s under the moniker Laissez-faire—this business knows best ideal opened
the way for the greed is good decades of the 1980s and 1990s which, in turn, made
the need for CSR very apparent, by its general absence.
 A policy of CSR is no substitute for fair dialogue, legislation, and other governance
by government (Wright and Smallman, 2008). In the absence of accountability (i.e.
well defined/measurable deliverables, reporting standards, verification, and harsh
and certain consequences for defalcations), CSR is likely to degenerate into mere
feel-good corporate-promotion puffery.
 If the UN proposal is able to establish its intent of an effective “…means for those
who believe they have been harmed to bring this to the attention of the company and
seek remediation, without prejudice to legal channels available” it may increase
poverty in many third-world nations, as responsible corporations internalize the
added transaction costs and/or uncertainty of investing in nations with shaky Human
Rights histories.
 The UN proposal will likely have little or no effect on irresponsible corporations,
who will continue to operate as normal but with subsidiaries to buffer them from
Human Rights consequences. Also, there may be a major increase in the mortality
rate for active and potential plaintiffs (Collingsworth, 2008, pp. 7-10).
“The substance of social responsibility arises from concern for the ethical
consequences of one’s acts as they might affect the interest of others” (Davis, 1967, p.
46). CSR, a decades old concept where businessmen are expected to “…oversee the
operation of an economic system that fulfils the expectations of the public [and] …
that the economy’s means of production should be employed in such a way that
production and distribution should enhance total socioeconomic welfare” (Frederick,
1960), is becoming an increasingly important tool in the struggle against a host of
social and environmental ills. However, the new focus on legislated CSR is a major
12 The Doctrine of Unintended Consequences is collection of cautionary laws and sayings, for example:
• Burn’s Law: “The best-laid schemes o’ mice an’ men gang aft agley” (Rawson, 2002, p. 38).
• Murphy’s Law: “If anything can go wrong, it will” (Rawson, 2002, p. 162).
• Hardin’s Law: “You can never do more than one thing” (Rawson, 2002, p. 225).
• Spencer’s Law: Every cause produces more than one effect” (Rawson, 2002, p. 229).
• Crumbpacker’s Law: “Murphy was an optimist” (Lyall, 1986).
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departure from what has, historically, been a mostly voluntary activity. This
legislative focus will require that Social Responsibility Accounting (SRA) be
developed to add rigour to CSR. Specifically, an operational system of SRA must
have an unambiguous statement of obligations, clear performance criteria, effective
means of validation, and harsh and certain consequences for defalcation.13
4.7 Chapter Conclusion
A new class of legislation and declarations of fundamental human, social, and
environmental rights appear to be seeking to explicitly induce a general
acknowledgment that most social harm associated with business arises via corporate
breach of a duty of care torts. As part of this acknowledgment, the new legislation is
seeking to create venues for those harmed to seek redress from those benefiting from
that harm. In the absence of a rigorous system of Social Responsibility Accounting,
(e.g. with an unambiguous statement of obligations, clear performance criteria,
effective means of validation, and harsh and certain consequences for defalcation),
Corporate Social Responsibility merely adds another venue for government and
corporate corruption.
Corruption, despite assertions in many earlier definitions, is not about private gain.
Specifically: “There is nothing wrong in making partial decisions in return for favours
on the grounds that it harms nobody” (Amos, 1982). Corruption needs to be defined
as a breach-of-trust tort that causes harm where a duty of care was reasonably
expected. As such, all corruption results in harm that is a social wrong and venues for
redress of that harm need to be developed. As an aside, efforts to legislate Corporate
Social Responsibility may prove to be an interesting first step on a path to eliminate
corruption, along with a host of related social ills, but only if Social Responsibility
Accounting is developed as an effective tool.
13 The need for Social Responsibility Accounting (SRA) to give CSR teeth is a recommendation in
this thesis. The literature review found a number of articles on SRA, but in each case it was used
as a synonym to CSR rather than being a key requirement for CSR to be effective.
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Chapter 5
Counting the Socio-economic Costs and
Consequences of Corruption
5.1 Introduction
While research on corruption has tended to focus on its perceived negative impacts on
socio-economic development and growth (e.g. UN, 2003), some research has included
a notion that corruption may have some redeeming value (Tanzi, 1998). However,
most governments and researchers continue to condemn all variants and levels of
corruption some even extending their condemnation to encompass the recent, more
inclusive research, as being a confounding or at least a confusing factor:
“…the diverging opinion of the global community regarding the definition of
corruption and what constitutes its externalities, as well as the written work of several
academics suggesting that corruption has positive ramifications for society, have
significantly contributed to the lengthy delay [in its resolution]” (Feng, 2004).
This study combines and analyses output and indices from a range of studies to
illustrate how corruption, at all levels and situations, causes net harm to society. The
adaptation mechanisms, used by businesses to ameliorate corruption’s harmful effects,
are never fully effective and, in themselves, have cumulative effects that eventually
precipitate multiple cascading failures in the infrastructure and foundations of society.
5.2 The Issue of Trust
Trust is fundamental to commerce, trade and other transactions that underpin a civil
society. From a social perspective, the individual harm and gains accruing from
corruption, mostly net-out to a zero-sum game—thus, the net social harm from
corruption is mostly in the form of reduced allocative efficiency and increased
transaction costs, arising from betrayal corrupting trust (Covey, 2006). In Figure 5-1,
the Business Freedom Index (Heritage Foundation, 2007 and 2008) is used as a proxy
for the social harm of corruption and as the Freedom from Corruption (FFC) falls the
Business Freedom Index appears to fall in the form of:
Y = c(1-e-b(X-a)) (1)
Y = Business Freedom Index
X = Freedom from Corruption
a,b,c = parameters
When equation (1) was regressed against the data in Figure 5-1 the results were:
Statistical Measures -- Goodness of Fit PARAMETERS t-STATISTIC
R2 = 0.5868 c Maximum Y 111.45 7.5864
LM Statistic = 2.7013E-10 b Slope 0.015308 2.7183
Durbin-Watson Statistic = 1.7014 a X Intercept 17.013 2.0941
CHI2 test on normality of residuals
= 4.78127 with 27 degrees of freedom
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When the above results are substituted into equation (1), the result is:
Y = 111.45(1-e-0.015308(X-17.013)) (1a)
While the overall fit of equation (1) to the Figure 5-1 data is fair, several key issues
prevent it from being good for example, the data in the lower and upper ranges of the
X-axis is poorly described by the function. The maximum value of Y (the Business
Freedom Index) exceeding 100 is not sensible, and the Y-intercept being greater than
zero is illogical. Also, (visually) two functions appear to be at play in Figure 5-1—
with one dominant in the upper range, another dominant in the mid-to-lower range,
and both at play in the upper-mid range. If the corruption effects are separated into
initial effects and a business compensating response (respectively, equation (2) and
equation (3), below), the fit to the data in Figures 5-1 and 5-2 greatly improves and a
clear/sensible view of the nature and effects of corruption emerges.
C = g/(1+(d/X)n) (2)
A = Xea(1-X/b) - c (3)
C = 1st order effects of corruption
A = 2nd order effects of corruption
a,b,d,n = parameters
Y= g/(1+(d/X)n) + Xea(1-X/b) - c (4)
The regression of equation (4) against Figure 5-1 data generates disappointing
results—i.e. some parameter values and signs are illogical—indicating severe
multicollinearity between the variables in equations (2) and (3). This issue was
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resolved by using a double-bootstrapping process to isolate and analyse the effects of
equations (2) and (3)—where:
 Parameter values for equation (2) were guestimated, then
 Values from that equation were deducted from the values in Figure 5-1, and equation (3)
was regressed against the residuals to generate estimates of its parameter values, then
 Those values were substituted into equation (3) and values from that equation were
deducted from the values in Figure 5-1, and equation (2) was regressed against the
residuals to generate estimates of its parameter values, then
 Those values were substituted into equation (2) and values from that equation were
deducted from the values in Figure 5-1, the negative residuals were converted to zero (on
the assumption that businesses are rational wealth maximisers), and equation (3) was
regressed against the residuals to generate estimates of its parameter values, then
 Those values were substituted into equation (3) and values from that equation were
deducted from the values in Figure 5-1, and equation (2) was regressed against the
residuals to generate estimates of its parameter values.
After using the above process in two bootstrap iterations, the regression results for equation
(2) were:
Statistical Measures -- Goodness of Fit PARAMETERS t-STATISTIC
R2 = 0.8832 G Maximum Y 134.58 5.9260
LM Statistic = 7.64665E-16 D Inflection point 76.899 10.593
Durbin-Watson Statistic = 2.0016 N Slope 4.0195 8.3657
CHI2 test on normality of residuals Ρ Rho error 0.31283 5.7337
= 66.5765 with 27 degrees of freedom
And, the regression results for equation (3) were:
Statistical Measures -- Goodness of Fit PARAMETERS t-STATISTIC
R2 = 0.7530 a Slope 2.1303 33.084
LM Statistic = 1.8424E -14 b Y=X point 69.288 17.409
Durbin-Watson Statistic = 1.9900 c Shift 43.321 5.2350
CHI2 test on normality of residuals ρ Rho error 0.37996 7.1892
= 125.8135 with 27 degrees of freedom
C = 134.58/(1+(76.899/X)4.0195) (2a)
A = Xe2.1203(1-X/69.288) – 43.321 (3a)
Y =134.58/(1+(76.899/X)4.0195) + Xe2.1203(1-X/69.288) – 43.32 (4a)
The initial effect of corruption is damage to trust, which reduces the effectiveness of
business. This is captured in Figure 5-2 via equation (2). Business, rather than
remaining a passive victim of corruption, responds with competitive corruption and
this is captured in Figure 5-2 via equation (3). However, this compensating response
to initial corruption restores only some, not all, of the business effectiveness and
efficiency lost to corruption. Thus, while some individuals may benefit from
corruption, per Figure 5-2 and equation (4a), society and business activity as a whole
are always harmed. Further, the net social harm arising from corruption rises with the
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level of corruption because corruption only has a market value to a corruptor
(equation (3a)) if it is rare and unexpected. As it becomes commonplace, its value
declines exponentially and the net harm to business increases at a declining rate, until
businesses are unable to function. Along with the Freedom from Corruption Index
(FFC; devised by a US somewhat right-of-centre Think-tank) there is the Corruption
Perception Index (CPI; devised by a European Think-tank)—Figure 5-3 shows that
the two measures are sufficiently similar and that there is no problem with this study
shifting to the more complete and somewhat more politically neutral CPI.
A lack of trust “...will destroy the most powerful government, the most successful
business, the most thriving economy, the most influential leadership, the greatest
friendship, the strongest character, the deepest love” (Covey, 2006, p.1). Trust effects
are at the core of the harm from corruption. Corruption damages trust, impaired trust
increases uncertainty, which raises the transaction cost of doing business.14
Businesses respond to corruption by trying to re-establish trust—however, corrupt
dealings are (by their very nature) difficult to enforce. Specifically, courts in most
jurisdictions refuse to enforce unlawful or shameful agreements (Rose-Ackerman,
1999, pp.92 and 96; Dick, 1995, p.26).
14 Uncertainty is far more damaging than risk—risk can be estimated and discounted, uncertainty (by
definition) cannot be estimated and, as such, it chills and eventually kills trade and business.
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The lack of effective legal or social recourse means corruption tends to engender
threats and violence (Lambsdorff, 2002). Figures 5-4 and 5-5 show that corruption,
violence, and poverty appear to be linked in a vicious spiral of degradation and
misery. Fisman and Miguel (2008) suggest that corruption and violence are “…the
twin causes of…the poverty of nations”. The increase in violence associated with
increased corruption can be seen in Figure 5-4—where the violent death rate
(excluding suicide) can be described by:
Y = a(x-c)-b (5)
Y = violent deaths per 100,000 people pa
X = Freedom from Corruption
a,b,c,g = parameters
ln(Y) = ln(a) – b[ln(x-c)] (5a)
When equation (5) is logged into a power function (equation (5a), above) and
regressed against the data in Figure 5-4, the equation and results are:
Statistical Measures -- Goodness of Fit PARAMETERS t-STATISTIC
R2 = 0.4853 A Intercept parameter 128.50 13.588
LM Statistic = 6.9024E-16 B Slope 0.29376 11.639
Durbin-Watson Statistic = 2.0015 C X-shift parameter 21.141 27.443
CHI2 test on normality of residuals Ρ Rho error 5.7573 0.71869
= 15.4530 with 12 degrees of freedom
Y = 128.50(x - 21.141)-0.29376 (5b)
Corruption is an excellent predictor of violence—for example, given that the Y-axis in
Figure 5-4 is in log10, violent deaths (excluding suicide) tend to increase, in the form
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of a double exponential, as corruption rises. Also, the regression errors show a strong
log-normal distribution—where its amplitude rises exponentially as corruption
increases. This outcome likely occurs because, as a society becomes more corrupt, its
infrastructure (including the investigating and reporting of violent death) becomes
ever less reliable.
5.3 The Economic Consequences of Corruption
The high correlation between poverty and corruption (Figure 5-5) is an increasingly
well-known concern (Graeff and Mehlkop, 2003) and has caused corruption to be
condemned as a crime against humanity (Acquaah-Gaisie, 2005; Bantekas, 2006) for
example Diamond (2004) called corruption a crime “... against development.... [and
when] you have rapacious corruption, which exists in many parts of the developing
world, this is on the level of a crime against humanity.”
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However, using the strong per-capita wealth and corruption correlation as an
argument that corruption is the main cause of poverty is premature. First, correlation
provides little insight into causality (i.e. poverty may cause corruption); Second,
several confounding factors further obscure the issue. Specifically:
 Poor developing countries tend to grow faster than richer developed ones – a
well accepted basic tenant from early development economics. Logically, poor
undeveloped countries, working from a smaller wealth-base (the denominator), tend
to grow faster than wealthier developed countries. Thus, in theory, all nations should
eventually be equalised by their growth rates and should eventually approach a
common situation of high wealth and relatively low growth (Chenery, 1960 and 1979;
Chenery and Syrquin, 1975).
This effect can be seen in Figure 5-6, but there are also offsetting effects that cause
some poor countries to have low or negative growth and others to have high growth.
 Economic growth is often stunted in nations with major natural resource
endowments. Even though this effect is counter intuitive (i.e. high levels of natural
resources, per the basic tenets of traditional neoclassical economics, should make
economic growth easier, faster, and higher), it is found in empirical study after study
(Leite and Weidmann, 1999; Sachs and Warner, 2001; Diamond, 2004) and clearly
shown in Figures 5-7 and 5-8.
o One theory as to why this process occurs is a crowding-out effect, often
called the Dutch Disease—attributed to the Economist (1977), by Barder
(2006)—where the finding of sudden great wealth causes other, more
sustainable, aspects of an economy to either not be developed or to wither.
o Another common theory of why economic growth is stunted in countries
that experience a sudden inflow of natural wealth is that corruption can
cause them to “… experience lower innovation, lower entrepreneurial
activity, poorer governments and lower growth.” (Sachs and Warner,
2001, p. 835).
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 Fortuitous price increases in natural resources can create high short-term
growth, by offsetting or even reversing the issues immediately above. During
the period being studied (2003 to 2008), oil (after an extended period of weak
prices) more than doubled in price per barrel.
 Peace, order, and good governance are vital to wealth creation and their
opposites, tend to blight economic growth. Figure 5-9, suggests that economic
growth is an inverse function of the rate of murder-and-war deaths. Thus, even
though for most of the last five millennia, war and murder were common means
of acquiring and/or securing wealth, power and position, it has become
increasingly apparent in the last two centuries that those means often damage
the sources of wealth creation and tend to destroy, squander, or lose much of the
wealth being fought over.
 The previous section and Figure 5-4 show that violence varies strongly with
corruption and the mayhem that afflicts nations as their CPI falls from 30
toward what appears to be a limit near 10 is well described in Yeats’ (1920)
poem on the end of times:
Things fall apart; the centre cannot hold;
Mere anarchy is loosed upon the world,
The blood-dimmed tide is loosed, and everywhere
The ceremony of innocence is drowned;
The best lack all conviction, while the worst
Are full of passionate intensity.
However, Figure 5-4 shows that not all highly-corrupt nations experience correspondingly
high rates of violent death. A key question for future research will be: Is relative peace a
matter of luck, is it the calm before the storm (i.e. are corrupt countries storing up trouble for
the future), or must corruption infect both a government and those it governs before violence
becomes endemic?
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Figure 5-7: Growth and Natural Resource Abundance 1970-1989
Source: Sachs and Warner, 2001, p. 829.
Figures 5-4 and 5-6 through 5-9, suggest simple economic growth is not a simple
function—instead causal strings come together and enfold one another, in a tangled
correlation knot. Multiple-non-linear regression, inference, and even bootstrapping
are needed to cut the correlation knot and separate the effects on economic growth of
wealth per capita, corruption, violence, and endowments of natural wealth.
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Gavg = ƒ(W, CPI, N, Oil, V) (6)
Gavg = economic growth as the effective annual
change in GDP per capita from 2003 to 2008
W = Capital per capita
CPI = Corruption Perception Index
N = Natural Wealth (as a share of GDP)
Oil = Barrels of Oil produced per capita, per year
V = Rate of violent deaths
Figures 5-4 and 5-6 through 5-9 provide insight into how various socio-economic
factors affect the growth rate. Specifically:
1) Wealth is clearly an increasing exponential as CPI improves (Figure 5-5),
2) GDP per capita (a proxy for wealth) was excluded because poverty and economic
growth are so highly auto-correlated with corruption (Figures 5-5 and 5-6) that
including both wealth per capita and corruption will confound the analysis,
3) V is excluded because it is so highly correlated with corruption (see Figure 5-4) that
its effects can be subsumed in the corruption variable, and
4) N can reduce growth via both the Dutch-Disease process and via corruption.
However, massive increases in the price of oil in 2003-08 produced a significant
effect on growth. The major producers of oil experienced significant growth and
countries without major oil production suffered significant reductions in growth. It
should be noted that if the price of oil falls this result is likely to be reversed—as
evidenced by the relative position of oil-rich nations in Figures 5-7 and 5-8.
Gavg = a + bOil – ce-dOil – g(CPI-h)-j (7)
In regressing equation (7) against the data in Figure 5-10, the value for Somalia was
excluded to eliminate the effect of gains from piracy and the Zimbabwe 2008 CPI
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rating was adjusted down from 18 to 11 in reflection of the currency collapse; land
thefts; political murder; crop failures; destruction of the judiciary and sundry other
crimes against humanity—NB: the CPI for Zimbabwe is critical as an anchor variable.
The result of the regression is:
Statistical Measures -- Goodness of Fit PARAMETERS t-STATISTIC
R2 = 0.3748 A Constant 10.821 4.5693
LM Statistic = 8.5942E-05 B Scaling parameter 0.027240 2.9727
Durbin-Watson Statistic = 1.9924 C Scaling parameter 6.5646 4.3587
CHI2 test on normality of residuals D Scaling parameter 0.33252 1.5074
= 15.3400 with 11 degrees of freedom G Scaling parameter 5.0855 3.1168
H Shift parameter 10.993 326.69
J Power parameter 0.31841 1.0810
 Ρ Rho error 0.012369 0.15759
Gavg = 10.821 + 0.027240Oil – 6.5646e-0.33252Oil – 5.0855(CPI-10.993)-0.31841 (7a)
The last term in eqn (7) implies that corruption has profoundly adverse effects on
economic growth in the form of:
L = -5.0855(CPI-10.993)-0.31841 (8)
L = Loss in Gavg from corruption
Another effect needs to be considered in that many studies suggest that economic
growth rates should be higher in poor countries than in richer countries and that, as a
result, countries will eventually all equalize at a common wealthy per capita level.
However, this levelling is not happening: as Landes (1998, p. xx) notes:
“Two hundred and fifty years ago, [the]…gap between richest and poorest was perhaps
5 to 1, ….[currently] the difference in income per head between the richest industrial
nation, say Switzerland, and the poorest nonindustrial country, Mozambique, is about
400 to 1…”
Thus, corruption’s full impact on growth is made more apparent if equation (8) is
adjusted for the effect of wealth on growth—for example if one assumes that a nation
with little or no wealth can grow at 18 percent, that very wealthy nations grow at 2.0
percent, that a totally corrupt nation (for example a CPI of 0.0) has little or no wealth
and that a nation with no corruption is either wealthy or soon will be wealthy (see
Figure 5-5), then equation (8) can be adjusted to:15
L = 3.2184 - 5.0855(CPI-10.993)-0.31841 - 18e-0.02197CPI (8a)
15 The first term in the left hand side of equation (8a) is a notional value to create the logic that the loss
arising from corruption is zero when the CPI is 100 (i.e. a CPI of 0.0 means total corrupt).
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The Figure 5-11 illustration of the profound harm that corruption has on growth is
consistent with the net effect that corruption has on the Business Freedom Index in
Figure 5-2—the lightly-shaded yellow area illustrates the loss of added growth that is
otherwise be expected in smaller economies. This pattern occurs because, by reducing
growth, corruption tends to keep small economies small or makes them smaller.
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Figure 5-11: Illustration of How Corruption Affects Growth of GDP per Capita
Economic Growth
Reduction Effect
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Rising rates of corruption are a persistent, accelerating drag on an economy—there is
no sweet spot where a low level of corruption helps an economy. In Figure 5-11 and
Figures 5-2, 4, and 10, as a nation’s CPI moves from 15 to 10, its economic growth of
legitimate activities goes into free-fall and it is at increasing risk of becoming a failed
state.
The effect of poorer economies growing faster than richer ones, netted against the
offsetting effect of corruption on economic growth, means that poor (and in socio-
economic terms) relatively virtuous countries tend to become rich in just a few
decades (e.g. Japan, Singapore and South Korea) and poor relatively corrupt countries
remain poor, or become even poorer (e.g. Nigeria, Zimbabwe, and Myanmar).
This caution is for rich as well as poor countries. Throughout history there are many
examples of corruption making rich countries less rich, or even poor—such as, mid-
20th Century Philippines, early 20th Century Argentina, the Turkish empire in the 19th
Century, 17th Century Spain, several West African empires in the 16th-17th Centuries,
15th Century China and Byzantium, 13th Century Anasazi, 9th Century Moche, 6th
Century Teotihucán, 5th Century Rome.
5.4 The Social Consequences of Corruption
Violence and poverty are highly correlated with corruption (Figures 5-4 to 5-5). When
the injustice and loss of basic human rights associated with corrupt acts and the cover-
up of corruption are included, it is unsurprising that Satisfaction with Life (SWL)
index is negatively correlated with corruption (Figure 5-12).
Six countries (Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Armenia, Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia) in
Figure 5-12 have SWLs that are much lower than what might be expected, given their
CPI. These outliers may be due to Russia’s willingness to meddle in the affairs of
what it calls near-away countries (e.g. its recent invasion of Georgia). Higher than
expected SWLs may be explainable via relative depravation—for example: significant
improvements occurred in the quality of life of their average citizen over the last
generation—and/or a failure of the population to realise that some popular practises of
their governments may not be sustainable (e.g. Venezuela’s nationalisation and
taxation practises).While the fit of the trend-line in Figure 5-12 is generally good,
there are a few concerns. Specifically, the fit as the CPI approaches 100 (very low
corruption) is clearly poor and the spread in the error widens as the CPI approaches
79
10. Similar concerns, noted for Figure 5-1, were attributed to the presence of two or
more interacting functions. Future research should explore that possibility and its
implications for the SWL vs. CPI function.
5.5 Chapter Conclusion
This study analysed and combined output and indices from a range of studies to
develop an overview of the socio-economic effects of corruption. While a few studies
have suggested that some level of corruption may benefit society by greasing the
wheels of enterprise, this study found corruption to be pernicious at all levels and that
there is no corruption sweet-spot.
The fundamental harm in corruption is its erosion of the trust that enables business
and social dealings—as trust erodes, transaction costs increase at an escalating rate.
Figure 5-2 suggests that the business response to corruption of competing in the
market-for-bribes rapidly runs afoul of how does one trust those whom one has bribed
to breach trust? Thus, while corruption may give a temporary gain to the corrupt it is
always a negative-sum game to society as a whole.
Figures 5-4, 5-5, and 5-12 suggest that countries with a high level of corruption are
likely to be very violent, be very poor, and have a low SWL.
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The correlation between corruption and poverty is clear in Figure 5-5, and the
mechanism by which corruption deepens and potentiates poverty is shown in Figures
5-10 and 5-11. Specifically, corruption stunts and can even reverse economic growth.
In Figures 5-2, 4, 10, 11 and 12, as the CPI moves from 15 toward 10, a nation’s
business prospects, growth of legitimate economic activities and SWL goes into free-
fall and it is at rising risk of becoming a failed state.
The effect of corruption on compounding rates of economic growth can be seen in
how:
 Poor countries tend to grow at a faster rate than rich countries,
 Poor relatively virtuous countries tend to become rich in just a few decades,
 Poor corrupt countries tend to remain poor, or become even poorer, and
 There are many examples, throughout history, of corruption making rich
countries less rich, or even poor.
It is unsurprising, given the association of corruption with violence, poverty, and
abuse of basic human rights, that there is a negative correlation between it and
satisfaction with life. Thus, leaders who truly care for their people and the future of
their nations will seek all means and measures to combat and mitigate corruption, at
any and all levels.
Additional research is needed on such things as:
 The effects of corruption on trust, transactions costs, and other costs of doing
business (Figure 5-2),
 How to develop a more complete specification of economic growth as a function
of corruption, endowments of natural wealth (including oil), violence, wealth per
capita, etc. (Figure 5-10),
 Means to develop a more formal estimate of the effect of corruption on economic
growth (Figure 5-11),
 Why the satisfaction with life of some nations is less affected by corruption than
others (Figure5-12),
 Whether relative peace is a matter of luck, the calm before the storm (i.e. are
corrupt countries storing up trouble for the future) or must corruption infect both
a government and those it governs before violence becomes endemic, and
 The longitudinal correlation between the CPI and economic growth, violence,
and satisfaction with life.
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Chapter 6
Morality, Ethics and Accounting’s Socio-economic
Role in the Control and Mitigation of Corruption
6.1 Introduction
Control and containment of corruption, one of Accounting’s more important roles in
society, is fraught with difficulties and temptations that put accountants at risk of
being sidetracked, confused or (worse yet) corrupted.16 As Lambsdorff and Schramm
(2005, p.1) assert:
“...the world is not short of ideas on how to tackle corruption. While good intentions
abound we currently know little about their likely success”
This chapter evaluates what accountants can and should do about corruption. The
limited success of previous research in this area likely arises from three main factors
—that research:
 Started from the most common definition of corruption as “the misuse of power
or public office for a private gain or interest”, rather than searching for a first-
principles definition,
 Presumed that corruption is always wrong and focused on what accounting can
do about it, rather than considering socio-economic and moral aspects of
corruption so as to expand the research scope to what accounting can and should
do about corruption, and
 Further limited its scope to the supply-side of corruption (e.g. developing
strategies to raise the overall cost of being corrupt) rather than considering both
the supply-and the demand-side of corruption.
This chapter draws from previous chapters in this thesis (on corruption’s socio-
economic and moral aspects) to justify redefining corruption as the tort “harm arising
from a breach of an owed duty of care” (Alzadjali, et al., 2009a). That definition:
 Eases difficulties in proving the existence of corruption,
 Directs the search for perpetrators and victims of corruption and suggests the
appropriate restitution,
 Enables ex-post controls by creating significant financial risks for the corrupt, and
 Provides insights on the creation of cost-effective ex-ante controls.
While a strong moral-and-ethical case can be made that society should limit, mitigate,
or, where possible, eradicate corruption, the intent of this chapter is to work from a
clear and useful definition of corruption to develop practical and viable means for
16 As noted in Figure 3-3, 1.7 percent of the 20,905 articles listed in ProQuest as being from 2000-
2009 and containing the words accounting and corruption were about accountants facilitating
corruption and a further 4.6 percent were about earnings management.
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accountants to work via, and with, the law and other authorities to contain and control
the blight of corruption. "research has shown that the initial formulation of a problem
is not only one of the most significant determinants of its solutions, both in term of
quantity and quality, but also profoundly determines what problem is solved" (Baer, et
al. (2008 p. 2); see also: Einstein and Infeld, 1938; Ackoff and Emery, 1972; Boland
and Greenberg, 1988; Churchman, 1971; Csikszentmihalyi and Getzels, 1971; Dewey,
1938; Duncker, 1945; Hines, R. (1988); Lipshitz and Bar-Ilan, 1996; Loasby, 1976;
Nutt, 1992; Simon, 1973; Simon and Hayes, 1976; Volkema, 1983).
6.2 Moral and Ethical Dimensions
Morality and ethics have historically contributed greatly to the corruption-control
strategies of Accounting. These controls have usually been accreted in successive
layers of regulation and controls—with new layers being added when and as new
corruption-driven outrages highlighted failings in the extant controls. Typically, these
controls impair efficiency, but when and as they are (in turn) shown to be subject to
circumvention, they are added to, rather than replaced. Given that all controls
ultimately fail, there is usually a deep succession of controls with most adding cost,
but (sooner or later) being of little or no value. Thus, a major cost of corruption is the
inefficiency imposed on society by the vast and ever growing morass of rules,
regulations, controls and norms established to contain and control corruption but
never quite succeeding. If a magic-bullet was found for corruption, the resulting rise
in trust and fall in transaction costs would likely spawn a socio-economic and cultural
Renaissance by freeing most of humanity from the spectres of hunger, poverty, and
privation.
The interest in morality and ethics as a potential magic bullet for corruption is
evidenced by the rising number of academic studies—e.g. Flory, et al. (1992), De
Sardan (1999), Eskeland and Thiele (1999), Thorne and Hartwick (2001), Lewis
(2005), and Smith (2006). However, the subjectivity associated with morality and
ethics tends to cause such studies to be fuzzy and inconclusive at best. Many
organisations seek to ease this subjectivity by codifying what is moral and ethical
behaviour. However, as Davies (1991; per Andrew, 1998) notes, these codes tend to
be widely ignored within their own organisations, are rarely enforced to any degree or
consistency and almost never influence the actions and choices of corporate decision
makers. Such revealed preference strongly suggests that morality-and-ethics codes are
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established more for public relations and display, than for any real, sustained use as a
guide, boundary, constraint, or control on organisation thinking, decisions and actions.
As far back as Plato (429-347 BCE), Aristotle (384-322 BCE), Augustine (354-430
CE) and Aquinas (1225–1274 CE), morality was authoritative in judging if an action
was right or wrong and ethics has long been associated with assessing the nature of
individuals. Thus, morality and ethics combine to form the core of how many
individuals perceive, interpret, and judge their own behaviour and actions. Shared
morality and ethics foster and encourage the many different human values that form
any given culture. Thus, any attempt to fight corruption, via morality and ethics, is
likely to be deflected by serious issues relating to individual and cultural values. For
example, one of many attempts to define the nature of Thai corruption, focused on the
perceptions and experiences of public officials, highlighted that most “…respondents
thought corruption was part of life in Thai society.…. [and that bribery] was seen as
customary” (Bhargava and Bolongaita, 2004, p. 174).17
Morality and ethics are intangibles that are often context sensitive and tend to arise
from a long history that may not be apparent to an observer or (even) to the actual
actors. As a result, efforts to combat corruption via morality and ethics tend to be
deflected by the enormous difficulty and inertia of displacing extant, but often
implicit, cultural values and norms.
Morality and ethics are the focus in a large number of corruption studies across a wide
array of disciplines (sociology, criminology, psychology, political science, etc) but,
because of the aforementioned issues, these studies tend to be ineffective and/or
situational specific. Morality and ethics may ultimately provide a long-term means to
resolve corruption. However, currently unresolved, conflicting and compounding
issues confound the search for a workable moral and ethical resolution to corruption.
Thus, in the short-to-intermediate term, a workable resolution to corruption is more
likely to arise from a combination of the more focused and applied accounting and
law disciplines.
While a strong moral and ethical case can and has been made for limiting, mitigating,
and (where and as possible) eradicating corruption, there are currently no means to
effect such aspirations. Less elegant, more practical, temporary means are needed in
17 This study was conducted as part of a Civil Service Commission research project on strategies for
combating corruption.
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the interim to control and contain corruption, while the more elegant long-term
corruption-control strategies are developed to change attitudes and behaviour.
Stapenhurst and Kpundeh (1999, p.8) conclude that “…curbing corruption is not
merely about ethics and morality; it is about sound governance and the effective,
efficient use of public resources for the public good”. Wright and Sayed (2003assert
that “...deviations from fairness break trust, increase transaction costs and, when
breaches in trust become endemic …our civilization will lose legitimacy and then
fail.” This notion is consistent with the definition, mentioned earlier, that corruption is
a breach of a duty of care. Accounting can, in fulfilling other roles (e.g. providing
information and organising control systems), implement strategies to help participants
more easily prevent or resolve corruption by identifying and avoiding such situations,
providing exit strategies (for situations where corruption is foreseeable), or
exposing/documenting corruption when it occurs. Numerous scholars have recently
suggested that it is critically important to develop theory which not only advances
fundamental understanding, but also enhances practice (e.g., Rynes, et al., 2001; Van
de Ven and Johnson, 2006). In terms of corruption, a theory is needed to help
Accounting cost-effectively mitigate corruption via prevention (where possible) or
help to identify, convict, and strongly discipline perpetrators after they commit
corrupt acts.
6.2.1 Moral and Ethical Dimensions of Corruption Resolution
While the next section shows how trust is essential to most successful relationships,
Everett, et al. (2007, p. 521) assert in counter-point that a reduction of trust can reduce
opportunities for corruption and suggest that eliminating subsidies, lowering trade
barriers, privatising government assets, and minimising regulation will “...
unambiguously reduce opportunities for corruption”. However, corruption in these
examples is less a matter of trust gone wrong and more an example of the old Roman
adage quis custodiet ipsos custodes?18 This is a common issue—e.g. the police have a
duty to protect the public and catch criminals, but there is a risk they will use their
authority to become criminal, so the police have an internal affairs department, who
may be tempted by corruption, and so forth. Thus, the only effective way to reduce
the opportunity for corruption is to attack corruption at its root. However, as Thoreau
18 Who will guard the guards themselves? From the Roman satirist Juvenal, 55-127 CE.
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(1854, p. 80) noted: “There are a thousand hacking at the branches of evil to one who
is striking at the root…”
In a variant of the above issue, Sterling, (1971, p.34 and 1975) asserts that
accountants conceive of “…issues in such a way that they in principle are
unresolvable [and, as a result,] … move from one unresolved issue to another, while
the stock of unresolved issues continues to increase.” Accounting, in developing a
resolution to corruption, should recognize that the needs of the direct and indirect
victims of corruption may differ from the general needs of society. It is also important
to note that, as Alzadjali, et al. (2009b, p. 14) found, corruption is never victimless, it
is “...pernicious at all levels...there is no corruption sweet-spot”. Thus, any resolution
of corruption must not only contain and control it, but also inform its victims in such a
way as to assist them in demanding and winning restitution.
Although, “the formulation of a problem is often more essential than its solution…”
(Einstein and Infeld, 1938, p. 92). However, Everett, et al. (2007) suggest that to
precisely address corruption we should consider three broad categories of solution:
control, exit, and voice. The definition of corruption used in this paper considers these
possible strategies so as to provide accountants with more control and information to
make better judgments. In addition, it helps provide an appropriate exit from corrupt
situations and enables victims (individual and/or groups) to voice their losses and
needs so as to claim restitution from those who have harmed them and/or otherwise
failed to discharge a legitimate duty of care. A large part of the corruption controls
will be embedded in written or implied legal and social contracts that explicitly state
what duties of care are owed, by whom and to whom. The greatest harm to society
from corruption is not in what is stolen (i.e. in economic terms, it merely transfers
value and, thus, nets to a zero-sum game), but rather in what is destroyed, and trust is
one of the greatest values destroyed by corruption. As asserted by Zaghloul and
Hartman (2003): “[in] the absence of trust in business relationships .... [there] is
significant need for a good and powerful control system to manage and administrate
the contracting process”. An additional significant advantage of inherent or enforced
trust is that it greatly reduces information and transaction costs and, thus, significantly
reduces the cost of doing business.
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6.3 Trust vs. Transaction Cost
As illustrated in Figure 6-1 (below), trust between parties helps minimize information
and transaction costs in most situations (see, also, Akerlof, 1970).
Figure 6-1: The Effect of the Trust-to-Mistrust Gradient on Transaction Costs
Mistrust increases costs in several ways (per Zaghloul and Hartman, 2003) including:
uncertain work conditions; delaying events; indemnification; liquidated damages; and
excessive documentation. The main points drawn from Figure 6-1 are:
– Trust reduces transaction costs: As trust declines, transaction costs
rise exponentially and approach infinity as trust approaches nil. Actual
or potential corruption makes it difficult and/or unwise to sustain trust.
– Accounting and a trustworthy legal system complement or enhance
trust: This causes the transaction-cost curve to rotate downward and
even allows transactions to occur where a minor degree of mistrust
exists. However, as shown in Figure 6-1, mistrust imposes serious costs
on business and makes transactions too costly where the mistrust is high.
– If high and certain cost are imposed on trust breakers, transactions
are viable even with great mistrust: This situation can occur where
there is effective accounting and law (i.e. contract enforcement via a
trusted, effective, efficient and timely legal system) or by brutal extra-
legal systems. However, in the latter case, the enforcement system must
be both feared and trusted—which may explain why many organised-
crime groups tend to use codes and neo-feudal systems of interlocking
entitlements and cross-obligations.
While both legal and extra-legal (organised crime) approaches can reduce transaction
costs to where transactions are viable even if there is great mistrust, Figures 6-2 and
6-3 show that extra-legal approaches to enforcing contracts in highly corrupt societies
tend to be associated with a huge increase in violence and a significant reduction in
satisfaction with life.
Contract
Enforced Transaction
Cost
(-100%) B A 0 (100%)
Mistrust Trust
1
2
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Thus, extra-legal approaches to managing corruption do not resolve it, but merely
change its form and shift its costs to different victims. Ultimately, extra-legal
approaches to corruption compound the problem and can eventually destabilise a
country by undermining its critical social institutions; which allow violently-corrupt
individuals to usurp wealth, power, and authority; which may accelerate a vicious
downward corruption and violence spiral.
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6.4 A Solution to Corruption that Integrates Economic, Legal
and Accounting Dimensions
In a high-trust environment transaction costs are considerably lower, because trust
reduces the perceived need for validation, cross-checks, and documentation. Dyer
and Chu (2003) support this notion in their study on the role of trust in transactions.
As previously noted, transaction costs rise dramatically as trust declines and trade
eventually becomes non-viable unless trust can either be re-established, replaced, or
complemented by other factors.
The operating and enforcement costs of a trustworthy legal system are negligible in
comparison to the rise in transaction costs imposed by a lack of trust or the violence
and socially corrupting effects of extra-legal approaches to resolving a lack of trust.
As Williamson (1979) notes: “...agreements and contracts can be best and almost
costlessly enforced within the legal system”. However, the main issue regarding the
legal system is only rarely its existence or cost. Most nations have a legal system;
however, many are ineffective because they are seen as corrupt, less-than competent,
too slow, and/or generally untrustworthy. Thus, the legal systems of many countries
have become so entangled in corruption that they no longer provide a viable solution.
Such legal systems need to be revived and made cost-effective, impartial, timely and
trustworthy. Tyler (1990) argues that people respect the law because they believe that
the justice system is fair and that they have been and/or will be treated fairly. The key
to less corruption (and more trust) then, is an effective system of property rights and
the rule of law (Lambsdorff, 1999; Leite and Weidmann, 1999; Treisman, 2000). An
interesting flow-of-causation issue is: Are trusting societies (as Uslaner (2004, p. 2)
concludes) less corrupt or are less corrupt societies more able to trust?
6.4.1 Defining Corruption to Facilitate Control, Exit, and Voice
Corruption, despite assertions in many earlier definitions, is not about private gain.
Specifically: “There is nothing wrong in making partial decisions in return for favours
on the grounds that it harms nobody” (Amos, 1982, p. 123). Corruption tends to be so
twisted, convoluted and confused that the struggle against it needs to be clearly
focused around a definition that is general and unambiguous. As noted previously,
this study suggests that the notion of corruption as a tort provides such a definition.
Corruption, as a tort, balances on three legs where all three must all stand for a
situation or action to be deemed corrupt. Specifically, as illustrated in Figure 6
accusation of corruption requires proof that:
 A duty of care existed,
 The duty of care was breached, and
 Harm arose from the breached
The first two legs, in Figure 6
via simple questions of fact (i.e. a duty eith
was honoured, breached, or still pending
of corruption are harmless and may even benefit society by working around
bureaucratic blockages to economic growth (Lef
Yoshihara, 1988; Coppier, and Michetti, 2006). However, such claims are hotly
disputed by most researchers and are irrelevant to the tort approach to corruption.
Specifically, the third leg of the corruption tort involves proving
arising from the breach of duty (again merit) and determining its amount (the
of the tort). Thus, proof of corruption requires that all three legs be present and those
Figure 6-4: Illustration of Corruption as a Tort Standing on Three
duty of care.
-4, involve proving or disproving the merit of the tort
er exists or does not and, if a duty exists, it
). A few researchers suggest that small levels
f, 1964; Huntington, 1968;
the existence of harm
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three legs of corruption identify the perpetrator, the victim and the quantum of harm.
If any of these items is unproven there is no corruption. Essentially, the focus in
corruption as a tort is all about harm occurring where there was a legitimate reason to
expect care. While unwarranted gain may be the intent of corruption, it is neither
necessary nor sufficient to prove corruption.
The violated duty of care is what emotes the perception of corruption as being heinous
and such outrage often fuels strident demands for legal action and retribution.
However, defining corruption as a criminal offence is a red herring. All corruption is
a social wrong that needs redress, but only a few variants of corruption are legislated
into being criminal acts. Proof of criminal corruption requires (in countries with an
English-based jurisprudence) evidence beyond a reasonable doubt (usually seen as ≥ 
95 percent confidence) of criminal intent, and a claim of stupidity is often a low-cost
but sufficient defence against charges of criminal corruption. A tort/civil lawsuit
requires only a probable level of evidence (usually 50+ percent confidence) and (other
than prison) offers a wider array of remedies. Thus, a tort approach to resolving
corruption offers retribution and restitution in the form of damages and it is important
to note that damages from corruption can often exceed what the perpetrator gained by
a multiple of two to five. Consequently, civil convictions for corruption will be easier
to achieve, be cost-effective, and may bankrupt those who are convicted. As a side
benefit, in a situation like that of the Enron fraud, hundreds of employees could be
brought before the courts, convicted, and punished—rather than only the top few.
Thus, the potential cost of participating in, or otherwise benefiting from, organizations
committing fraud would rise to a point of being an untenable risk.
One weakness, common to both criminal and civil systems of law, is that victims need
to become aware they have been harmed before they can argue for restitution and
evidence must be gathered on the nature and extent of the harm. Thus, anti-corruption
legislation needs to be written so as to make substantiation of the offence, perpetrator,
and harm, easy to perform.
A new class of legislation and declarations of fundamental human, social, and
environmental rights appear to be seeking to explicitly induce a general
acknowledgment that most social harm associated with business arises via corporate
breach-of-a-duty-of-care torts. Furthermore, (as part of this acknowledgment) venues
are being created for those harmed by such torts to seek redress from those benefiting
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from that harm. In the absence of a rigorous system of Social Responsibility
Accounting, (for example an unambiguous statement of obligations, clear
performance criteria, effective means of validation, and harsh and certain
consequences for defalcation) Corporate and Individual Social Responsibility merely
add another venue for corruption.19
Social Responsibility Accounting can be ordered into what Everett, et al. (2007) have
called control, exit, and voice—where:
 Control involves traditional accounting methods and approaches to prevent or
detect defalcations like corruption—this stage provides a statement of responsibility
and evidence of due diligence in completing a duty of care,
 Exit involves gathering and providing information so that individuals and
organisations can identify situations that are corrupt or risky and either avoid them
or exit from them before harm occurs, and
 Voice involves providing individuals and organisations with the information they
need to give voice to either the harm that they or others have experienced from those
who have failed in their duty of care or to prove that they have completed their duty
of care with due diligence.
The beauty of the tort approach to corruption is that it makes intent irrelevant—what
counts are obligations, outcomes, and a defendant having to prove due diligence if a
contracted intent was not achieved (NB: a contract in this case might be an actual
contract, a social contract or a legislated contract inferred by social norms or
legislated Corporate and Individual Social Responsibility). Thus, the onus of proof for
harm and a breach of a duty of care should rest with the plaintiff and, once those are
proven, the onus of proving due diligence should rest with the defendant.
Accountants are well positioned to develop appropriate reporting and controls for
Corporate and Individual Social Responsibility—the accounting professional
associations provide a clear statement and guideline of the responsibility and ethics of
accountants. Specifically, accountants are required to report annually on how they
have kept their knowledge current via professional development, and accounting
clients can file a complaint and/or ask for arbitration from the association if they feel
19 As previously discussed, the need for Social Responsibility Accounting (SRA) to give CSR teeth is
a recommendation in this thesis. The literature review found a number of articles on SRA, but in
each case SRA was used as a synonym to CSR rather than being a key requirement for CSR to be
effective.
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that an accountant has not been professional and/or otherwise failed to diligently
discharge his/her duties.
6.5 Chapter Conclusion
Corruption has plagued and impoverished humanity since time immemorial. Many
studies and sermons have been written and presented to condemn corruption and to
seek a solution, but have changed little. Accounting has, for millennia, sought to
contain and control corruption. The corrupt, however, gather wealth, power and
authority and use those means to corrupt and subvert the systems and processes setup
to fight corruption. Corruption is an enormous drag on society that destroys far more
wealth than that gathered by the corrupt. This study found that, while corruption can
be soundly condemned on moral and ethical grounds, those grounds are too culturally
and context sensitive to provide an unambiguous paradigm from which to fight
corruption.
This study suggests that tort law be used in civil courts to fight corruption. After
legislation firmly establishes the nature and context of a duty of care—precedents in
case law will soon fill in the details of who owes what to whom and will keep that
process up-to-date. The risk of lawsuits is likely to have a salutary effect on those who
might be tempted to benefit via corruption. Accounting will need to develop Social
Responsibility Accounting to keep the system fair, reasonable, and relatively free
from frivolous and vexatious tort lawsuits.
Social Responsibility Accounting will require a clear accounting of who owes what
duty to whom and what constitutes due diligence in fulfilling those duties. Such
accounting will arise from the activities of control, exit, and voice. Voice is the most
important of those activities, because it enables and empowers victims of corruption
to denounce and seek restitution from those who betrayed their trust. However, this
process will not work unless the courts are seen as cost-effective, impartial, timely
and trustworthy.
93
Chapter 7
Application of Research to Several Cases
7.1 Introduction
Previous chapters in this thesis introduced corruption, discussed its nature, used an
inductive research approach to review the extant literature, empirical research and
other studies on corruption,20 and used quantitative approach to deduce the socio-
economic costs and consequences of corruption. The intent of this study is to initiate a
paradigm shift on how corruption is perceived. In the search for new precepts, initially
an inductive approach is crucial. Specifically, as Yu (2006, p. 53) notes, “...deductive
reasoning cannot lead to the discovery of knowledge that is not already embedded in
the premise.” However, once inductive insights are developed, a deductive approach
is ideal for evaluating their capacity to meet deliverables. Later in this Chapter, a
deductive case study approach is applied to examine how well the tort paradigm of
corruption meets the following deliverables that were inductively inferred, earlier in
this thesis:
 A practical definition of corruption, as the tort breach of a duty of care.
 A definition of the three legs of this tort, in such a way as to delineate merit
and quantum for the civil courts.
 A review of the socio-economic cost and consequences of corruption,
using received literature and other studies, from a wide range of sources.
 An examination of moral and ethical issues surrounding corruption, that
found them too fuzzy and/or situational-and-culturally specific to be useful in
developing an immediate and rigorous means to resolve corruption.
 A finding that various legal systems are evolving toward a tort approach
to resolving corruption, via corporate and individual social responsibility.
However, in the absence of Social Responsibility Accounting, laws requiring
corporate and individual social responsibility are likely to rapidly devolve
into just another venue for corruption and/or corporate puffery.
 A finding that a broad definition of the attributes Social Responsibility
Accounting is needed, to make corporate and individual social responsibility
approaches viable and enforceable.
The above (initial) deliverables were combined and extended to infer a cost-effective
means by which societies can forestall corruption and its effects from overwhelming
20 An inductive research approach uses a broad initial literature review to formulate questions and to
direct the review of those questions via a detailed literature review and/or an analysis of extant data.
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their opportunities to grow and provide their citizens with the incentive and means to
create and enjoy a high-quality of life. This approach requires that a society’s legal
system be of sufficient competence, authority, merit, and fairness to give good reason
for its citizens, and others relying on it, to be confident that it will be: cost-effective,
impartial, timely, and worthy of trust. Social Responsibility Accounting and the legal
system can then be a reasonably certain and cost-effective means for the victims of
corruption to seek fair restitution and retribution against their tormentors.21 If this
anti-corruption path is valid, and given that the harm of corruption is often many
times greater than the gain to the corrupt, this approach will tend to bankrupt the
corrupt, remove their power/authority, and, thereby, reduce their power to corrupt and
afflict society. However, research has social utility only when it is relevant and can be
reasonably tied back to reality. Figure 7-1 illustrates how theory can arise from a
review of extant empirical studies/analysis and/or be developed from real-world
questions. Ideally, after a theory is formulated, it should be evaluated by testing its
capacity to predict, explain, or influence real-world experiences and outcomes.
Figure 7-1: Development and Grounding of Theory
A
Source: Adapted from Birks (2009, p. 2).
21 Social Responsibility Accounting (SRA) is a phrase developed in Chapter 4 of this thesis were SRA
provides an unambiguous statement of obligations, clear performance criteria, effective means of
validation, and harsh and certain consequences for defalcation. Occasional references to SRA in the
Accounting Literature as a synonym to Corporate Social Responsibility is neither logical nor useful
as a notion.
B
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One of the key limitations of inductive methods, as argued by Hume (1777-1812), is
that “...things are inconclusive by induction because ... there are always new cases and
new evidence”. Hacking (1975) suggested that this issue is also known as “...the
sceptical problem about the future”. However, deductive enquiry is not entirely free of
being part of a progression toward infinity—as Hoffmann (1997) notes: the main role
of the deductive method is to test the validity of one truth, and as it does so, it reveals
another truth, to be validated and so forth—on to infinity or to when the basic premise
or paradigm is exhausted and requires replacement or renewal via inductive means.
This chapter uses deductive methods, via case studies, to illustrate the applicability of
the outcome/deliverables of this study (listed above) and to evaluate their validity and
usefulness. The cases develop five well-known situations to provide a low-cost and
low-risk means for this evaluation. As with any new paradigm, testing and adaptation
are ongoing processes until the paradigm is invalidated or superseded by yet another
paradigm. It is important to note that this thesis does not assert that the corruption
paradigm it develops is superior in all ways to the current paradigm, only that the new
paradigm provides new approaches and tools to identify and resolve corruption that
are, in many cases (but not all), more efficient and/or effective than those associated
with the extant paradigm.
7.2 Case Studies – Fraud and/or Other Financial Malfeasance
This section uses five relevant cases (WorldCom, Enron, Goldman Sachs vs. Bear
Stearns, the BP Deepwater Horizon Gulf of Mexico Oil-spill Debacle, and the Bofors-
India Scandal) to evaluate the validity of this study’s deliverables. These particular
cases are chosen because they are frequently and widely cited by many researchers.
Also, a number of references are made to other case studies, drawn from well-known
examples of scandal around the world, to illustrate how corrupt acts can occur and the
socio-economic consequences of such acts.
7.2.1 Case 1: WorldCom
WorldCom became a giant in the wildly expanding telecom industry, in part, because
legal and regulatory barriers in its markets were relaxed or eliminated. Acquiring and
merging with a large number of other large telecom providers enabled WorldCom to,
very quickly “…become the 25th largest firm in America, the world’s largest internet
96
backbone provider and largest carrier of international voice traffic, and in its home
market, the second largest provider of long distance service” (Clarke, 2007, p. 331).
In their early years, WorldCom leased enormous amounts of communications capacity
and forecast that they would grow into it via optimistic forecasts that telecom service
demand would grow at 400 percent, or more, per year. In such a scenario it was both
reasonable and permissible under (the then) US GAAP for them to capitalize large
fractions of their system lease-and-development costs, until demand growth for their
products flattened-out (Economist, 29 June, 2002b p. 57). However, demand slowed
and stalled far earlier than expected and WorldCom should have immediately started
to expense all subsequent system-development costs and amortized those that had
previously been capitalized. Instead it continued capitalizing those costs and began to
book fictitious revenues (Economist, 29 June, 2002a, p. 13, 20 July 2002b, p. 9). The
WorldCom situation became grossly untenable after a technical advance raised
potential physical-system utilization 100-fold. Combined with the physical increases
in communication networks, this advance increased telecom capacity by over 500
fold. The resulting 50,000 percent increase in capacity swamped the 400 percent rise
in demand that had occurred over the previous three years – the resulting decline in
service prices finished WorldCom (Economist, 20 July 2002a, pp. 59-61).
Top executives of WorldCom, in dealing with these issues, worried more about their
own wealth than about serving the security and long-term future of the company and
its shareholders. In serving their own narrow interests, WorldCom top management
repeatedly sought to hide or obfuscate facts via inflated or false claims and reports
that exaggerated revenues and under-reported costs. As Clarke (2007, p. 338) notes
“...the capitalisation of WorldCom’s operating expenses enabled the company to
claim ... that the cost would be spread out over several years instead of immediately”.
These breaches of duty of care to its shareholders and stakeholders, via false claims
and management of (and/or outright manipulation of) financial statements, resulted
not only in approximately $9 billion in losses in WorldCom but also the “...accounting
fraud destroyed at least $7.8 billion of shareholder wealth in other American
telecommunication companies” (Sidak, 2003, p. 235).
While WorldCom top executives prospered (by selling their WorldCom shares, at
highly inflated prices, before the company was forced into bankruptcy), WorldCom’s
employees lost their jobs and the value of the WorldCom stock that many held as a
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large part of their 401K retirement portfolios. This case is a clear example of the harm
that arises from a breach of a duty of care by the principals of a corporation to their
employees and other stakeholders. These breaches occurred because the interests of
WorldCom stakeholders were poorly served by the company’s top management and
those who assisted them in hiding the truth. Thus, this harm to the stakeholders of
WorldCom is easily tied to breaches of duty of care by the WorldCom principals that,
along with the resulting harm, would be relatively easily documented and proven in a
civil court—which would then lead to extant assets and/or future earning being seized
for distribution to those harmed.
In this case, use of the traditional approach to corruption dramatically reduced the
scope of the scope of the corruption investigation, the number of recognised victims,
the quantum of the damages and the pool of assets that could be seized to effect
restitution. Forcing the victims and/or their advocates to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt, the existence of a wrongful private gain and/or the intent to corruptly create a
private gain, dramatically reduced the numbers of perpetrators who were tried for
corruption and/or other forms of malfeasance. The paradigm developed in this thesis
would have greatly eased the way and reduced the cost of bringing these perpetrators
to account for the harm they created.
7.2.2 Case 2: Enron
The extensive documentation and study of Enron makes it an ideal case study for this
thesis—for a more detailed discussion of Enron please see Fusaro and Miller, 2002;
Arnold and de Lange, 2003; Currall and Epstein 2003, Fox, 2003; McLean and
Elkind, 2004; Dembinski, 2006.
Enron was a natural-gas-utility firm that on-sold natural gas from producers to power
utilities and other end-users. Historically, such utilities are ultra-low risk and have low
returns. Traditionally, such utilities eliminate price-risk for producers by purchasing-
forward (for a block of time, often five years) large volumes of natural gas and reduce
end-user cost/risk by matching forward purchases with set-price forward sales, for a
similar period. This hedging eliminates risk by matching the equal but opposite price
and costs risks of producers and end-users. The utility earns its income from the
producer-buyer spread (often only a fraction of a percent or at most a few percent) and
from transporting the product to the end-user. As noted, immediately above, the
returns from such utilities are normally predictable, dull, low, and stable.
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The senior managers and board of directors of Enron, after noting that for an extended
period the price of natural gas had been rising, decided to jazz-up the firm’s financial
performance by forward buying massively more natural gas than their forward-sales-
contract commitments and re-selling the intended excess in gas spot markets, as the
forward purchase contracts came due. Enron was lucky for many years and gained
spectacular profits from what was, in substance, gambling. US GAAP, at that time,
did not require such high-risk and highly irregular gains to be differentiated from
regular business income in the annual financial statements and did not require that the
associated risks be reported. The Enron principals were hailed as financial wizards
(for generating profits that were far out-of-proportion to their assets) and responded
by developing an ever-greater appetite for risk and continually expanded Enron’s un-
hedged forward natural gas commitments. While it might be argued that, to this point,
no fraud had been committed, the Enron principals had clearly breached their duty of
care to their shareholders, via an ongoing failure to fully disclose that Enron’s rapidly
increasing windfalls were highly risky and did not arise from normal business
operations. However, as long as Enron was spectacularly profitable there was little
likelihood of complaints against them. That is the nature of gambling—if you win,
you are a hero and all is forgiven, but if you lose, you are a bum (and if you keep
gambling, sooner or later, you will lose—unless you cheat, then sooner or later you
will get caught and be a cheating bum along with being a loser bum).
Enron’s troubles began when the spot price of gas fell and their huge, rising windfall
gains reversed into truly prodigious losses. Rather than accept that they had lost their
gamble, the Enron principals started manipulating natural gas prices, via the creation
of artificial spot shortages that enabled their losses to be recouped. This scandalous
behaviour expanded Enron’s breach of duty of care to include harm to its customers,
arising from artificial shortages, high prices, and misallocation of resources.
After re-establishing its ability to generate massive profits, Enron engaged in another
bout of gambling and found that its rising share prices created another opportunity for
the principals to enrich themselves. Cornford (2006, p. 21) suggests that “Enron’s
conduct was similar to that of many firms in the 1990s, deriving from the links
between stock prices and executives’ remuneration and wealth, above all through
stock options”. However, the sheer size and weight of the energy markets in which
Enron participated eventually overwhelmed its ability to manipulate US natural gas
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prices, the spot price dropped below the forward price, and Enron faced snowballing
losses that threatened to avalanche through and wreck it operations.
Unlike the previous debacle, more than market and stock manipulations were needed
to salvage Enron’s situation. In response, among many other accounting and financial
statement manipulations, Enron used non-consolidated special purpose entities (SPEs)
to shift losses and liabilities from its published financial statements (Economist, 19
January 2002, pp. 57-58, 2 February 2002, p. 70, 16 February 2002, pp. 57-58, 31
August 2002, p. 55). Schwarcz (2002, p. 1309) more bluntly asserts that “...Enron
engaged in a range of complex transactions, designed to achieve accounting rather
than operating results”, and Ijiri (2005, p. 271) even more harshly observed “...how
skilfully it [Enron] took advantage of fine details of US accounting standards and
manipulated accounting at the threshold of legal and illegal treatments” (see also
Donelson, et al., 2009).
The external auditors, supposedly the guardians of financial reporting, recognised that
they were hired by Enron’s principals (e.g. the CEO and Board), that typically they
earned more from consulting than by auditing (Economist, 2002a, 9 February, p. 9
and 2002, 20 July, p. 70), and chose to enrich themselves as accomplices instead of
serving as dutiful guardians. Enron claimed that their auditors (Anderson Accounting)
consulted with them on how to creatively beat the GAAP safeguards with Chewco
and other SPEs (Economist, 9 February 2002b, p. 57, 22 December 2001, p. 84).
Thus, Enron compounded its earlier breach of duty to its shareholders and creditors by
blatantly lying to them in its financial statements and Anderson Accounting breached
its duty of care to Enron’s stakeholders by participating in some lies and turning a
blind eye to others. It is clear that corruption begets corruption and can engender
cascading failures throughout society’s systems and safeguards.
During the investigation of Enron, many of its documents were shredded—this
destruction (of the evidence of what actually happened) breached the duty of Enron
and Anderson Accounting to stakeholders and society, to maintain clear records of
Enron’s transaction and dealings.
The Enron debacle makes it clear that high-minded codes of conduct often mean
little—Schwarcz, (2002, p. 1312) observed that Enron’s senior executives “...seemed
to have a somewhat casual approach towards compliance with Enron’s Code of
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Conduct”. Enron’s many breaches of duty led to its final collapse in early 2002,
spawned losses of $60-100 billion USD, and badly shook confidence in the integrity
of US financial markets. Only a small part of those losses were recovered and only a
very small fraction of the perpetrators, their accomplices, and/or those who knowingly
gained from those corrupt deeds were ever brought to account for their actions or
inactions. Worse soon followed—2002 was a very bad year; in which the now wary
markets found that a lack of integrity had corrupted many big firms (Adelphia, AOL,
Bristol-Myers Squibb, CMS Energy, Duke Energy, Dynegy, El Paso Corporation,
Freddie Mac, Global Crossing, Halliburton, Homestore.com, ImClone Systems,
Kmart, Merck and Co, Merrill Lynch, Mirant, Nicor, Peregrine Systems, Qwest
Communications, Reliant Energy, Sunbeam, Tyco International, etc.).
A number of lessons can be drawn from the above case and discussion:
1) High-minded codes of conduct provide little or no protection—the corrupt are always
happy to declare (to stakeholders, regulators, and/or anyone else) that they subscribe
to the highest moral standards and then lie, cheat, squander, and worse.
2) The principals, managers, and associates of Enron committed a number of breaches
of duty of care that harmed shareholders, creditors, suppliers, customers, financial
markets, accountant reputations, and society in general.
3) Enron’s principals took a dull, boring, and stable utility on a wild ride of risk by
gambling on rising natural gas spot prices with un-hedged futures. Their initial
success created an illusion of profitability that encouraged them to take ever greater
undisclosed risks with assets entrusted to them by stakeholders. When the markets
turned on them, the Enron principals compounded their initial breach of duty of care
by manipulating prices in the end-user markets and by manipulating their stock.
Eventually, out of desperation, the Enron principals started manipulating their
financial statements and corrupted their external audit firm (Anderson Accounting).
4) Corruption begets corruption—success gives the corrupt power, authority and the
means to be even more corrupt and to corrupt those around them or to destroy those
who refuse to be corrupted. As Machiavelli (1532, p. 93) noted a person: “...who
wishes to profess the good [to act virtuously] in everything needs must fall among
many who are not good [and thus come to his ruin].”
5) When corruption becomes endemic, trust and confidence are destroyed—which
spawns cascading failures through markets and society.
6) Efforts to restore confidence via trickery and/or other corrupt means eventually
compound and deepen the costs and consequences of corruption.
7) Corruption must be resisted at any and all levels. As Nehru (1942, p. 280) asserted
“Evil unchecked grows, Evil tolerated poisons the whole system”. Arendt (2005, pp.
271-272) warns that we must not become “...blind to the numerous small and not so
small evils with which the road to hell is paved”. In the case of Enron only the most
corrupt were prosecuted, the costs of the prosecutions (being criminal and with
significant threatened punishments) were prohibitively costly, little was recovered to
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compensate the victims, and the majority of those who participated in and/or
knowingly benefited from the corruption were left free to infect other firms with their
depravity and cupidity.
8) The tort approach to controlling corruption proposed in this thesis would have
involved the victims in claiming restitution and retribution from their tormentors,
would have brought the majority (if not vast majority) of Enron perpetrators to
account for their actions and/or inactions, would have multiplied the recovered
restitution many-fold, and greatly reduced the harm that continues to be inflicted on
society by those who escaped prosecution and consequences for their malfeasance at
Enron.
9) A breach of duty of care where the harm involves increased risk may not cause
noticeable/tangible losses for many periods. Thus a system that relies on those who
are harmed by corruption coming forward to claim restitution and retribution from
their tormentors is necessary and sufficient to control corruption ex post, but
regulators are still needed for ex ante controls on corruption.
The insights generated/raised in this thesis provide new ways to identify, consider,
regulate, and control corruption, both ex ante and ex post. The traditional approach to
dealing with corruption very clearly failed in the Enron case—very few of those who
gained from the corruption in Enron were brought to justice and the victims received
little compensation from those who wrongfully gained at their cost. The efforts to
prevent future Enron-like debacles (e.g. legislation like the Sarbanes-Oxley act) are
proving costly to society, are not particularly effective, and are subject to dilution or
reversal as those who are regulated capture the regulators (see, Stigler, 1971).
The approach in this thesis clearly defines corruption as harm arising from a breached
duty of care and if it had been used in the Enron situation it would have dramatically
reduced the cost of prosecutions, increased the numbers of individuals held culpable
for the greatly expanded harm recognised as be created by Enron. In this approach, a
plaintiff need only prove on the preponderance of evidence, in a civil court, that a
defendant owed a duty of care, breached that duty of care, and that harm arose from
that breached duty of care. The restitution is then based on the quantum of the harm
rather than that of the often much lesser amount of the gain and can be funded by the
full range of the assets owned by the much larger pool of defendants. It is clear from
the above analysis (in the case of the Enron defalcation) the anti-corruption tools
provided by the extant paradigm of corruption are costly, difficult to apply and of only
limited effect as compared to the potential of the proposed paradigm.
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7.2.3 Case 3: Goldman Sachs vs. Bear Stearns
Goldman Sachs, the world’s most powerful investment bank, was founded in 1869 in
Manhattan by a German immigrant Marcus Goldman and his son-in-law Samuel
Sachs. The main activity of the bank was to lend money in short-term IOUs to traders.
Over the years, Goldman Sachs shifted its market to enter the housing mortgage
market. In 2005/06, the principals of Goldman Sachs began to worry that the US
mortgage market was heading into a liquidity crunch with a three-fold set of
problems:
1) Too much money had been extended to homebuyers who were very-poor to
impossibly-poor credit risks. As long as house prices had been rising such
poor quality borrowers had not been a major issue, because failed-borrowers
could quickly sell at a higher price than their purchase price,
2) The housing market was looking more and more like a bubble that was
running out of soap, and
3) Goldman Sachs was over-exposed in mortgage lending and a large part of
that loan-portfolio investment looked like it would become worthless.
Believing that the housing mortgage market was nearing collapse, Goldman Sachs
started bundling much of their mortgage investment, so that it could be off-loaded on
to other investors. Goldman Sachs’ awareness of just how bad a deal they were selling
their clients is evidenced in an email by Tom Montag (then co-head of Goldman's
trading division) which read: "Boy that Timberwolf [sic] was one shitty deal"
(Francesco and Henny, 29 April, 2010, p. 1).
The impact of those deals can be seen in the following citations:
“Goldman was the underwriter and sole marketer of the Timberwolf deal, which lost 80
percent of its value within five months of its March 2007 closing. The so-called
hybrid collateralized debt obligation was liquidated in early 2008, months before the
U.S. government averted an AIG bankruptcy.... In all, Goldman sold some $600
million worth of the Timberwolf securities to investors. The now-defunct Bear Stearns
hedge funds were the biggest buyer, gobbling up a $300 million slug. Another busted
hedge fund, Australia's Basis Yield Alpha Fund, bought about a $100 million piece of
the deal. The other buyers are not known (Goldstein, 29 April, 2010).
While offloading what it had to know were toxic investments on it clients is clearly a
breach of duty of care, that breach went two steps further:
 It appears that Goldman Sachs was so certain of the poor quality of its Timberwolf
bundle that it shorted the deal (i.e. bet against its own product succeeding;
Goldstein, 29 April, 2010), and
 "[Goldman's] misuse of exotic and complex financial structures helped spread toxic
mortgages throughout the system, [said Mr Levin, and when] .... the system finally
collapsed ... Goldman profited from the collapse." (Francesco and Henny, 29 April,
2010, p. 1)
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Bear Stearns Asset Management bought heavily into the Goldman Sachs hedge funds
and when those supposedly safe investment funds eventually went belly-up, so did
Bear Stearns—that failure touched-off a world credit crisis, that cascaded into a near
systemic failure of the world financial system and the first depression in 80 years.
Bear Stearns was founded in 1923 as an investment bank and it mainly traded in
bonds. In the last part of the 20th Century, it moved into asset management, traded in a
variety of stocks, bonds and derivatives, and became the fifth largest investment bank
in Manhattan, USA. At the turn of the 21st Century, Bear Stearns responded to the
busting of the tech bubble by shifting its focus to the housing investment market. The
logic in that move is captured by Snider and Howard (2010, p. 13) who note that, in
2001, “...not only was the economy headed downward, but the large pool of IPOs that
banks had facilitated for new technology companies dried up”. Although, high-yield
bonds had been previously profitable for the investment banks, this source faded after
investors adjusted their risk expectations during the 2001 recession. In their search
for areas of high profit and low risk “...investment banks saw the U.S. housing market
as an area with significant profit potential, given that increasing home values led to a
very low default rate on mortgages” (Snider and Howard, 2010, p. 14). However, the
investment bankers under-estimated the financial and agency risks that are inherent in
housing mortgage market and expected that housing prices would continue to rise, for
at least a while longer. Mortgage brokers compounded these problems by seeking
easy commissions, by failing to adequately qualify those applying for mortgages. As a
result, the quality of subprime mortgages began to fall in terms of risk22—this was not
a problem during the 20 year ramp-up in housing prices in the USA but once house
prices began to fall in 2006 the opportunity to sell houses without a loss evaporated
and mortgage risk-quality became a binding issue. As Friedland (2009, p. 49) notes,
after “...2007 many lenders have been reluctant to extend credit to counter-parties,
especially if highly leveraged.”
Goldman Sachs created Timberwolf I Ltd and other equity puts to sell them to clients,
like Bear Stearns, to reduce Goldman Sachs overexposure to subprime mortgages.
When the two Goldman Sachs sponsored mortgage funds (in which Bear Stearns had
heavily invested) failed, Bear Stearns was unable to meet its pledge “...to fork over
22 Subprime mortgages are mortgages issued to less credit-worthy people. Often these individuals have
histories of failure to re-pay debt or have declared bankruptcy.
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more than $3 billion...to bail out one of its two hedge funds that” relied heavily on
Goldman Sachs subprime loans (Burroughs, 2008, p. 106). After the proposed Federal
Reserve bailout of Bear Stearns failed at the 11th hour, Bear Stearns was acquired for
a pittance by J.P. Morgan and Chase and Co.
While Goldman Sachs cannot be reasonably held responsible for the Global Financial
Crisis that engulfed the world after the collapse of Bear Stearns, if there is fairness
and truth to the US Senate hearings on this matter, then Goldman Sachs likely
breached its duty of care to Bear Stearns and many other clients when it sold them
what it knew, or should have known, were toxic investments that were comprised of
assets that it felt were too risky to hold.
The harm to Bear Stearns can be measured in the potential loss of 14,000 jobs and the
loss of value in the Bear Stearns shares held by its employees and other stakeholders
(Kerr, et al., 2008). Near the end of 2007, Bear Stearns stocks fluctuated between
$110 and $115, JPMorgan and Chase and Co. acquired the firm by paying just $2 a
share for the 85 year old investment bank. Thus, Bear Stearns stakeholders lost over
$5.2 billion on their holdings in the company (Kerr, et al., 2008). How much of that
loss is real and how much is due to the early price being inflated by unrealistic
expectations about Bear Stearns’ prospects is unclear. What is clear is that Goldman
Sachs breached its duty of care to Bear Stearns when its employees exaggerated the
safety and returns of Timberwolf to the Bear Stearns employees.
The traditional approach of looking to the attributes of the alleged perpetrators was
unable to prove malfeasance beyond a reasonable doubt as to who did what to whom.
First, it was difficult to disentangle the gains between normal profits and wrongful
gains. Second, while the fake product (Timberwolf) shows a clear prior knowledge on
the part of Goldman Sachs, of just how bad their products actually were, the difficulty
of proving beyond a reasonable doubt the intent of Goldman Sachs to de-fraud Bear
Stearns and other clients was problematic. The breached-duty–of-care approach that is
proposed in this study would dramatically reduce the cost of prosecuting Goldman
Sachs. Further, the clarity that would have been created by that approach (as to what
constitutes corruption) may have encouraged Goldman Sachs to treat its clients better.
The paradigm in this thesis shifts the focus in a corruption investigation from gain and
intent to the harm Goldman Sachs caused to Bear Stearns and others. Intent (i.e. the
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guilty mind) is not relevant in a tort civil suit—what matters is the presence of a
breached duty of care as a proximal cause of harm. Further, limits on what a plaintive
can use as an effective defence make the approach cost-effective. Specifically, once
harm is proven (based on a preponderance of evidence rather than beyond a
reasonable doubt) to be caused by a breached duty of care, the defendant must
compensate the victim—regardless of intent. In this approach to corruption, the only
effective defence is to disprove one of the three legs of the tort (Figure 4-2) and/or
prove that the defendant was incapable of forming a duty of care.
7.2.4 Case 4: BP Deepwater Horizon Oil-spill Debacle
This case was added to explore whether the concept of corruption as a breach of duty
of care could be extended into non-financial areas.
The Deepwater Horizon, a nine-year-old semi-submersible mobile deepwater offshore
drilling unit, was operating 66 km off the Louisiana (USA, Gulf of Mexico) coast
drilling-down 5,600 metres (inclusive of 1,500 metres in the water column) when, on
20 April 2010, the rig exploded—killing 11 workers and injuring 17 others. The
resulting oil spill is the largest in US history and released an estimated 4.9 million
barrels (775,000 m³) of oil during the three months from 20 April to 15 July, 2010.
Any death, or injury, or oil spill is a terrible loss that should (if reasonably possible)
be avoided. However, most commercial ventures involve risks and if you take enough
risks sooner or later accidents will happen and lives or property will be damaged or
lost. What matters (in terms of duty of care) are—did the company:
1) Take all reasonable precautions to lessen, manage, and control the risks,
2) Reasonably inform those at risk (and/or their agents) of the risks and what
precautions they might take to mitigate those risks, and
3) Have reasonable response measures in place for when the inevitable happens or did
they just hope that it would not happen on their watch.
In terms of the second duty of care (above), in February 2009, BP filed and gained
approval for a 52 page exploration and environmental impact plan with the Minerals
Management Service (US Dept of the Interior) that asserted that it was "...unlikely
that an accidental surface or subsurface oil spill would occur from the proposed
activities" and should an accident occur, the well was 48 miles from shore and given
the response capabilities that would be implemented, no significant adverse impacts
were expected (Burdeau and Mohr, 2010). Given the level of damage that actually
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occurred, from 20 April to 15 July, 2010, the above filing appears to have been either
intentionally or negligently less than truthful. Further, the filing appears to contain a
promise of disaster-response capacity that did not exist or was grossly exaggerated.
In terms of the first duty of care, the title and content of the Gold and Casselman (28
April, 2010) Wall Street Journal (i.e. Leaking oil well lacked safeguard device) raise
serious concerns over whether BP was sufficiently prudent in how it designed and ran
the Deepwater Horizon operation. These concerns are compounded by issues raised
over the design and implementation of the cement lining around the drill hole that was
intended to contain natural gas—to prevent it from being an explosion hazard (Urbina,
2010). In summary, it appears that in 2009 there were worries that the metal casing
around the drill hole might collapse under high pressure but BP gave special
permission to use the casing even though it violated the company’s safety policies and
design standards. Concerns were expressed about the capacity of the nitrogen foamed
cement (used to plug drill hole casing) to contain natural gas.
In terms of the third duty of care, there had been substantial problems with the well as
early as 2008, there were a number issues in the month prior to the explosion but less
than half of the workers interviewed said they felt they could report actions leading to
a potentially risky situation without any fear of reprisal or fear of heavy objects that
might be accidently dropped from heights (Langford, 2010). As a result of such fears,
many rig workers entered fake data—which further distorted BP’s perception of
safety on the rig. The rig workers indicated that there was little or no preventative
maintenance and that “Run it, break it, fix it” was the standard MO. In at least five
decisions, BP appears to have put keeping costs down ahead of safety (Daly, 14 June
2010). The inability of BP to shutdown the oil leak for nearly three months and its
inability to effectively contain or remove the 850,000m³ of leaked oil indicate that
despite its earlier assurances to the contrary, it was very much unprepared for a spill
of this magnitude.
The consequences of the explosion and oil spill are immense:
 “Under the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, a company that spills oil can be fined up to
$1,000 per barrel of oil, or up to $3,000 per barrel in cases of gross negligence.”
(Rickman, 2010). Thus the fines to BP could range from $4.9 to 14.7 billion USD.
 Estimates of the economic losses from the spill range from $12 to 30 billion USD
(Bergin, 2010).
 BP's stock lost nearly half its value after the oil spill into the Gulf of Mexico and
that translates to a loss of $94 billion USD to BP shareholders (Peridot Capitalist, 09
June, 2010).
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The traditional approach to corruption does not easily fit in this case. Specifically,
where is the gain, how can the gain be separated between normal drilling profits
and wrongful gain, and there was no intent to harm people and the environment by
causing a massive oil spill. However, none of these factors of traditional proof in a
traditional approach to prosecuting corruption are relevant to a tort. The corruption
in this case is wilful or negligent pursuit of profit ahead of the three duties of care
previously listed in this case. The oil spill is directly due to bad luck and the breach
of the first listed duty of care (reasonable precautions); harm from the spill was
greatly magnified by misinformation given to the potential victims and/or their
agents (breach of the second listed duty of care); efforts to mitigate the harm from
the oil spill were hamstrung by the lack of reasonable response measures in place
(breach of the third listed duty of care). The US Federal Government, after finding
that there were no effective means available to bring BP to account for the harm
that it caused, imposed massive special legislation on BP. That legislation may not
have been needed as the BP head office, horrified by the harm it had created, made
massive allowances to reduce and compensate for that harm. Special legislation
would not have been needed if the approach suggested in this study had been
applied and if BP had been made fully aware of its duties of care, the whole
debacle might have been avoided or, at least, reduced. The special legislation that
the US Federal government imposed on BP is clear evidence that the extant tools
for identifying, discouraging, and resolving the negligent indifference displayed by
BP prior to the Deepwater Horizon Oil-spill are inadequate and would be greatly
supplemented by the paradigm developed in this thesis.
The approach suggested in this thesis is likely to greatly expand what is considered
to be corrupt behaviour. Initially, until precedence becomes well established, the
civil courts are likely to be very busy establishing that precedence. However, once
the concept becomes well established in the law/precedence, responsible firms will
seek means to: 1) identify their duties of care; 2) establish the discharge of those
duties; and 3) verify that duties of care to them have been adequately discharged.
These critical tasks can be cost-effectively done by a process proposed Chapter 4
in this thesis, that it calls Social Responsibility Accounting.
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7.2.5 Case 5: The Bofors-India Scandal
Among "...the worst scandals [to afflict India] was Bofors' export of war equipment to
India in the mid-1980s" Larsson (2005, p. 135). The Scandal occurred in 1986, when
India purchased 400 155mm howitzers from the Swedish firm Bofors AB, for $1.4
billion. Rajiv Gandhi (then the Prime Minister) and other prominent politicians were
accused of receiving kickbacks from Bofors AB for facilitating a bid to supply the
howitzers to the Indian army. It has been speculated that the facilitation payments
were on the scale of Rs. 400 million (around 9 million USD). This scandal was a
direct cause of the defeat of Rajiv Gandhi's ruling Indian National Congress party in
general elections.
Prior to the alleged facilitation payments, the Rajiv Gandhi government was dithering
over whether to buy British, Austrian or Swedish howitzers. In the second half of
1985, AE Services (AES), a shell company, proffered an offer to Bofors: “If we get
you the deal by March 31, 1986, give us a fee of three per cent. If not, don’t pay”
(Bhagat, 2011). Bofors accepted the offer and signed up with the AES shell on
October 15, 1985. A latter investigation showed that Ottavio Quattrochi (an Italian
businessman, close to the Gandhi family and a powerful broker in the 1980s between
big businesses and the Indian government) acted as a middleman in what was soon
called the Bofors Scam. AES shell did get the Rajiv government to sign the contract
with Bofors on March 22, 1986 (seven days ahead of the March 31, 1986 deadline).
Within six months, AES got the first of its fee of $7.3 million and much of that fee
flowed on to Quattrochi—showing he was the man behind the shell.
KPMG reported that "high-level corruption and scams are now threatening to derail
the country's [India’s] credibility and [its] economic boom" Colvin (2011). Hadjikhani
and Hakansson (1996, p. 434) asserted that "Rajiv Ghandi had earlier declared that he
was going to fight against corruption and now he himself was accused of being
involved in corruption by possibly receiving money through the agents for the
contract." As a result, "Bofors and the Indian defence Ministry became a major issue
in the Indian political and social system" (Hadjikhani and Hakansson, 1996, p. 433).
Gandhi was assassinated in 1991 and was cleared of the corruption charges against
him in 2004. In 2005, the charges against the Hinduja brothers were dismissed by the
Delhi High court. "All of them had allegedly received crores of rupees .... [but] were
109
let off by the court because the CBI [Central Bureau of Investigation, India] could not
(or did not?) find any corroborative evidence"23 (Businessline, 2000).
The Bofors-India Scandal is typical of many public-sector scandals in developing and
emerging countries in that, while large sums were involved, the harms was diffused
over large numbers of people (if not the whole country) and it is difficult for the
victims of this corruption to know that they have been harmed and to what extent.
Such cases frequently involve “…a decision taken by the government authority,
which imposes a social loss. This could take many forms including procuring poor
quality material and needlessly expensive provision among other things…..The main
issue… [often] involves acceptance of bribes by government officials towards defense
procurement" (Vaidya, 2005).
The use of the traditional focus on the attributes of the alleged perpetrators and their
wrongful gains created a major weakness in the investigation and prosecution of the
Bofors-India Scandal. Although this act happened in the public arena, no one could
prove that corruption had occurred. The private gain was not clear either as to how it
happened or how to measure it. Further, the alleged perpetrators were so powerful and
the harm so diffuse that the supreme courts were less willing to prosecute.
If the investigation had focused on the harm, the results may have been very different.
Specifically, the harm to India in the Bofors-India Scandal was likely concentrated in:
1) the acquisition of howitzers that were inferior and/or badly suited to the needs of
India’s military; 2) the payment of too much for the howitzers; 3) the loss of potential
vendors who will not compete through bribery. This scandal is all the more serious
because it involves those who have a duty of care to the nation to minimise and
punish corruption. Thus, a “...country needs a system that allows the charges of
corruption against the highest official to be probed without interference…"
Businessline (2000).
The paradigm in this thesis allows interested parties to focus in on the harm, to tie that
harm back to a breached duty of care and then to initiate a civil lawsuit to recover
damages and impose a penalty on the perpetrators of the corruption. One of the most
important failings in the traditional approach to corruption is the need to prove that an
alleged perpetrator of corruption intended to obtain a wrongful gain from the corrupt
23 A crore is 10 million rupees or 100 lakhs in India and Pakistan.
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action or inaction. The case of Cooper v Slade (1857) suggests that corruption and
dishonest intent are not coterminous concepts. However, Scanlan (2004) suggests that
the Cooper v Slade (1857) precedent is of little value because it fails to provide a
sound definition for corruption. The approach in this thesis avoids the need to prove
wrongful intent and clearly defines corruption as harm arising from a breached duty of
care—thus, a plaintiff need only prove that a defendant owed a duty of care, breached
that duty of care, and that harm arose from that breached duty of care. Given that the
tort is prosecuted in civil court, only a preponderance of evidence is needed rather
than the beyond a reasonable doubt level needed in criminal court.
Another critical issue in the Bofors-India Scandal is the dispersed nature of the harm
arising from the scandal. A class-action is a common way of resolving this issue and
if a law firm can be paid on contingency, law firms may gather the plaintiffs together
to initiate cases against those who are alleged to be corrupt.
Ultimately, the approach suggested in this thesis is cost-effective because, as noted
above, the plaintiffs and/or lawyers initiate the civil proceedings against those they
allege to be corrupt and they gather evidence – society is cleaned of corruption with
little or no effort by its institutions and those considering gain from corruption are
likely to be deterred by the risks and consequences of being sued for breach of duty of
care. While in this case it can be argued that the traditional tools developed from the
extant paradigm of corruption failed to provide a remedy for the corruption, it is likely
that tools derived from the new paradigm would be ineffective—given the apparent
capacity of the rich and powerful to influence the decisions of the courts. However,
the new paradigm generates lower cost prosecutions with a lower burden of proof on
the part of the prosecution and a shift in the burden of proof to the defence, once the
three legs of the tort breach of duty of care has been proven.
7.3 Chapter Conclusion
A comparative analysis was done comparing Cases 1 through 5 to link the patterns in
those to the framework developed in this study. The above cases exemplify how
significant harm to shareholders, creditors, suppliers, customers, financial markets,
accountant reputations, and society in general could be traced back to a series of
breaches of duty of care by the principals of a variety of large firms. In each of the
examples, the harm was traced back to one or more breaches of a duty of care. In
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several examples, traditional approaches to prosecuting corruption resulted in many, if
not most of those who gained from breaching a duty of care not being prosecuted—it
was too difficult and costly to prove they intended to gain from corruption. The harm
generated in the five cases of corruption reviewed above was often massive and
affected large portions of the economy. Perhaps the greatest harm from the traditional
approach to prosecuting corruption is that in many cases only the top of the pyramid
of corrupt individuals is every brought to book for their actions and the great mass of
individuals in the rest of the pyramid of corruption retain their ill-gotten gains—
giving them even more power and wealth by which to corrupt and afflict society. The
approach suggested in this study would make the entire pyramid of corrupt people in a
situation like Enron subject to prosecution in civil court and the likely seizure of their
assets, as restitution to those harmed by corruption, would reduce the harm of that
corruption and reduce their capacity to engage in further corrupt acts.
In summary, all five examples (including the BP case) clearly tie the harm back to
breaches of one or more duties of care. In all five examples, proving a breach of duty
of care and the resulting harm would be a relatively easy task—as would tying the
breach back to specific agents/employees within the company. As a result, the pool of
assets from which restitution could be claimed would be greatly increased and those
guilty of breaching a duty of care would be less able to inflict future harm.
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Chapter 8
Discussion, Conclusions, Recommendations,
Limitations, and Suggestions for Future Research
8.1 Discussion
Corruption is a worldwide endemic affliction, which arises because people place trust
in those holding positions of power and sometimes trust is betrayed, with negative
consequences for those who were owed a duty of care and for honest stewards seeking
a position of power.
A review of 30 extant definitions of corruption revealed a lack of convergence and
consistency between the definitions and actual cases—more importantly, flaws in the
extant definitions carried through to create flawed anticorruption tools that were too
situation specific, allowed many types of corruption to slip through unchallenged or
were too difficult and/or costly to implement. This finding redirected the study to a
search for a more succinct and general definition for corruption that could embrace all
variants and aspects of corruption, across cultures and situations.
The literature review on corruption, sourced from different disciplines, indicates that a
morality and ethics approach is unlikely to generate a cost-effective general solution
to corruption in the next few generations. It is suggested that a more timely definition
and solution could be based on actions and outcomes rather than (difficult to prove)
intent. Corruption was defined as a tort, with three legs that must all stand for a given
situation, or action, to be deemed corrupt. Specifically, to be successful an accusation
of corruption should prove that:
 A duty of care existed (proof of merit),
 The duty of care was breached (proof of merit), and
 That harm arose from the breached duty of care (proof of merit and quantum).
The notions behind this framework were developed via speculative thought, which
allowed the researcher to bootstrap a solid resolution from fuzzy and often conflicting
studies. This approach has a long history of producing solutions for complex issues
and generating theories with real-world value. Essentially, it is a means to progress
from thought through to practice and vice versa.
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As this study progressed, it gathered evidence of the socio-economic consequences of
corruption. Content analysis was used to combine and contrast published indices of
key variables and relations for use in quantitative analysis to show how corruption
negatively affects the economy and society (e.g. via business, death rates, and
satisfaction-with-life). While a few researchers claim that some types or levels of
corruption might actually help foster economic development, this study shows that
corruption always has net adverse and potentially severe socio-economic effects on
society. Specifically, poor relatively-virtuous countries tend to become rich in just a
few decades and poor highly-corrupt ones remain poor, or become even poorer. The
harm from corruption is not restricted to poor nations—throughout history, corruption
has made many rich countries less rich and made others poor.
After delineating the nature, causes, consequences of corruption, this study shifted to
a search for appropriate solutions to contain, control and/or resolve corruption. Most
of the reviewed studies of corruption focus on morals and ethics as a dual function
with the potential to mitigate corruption and provide insight into its nature. Initially,
this study (working from similar beliefs) focused on morals and ethics as the core
elements in the fight against corruption. However, as the study progressed it became
clear that, while morals and ethics may eventually provide a solution for corruption,
they are so culturally and context sensitive that they will likely take generations to
have any significant effect on attitudes and behaviour. In response, this study shifted
away from morals and ethics to focus on a search for more immediate solutions.
Trust is paramount to successful transactions as it minimizes transaction costs. Those
costs increase as relations move from high levels of trust toward mistrust. Thus, a
mechanism is required, in situations of mistrust, to help minimize transaction costs
and/or revive trust between the parties. Contracts are often an effective way to create
trust between parties via a clear expression of their intent and remedies if the intent is
not realised. While contracts do not contain the power or means to fulfil the intended
conditions, they work in concert with the law, which does have the power to enforce
the contracted intent. This integrated contract and law solution only works with a
clear statement of the intended obligations and duties each party owes the other.
The corruption definition developed in this thesis and the derived framework for the
resolution of corruption has real-world implications that can rapidly adapt to changing
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circumstances. The different elements of the framework were proven and cross-linked
to scenarios in accounting and other disciplines. The three legs of the framework
make it strong, stable, and adaptable. Five case studies were examined to help validate
the developed framework and to consider how duty of care and breach of that duty
create harm and can provide viable ex post evidence of a corrupt act and the need for
restitution.
The WorldCom, Enron, Goldman Sachs vs. Bear Stearns, the BP oil-spill (in the Gulf
of Mexico), and the Bofors-India Scandal cases showed how the harm in all these
situations arose from and could clearly be traced to breaches of duties of care toward
stakeholders (e.g. shareholders, clients, customers, people reliant on the environment).
In the Enron case, the original breach of duty of care resulted from the taking excess
risks and the failure to report such risks. The BP situation was still before the US
congress and the courts when this thesis was written, but is likely to be a similar
situation of taking excess risks and the failure to adequately inform stakeholders of
those risks and their potential consequences. The Bofors-India Scandal suggests that,
in many cases of public sector corruption, the dispersed nature of the harm and the
often relative power of potential defendants often make a satisfactory resolution
difficult with either the approach suggested in this study or the traditional means of
dealing with corruption. The class-action approach used in the USA may provide a
solution, especially if lawyers can initiate actions on behalf of a dispersed class of
victims (such as the Indian electorate in the Bofors-India Scandal case).
The cases studies suggest that commonly accepted definitions of corruption are far too
ambiguous and/or are excessively focused on the perceived gain motive of corruption
to be generally cost-effective in identifying and controlling petty and grand
corruption. In contrast, the case studies indicated that the tort approach to defining and
resolving corruption (where corruption is defined as a breach of duty of care,
resulting in harm to those, to whom, one owes that duty of care) will work cost-
effectively for most and possibly all types of corruption and will likely expand what is
considered to be corruption.
The second part of this thesis study showed how corruption harms the socio-economic
and political fabric and well-being of nations. The thesis then suggested how the
information in this thesis might be combined into a cost-effective anti-corruption tool
that uses civil law and accountability, rather than depending on the criminal courts or
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waiting for such longer-term solution as might eventually be developed from morality
and ethics.
8.2 Conclusions and Recommendations
The corruption-as-a-tort framework (by making all parties aware of their obligations,
responsibilities and rights and by encouraging those who are harmed by corruption to
bring claims before the civil courts) profoundly increases the risks to all those who act
irresponsibly. The framework’s attack on a root cause of corruption (i.e. opportunities
to gain from acting badly) makes it a powerful, flexible and unique tool in the anti-
corruption arsenal. While the growing use of Corporate-Social-Responsibility (CSR)
legislation has a capacity to fulfil the contract part of the framework, it is incomplete
and, thus, critically flawed. Specifically, without Social Responsibility Accounting to
stiffen CSR, there is little means to define intent, measure performance, or provide
rigorous evidence of either discharge or defalcation of the social responsibilities
claimed by a corporation. Such flaws make CSR, at best, little more than a corporate
public-relations exercise and, at worst, another venue for corporate venality.
The socio-economic harm arising from corruption is profound and includes increased
violence, reduced satisfaction with life, and reduced economic growth, all of which
perpetuate or deepen poverty. Thus, corruption despoils the very means by which a
nation increases and maintains the wealth and social well-being of its citizens and the
effectiveness of a nation’s response to corruption may well be a pivotal factor in its
rise, decline, or even collapse.
In summary, corruption can be cost-effectively resolved by defining it as a breach of a
duty-of-care and using the civil courts to impose retribution on the guilty and provide
their victims with restitution. Where a case of corruption is particularly egregious, the
use of a civil-tort remedy in no way precludes the use of a criminal remedy and may
even bolster any criminal proceedings.
8.3 Limitations
The main limitation affecting this study is the difficulties in conducting questionnaires
or holding interviews. These difficulties are created by sensitivity of the topic and the
high level of secrecy surrounding it. In addition, while this study is not a new frame-
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work for resolving corruption, it is a paradigm shift that may eventually lead to such a
framework.
The limited availability of literature and other materials greatly reduced the range of
applicable methodologies plus some of the materials reviewed were over informative
(e.g. gave more perspective than understanding or solution).
Finally, the unavailability of detailed time-series data on corruption or many socio-
economic factors for individual countries pushed the research into being cross-
sectional by country. Ideally, this type of research should be done on a longitudinal
(over time for several countries) and cross-sectional (across many countries) basis.
8.4 Suggestions for Future Research
This study addressed its research questions and met its specified goals. The findings
provide a new paradigm on corruption that over the next few years could provide a
strategic contribution to understanding and controlling corruption and to professional
practice in accounting. However as Carnap (1952) notes: induction may lead to the
generalization of empirical laws but not theoretical laws. Thus, research on corruption
will continue and may benefit from:
 Using this study as a starting point, from which to expand and extend into
new notions on corruption and to consider what it means if a person accused
of corruption lacked the capacity to form a duty of care,
 A more detailed model of the effects of corruption on trust, transaction costs
and other costs of doing business,
 An examination of the definition of corruption as a breach of a duty of care
tort in terms of the capacity of that definition to:
– Target corruption (i.e. does it label as corrupt actions and/or outcomes
which are either not corrupt or where the corruption is unclear?),
– Transcend cultures and situations, and
– Be used to develop a cost-effective framework for resolving corruption.
 The development of a more complete specification of economic growth as a
function of corruption, endowments of natural wealth (including oil),
violence, wealth per capita, etc.,
 A means to develop a more formal estimate of the effect of corruption on
economic growth,
 A better specification and of understanding of the relationship between the
Satisfaction with Life ranking and the Corruption-Perception Index,
 A better understanding of why the Satisfaction with Life of some nations is
less affected by corruption than others,
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 A better understanding of whether relative peace is a matter of luck, the calm
before the storm (i.e. are corrupt countries storing up trouble for the future),
or must corruption infect both a government and those it governs before
violence becomes endemic. This understanding may provide interesting
insights into the recent events in North Africa, Oman, Yeman, and Syria.
 A better understanding of the longitudinal correlation between the
Corruption-Perception Index and a country’s economic growth, violence
levels and Satisfaction-with Life index, and
 A better understanding of how morality and ethics can be made more
general, rigorous, and less fuzzy so that they can more effectively contribute
to finding a long-run resolution to corruption—possibly, by changing the
fundamental nature of humanity.
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A.16 Satisfaction-with-Life as a Function of Corruption
159
APPENDIX B
TABLES
160
B.1 Sources for the TI 2007 – Corruption Perception
Index (CPI).
161
Source: Transparency International (TI) – Sources for Corruption Perception Index (CPI) 2007.
http://www.transparency.org/
162
B.2 Sources for the TI 2008 – Corruption Perception
Index (CPI).
163
Source: Transparency International (TI) – Sources for Corruption Perception Index (CPI) 2008.
http://www.transparency.org/
164
B.3 Sources for the TI 2009 – Corruption Perception
Index (CPI).
165
Source: Transparency International (TI) – Sources for Corruption Perception Index (CPI) 2009.
http://www.transparency.org/
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B.4 Number of Surveys used to determine the score
for some countries for years 2007, 2008, and 2009.
No. Country/Territory SurveysUsed 2007
Surveys
Used 2008
Surveys
Used 2009
1 Afghanistan 4 4 4
2 Albania 6 5 6
3 Algeria 6 6 6
4 Angola 7 6 5
5 Argentina 7 7 7
6 Armenia 7 - 7
7 Australia 8 8 8
8 Austria 6 6 6
9 Azerbaijan 8 8 7
10 Bahrain 5 5 5
11 Bangladesh 7 7 7
12 Barbados 4 4 4
13 Belarus 5 5 4
14 Belgium 6 6 6
15 Benin 7 6 6
16 Bhutan 5 5 4
17 Bolivia 6 6 6
18 Bosnia and Herzegovina 7 7 7
19 Botswana 7 6 6
20 Brazil 7 7 7
21 Brunei Darussalam - - 4
22 Bulgaria 8 8 8
23 Burkina Faso 7 7 7
24 Burundi 7 6 6
25 Cambodia 7 7 8
26 Cameroon 8 7 7
27 Canada 6 6 6
28 Cape Verde 3 3 3
29 Central African Republic 5 5 4
30 Chad 7 6 6
31 Chile 7 7 7
32 China 9 9 9
33 Colombia 7 7 7
34 Comoros 3 3 3
35 Congo Brazzaville 6 6 5
36 Costa Rica 5 5 5
37 Côte d´Ivoire 6 6 7
38 Croatia 8 8 8
39 Cuba 4 4 3
40 Cyprus 3 3 4
41 Czech Republic 8 8 8
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42 Democratic Republic of Congo 6 6 5
43 Denmark 6 6 6
44 Djibouti 3 4 4
45 Dominica 3 3 3
46 Dominican Republic 5 5 5
47 Ecuador 5 5 5
48 Egypt 7 6 6
49 El Salvador 5 5 5
50 Equatorial Guinea 4 4 3
51 Eritrea 5 5 4
52 Estonia - 8 8
53 Ethiopia 8 7 7
54 Finland 6 6 6
55 France 6 6 6
56 FYR Macedonia 6 6 6
57 Gabon 5 4 3
58 Gambia 6 5 5
59 Georgia 6 7 7
60 Germany 6 6 6
61 Ghana 7 6 7
62 Greece 6 6 6
63 Guatemala 5 5 5
64 Guinea 6 6 5
65 Guinea-Bissau 3 3 3
66 Guyana 4 4 4
67 Haiti 4 4 3
68 Honduras 6 6 6
69 Hong Kong 8 8 8
70 Hungary 8 8 8
71 Iceland 6 5 4
72 India 10 10 10
73 Indonesia 11 10 9
74 Iran 4 4 3
75 Iraq 4 - 3
76 Ireland 6 6 6
77 Israel 6 6 6
78 Italy 6 6 6
79 Jamaica 5 5 5
80 Japan 8 8 8
81 Jordan 7 7 7
82 Kazakhstan 6 6 7
83 Kenya 8 7 7
84 Kiribati 3 3 3
85 Korea (South) 9 9 9
86 Kuwait 5 5 5
87 Kyrgyzstan 7 7 7
88 Laos 6 6 4
89 Latvia 6 6 6
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90 Lebanon 4 4 3
91 Lesotho 6 5 6
92 Liberia 4 4 3
93 Libya 4 5 6
94 Lithuania 7 8 8
95 Luxembourg 5 6 6
96 Macau 4 4 3
97 Madagascar 7 7 7
98 Malawi 8 6 7
99 Malaysia 9 9 9
100 Maldives 4 4 4
101 Mali - 6 6
102 Malta 4 4 4
103 Mauritania 6 7 7
104 Mauritius - 5 6
105 Mexico 7 7 7
106 Moldova 7 7 6
107 Mongolia 6 7 7
108 Montenegro 4 5 5
109 Morocco 7 6 6
110 Mozambique 8 7 7
111 Myanmar 4 4 3
112 Namibia 7 6 6
113 Nepal 7 6 6
114 Netherlands 6 6 6
115 New Zealand 6 6 6
116 Nicaragua 6 6 6
117 Niger 7 6 5
118 Nigeria 8 7 7
119 Norway 6 6 6
120 Oman 4 5 5
121 Pakistan 7 7 7
122 Panama 5 5 5
123 Papua New Guinea 6 6 5
124 Paraguay 5 5 5
125 Peru 5 6 7
126 Philippines 9 9 9
127 Poland 8 8 8
128 Portugal 6 6 6
129 Puerto Rico - 4 4
130 Qatar 4 4 6
131 Romania 8 8 8
132 Russia 8 8 8
133 Rwanda 5 5 4
134 Saint Lucia 3 3 3
135 Saint Vincent and the
Grenadines
3 3 3
136 Samoa 3 3 3
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137 Sao Tome and Principe 3 3 3
138 Saudi Arabia 4 5 5
139 Senegal 7 7 7
140 Serbia 6 6 6
141 Seychelles 4 4 3
142 Sierra Leone 5 5 5
143 Singapore 9 9 9
144 Slovakia 8 8 8
145 Slovenia 8 8 8
146 Solomon Islands 3 3 3
147 Somalia 4 4 3
148 South Africa 9 8 8
149 Spain 6 6 6
150 Sri Lanka 7 7 7
151 Sudan 6 6 5
152 Suriname 4 4 3
153 Swaziland 5 4 3
154 Sweden 6 6 6
155 Switzerland 6 6 6
156 Syria 4 5 5
157 Taiwan 9 9 9
158 Tajikistan 8 8 8
159 Tanzania 8 7 7
160 Thailand 9 9 9
161 Timor-Leste 3 4 5
162 Togo 5 6 5
163 Tonga 3 3 3
164 Trinidad and Tobago 4 4 4
165 Tunisia 6 6 6
166 Turkey 7 7 7
167 Turkmenistan 5 5 4
168 Uganda 8 7 7
169 Ukraine 7 8 8
170 United Arab Emirates 5 5 5
171 United Kingdom 6 6 6
172 United States 8 8 8
173 Uruguay 5 5 5
174 Uzbekistan 7 8 6
175 Vanuatu 3 3 3
176 Venezuela 7 7 7
177 Vietnam 9 9 9
178 Yemen 5 5 4
179 Zambia 8 7 7
180 Zimbabwe 8 7 7
Source: Transparency International (TI) – Corruption Perception Index (CPI) 2007 2008 and 2009.
http://www.transparency.org/
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B.5 Natural Wealth per Capita and Change in Wealth
per Capita for 2000
country Natural Wealth/pc TCap00 Change in Wealth/pc NW/TW
Albania 3892 17312 122 22.48151571
Algeria 13200 18491 -409 71.38607971
Argentina 10312 139232 -109 7.406343369
Australia 24167 371031 46 6.51347192
Austria 7174 493080 2831 1.454936319
Bangladesh 961 6000 41 16.01666667
Barbados 1388 146737 520 0.94591003
Belgium 3030 451714 2649 0.670778413
Belize 6950 52936 -150 13.12906151
Benin 1333 7895 -42 16.88410386
Bhutan 4945 7747 -111 63.83116045
Bolivia 4783 18141 -127 26.36569098
Botswana 3183 40592 814 7.84144659
Brazil 6752 86922 64 7.76788385
Bulgaria 3448 25256 238 13.65220146
Burkina Faso 1219 5087 -36 23.96304305
Burundi 1210 2859 -37 42.32249038
Cameroon 4733 10753 -152 44.01562355
Canada 34771 324979 2221 10.69946058
Cape Verde 711 32942 -81 2.158338899
Chad 1861 4458 -74 41.74517721
Chile 10944 77726 129 14.08023055
China 2223 9387 200 23.68168744
Colombia 6547 44660 -205 14.65965069
Congo 9330 3516 -727 265.3583618
Costa Rica 8527 61611 107 13.84006103
Côte d´Ivoire 3121 14243 -100 21.91251843
Denmark 11746 575138 4014 2.042292459
Dominican Republic 3176 33410 198 9.506135887
Ecuador 13117 33745 -293 38.87094384
Egypt 3249 21879 -45 14.84985603
El Salvador 912 36476 37 2.500274153
Estonia 6283 66769 681 9.410055565
Ethiopia 796 1965 -27 40.50890585
Finland 11445 419346 4236 2.729249832
France 6335 468024 2951 1.353563065
Gabon 28586 43168 -2341 66.22034841
Gambia 514 6365 -45 8.075412412
Georgia 1799 13036 16 13.80024547
Germany 4445 496447 2071 0.895362446
Ghana 1336 10365 -18 12.88953208
Greece 4554 236972 1327 1.921746029
Guatemala 2971 30480 -123 9.747375328
Guyana 10301 15810 -108 65.15496521
Haiti 793 8235 106 9.62962963
Honduras 3005 11567 53 25.97907841
Hungary 4947 77072 765 6.418673448
India 1928 6820 16 28.26979472
Indonesia 3472 13869 -56 25.03424904
Iran 14105 24023 -398 58.71456521
Ireland 10534 330490 4199 3.187388423
Israel 3999 294723 268 1.356867296
Italy 4678 372666 1947 1.255279526
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Jamaica 2627 47796 371 5.496275839
Japan 1513 493241 5643 0.306746601
Jordan 931 31546 28 2.9512458
Kenya 1368 6609 -11 20.69904675
Latvia 5485 47198 551 11.62125514
Luxembourg 3030 451714 2649 0.670778413
Madagascar 1681 5020 -56 33.48605578
Malawi 785 5200 -29 15.09615385
Malaysia 9103 46687 227 19.49793304
Mali 2157 5241 -47 41.15626789
Mauritania 2982 7959 -147 37.46701847
Mauritius 642 60284 514 1.064959193
Mexico 8493 61872 155 13.72672614
Moldova 3260 8771 56 37.1679398
Morocco 1604 22965 117 6.984541694
Mozambique 1059 4232 -20 25.02362949
Namibia 2352 36907 140 6.372774812
Nepal 1229 3802 2 32.32509206
Netherlands 6739 421389 3176 1.599234911
New Zealand 43226 242934 1082 17.79331012
Nicaragua 2092 13214 -18 15.83169366
Niger 1975 3695 -83 53.45060893
Nigeria 4040 2748 -210 147.0160116
Norway 54828 473708 5708 11.57421872
Pakistan 1368 7871 -2 17.38025664
Panama 5051 57663 585 8.759516501
Paraguay 5372 35600 -93 15.08988764
Peru 3575 39046 15 9.155867438
Philippines 1549 19351 114 8.004754276
Portugal 3629 207477 750 1.74910954
Romania 4508 29113 89 15.48449146
Russia 17217 38709 4 44.47802837
Rwanda 2066 5670 -60 36.43738977
Senegal 1272 10167 -27 12.51106521
Singapore 0 252607 6949 0
South Africa 3400 59629 -2 5.701923561
South Korea 2020 141282 2415 1.429764584
Spain 4374 261205 1663 1.674546812
Sri Lanka 817 14731 116 5.546127215
Swaziland 1267 27739 8 4.567576337
Sweden 7950 513424 4191 1.54842781
Switzerland 5943 648241 8020 0.916788663
Syria 8725 10419 -473 83.74124196
Thailand 3936 35854 259 10.97785463
Togo 915 7109 -88 12.87100858
Trinidad&Tobago 30977 57549 -774 53.82717337
Tunisia 3939 36537 176 10.78085229
Turkey 3504 47859 273 7.321506927
UK 7167 408753 1725 1.753381627
Uruguay 9279 118463 20 7.832825439
USA 14752 512612 2020 2.877810118
Venezuela 27227 45196 -847 60.24205682
Zambia 1779 6564 -63 27.1023766
Zimbabwe 1531 9612 -4 15.92800666
Source: World Bank, 2005a. Appendix 4.
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B.6 GDP per Capita 2003 and Effective Annual Growth
in GDP per Capita (2003-2008)
No. Country GDP/pc03(PPP USA) G.avg
1 Afghanistan 700 6.1248
2 Albania 4500 3.4011
3 Algeria 5900 5.4238
4 Angola 1900 22.7514
5 Argentina 11200 2.5150
6 Armenia 3900 6.5291
7 Australia 28900 4.4373
8 Austria 30000 4.4698
9 Azerbaijan 3400 17.6144
10 Bahrain 17100 12.5181
11 Bangladesh 1900 -4.9623
12 Barbados 16200 3.3138
13 Belarus 6000 9.2467
14 Belgium 29000 3.9080
15 Belize 4900 8.0562
16 Benin 1100 5.3052
17 Bhutan 1300 1.2428
18 Bolivia 2400 10.6302
19 Bosnia and Herzegovina 6100 1.3217
20 Botswana 8800 8.9279
21 Brazil 7600 4.1501
22 Bulgaria 7600 7.6080
23 Burkina Faso 1100 1.4608
24 Burundi 600 4.9115
25 Cambodia 1700 0.9572
26 Cameroon 1800 4.1700
27 Canada 29700 4.2840
28 Cape Verde 1400 30.7660
29 CAR 1200 -8.5916
30 Chad 1200 4.9115
31 Chile 9900 6.4440
32 China 5000 0.9759
33 Colombia 6300 2.2505
34 Comoros 700 -2.5365
35 Congo 700 31.9828
36 Congo, Democratic Rep. 600 -10.9101
37 Costa Rica 9000 6.9913
38 Cote d'Ivoire 1400 4.2775
39 Croatia 10700 6.3713
40 Cuba 2800 8.2287
41 Czech Republic 15700 7.6255
42 Denmark 31200 3.0670
43 Djibouti 1300 -4.2785
44 Dominica 5400 -5.6884
45 Dominican Republic 6000 7.3840
46 Ecuador 3300 13.6207
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47 Egypt 3900 5.5735
48 El Salvador 4800 1.3430
49 Eritrea 700 6.1248
50 Estonia 12300 10.0082
51 Ethiopia 700 0.0000
52 Finland 27300 4.4747
53 France 27500 3.4977
54 Gabon 5500 16.5698
55 Gambia, The 1700 -11.8058
56 Georgia 2500 9.0314
57 Germany 27600 3.7389
58 Ghana 2200 -7.2563
59 Greece 19900 7.3761
60 Grenada 5000 -4.0565
61 Guatemala 4100 4.6972
62 Guinea 2100 -11.6316
63 Guinea-Bissau 900 -6.5345
64 Guyana 4000 4.8019
65 Haiti 1600 2.9056
66 Honduras 2600 4.0535
67 Hong Kong 28700 6.5519
68 Hungary 13900 5.8043
69 Iceland 30900 4.1333
70 India 2900 -1.1839
71 Indonesia 3200 1.0155
72 Iran 7000 9.8503
73 Iraq 1600 14.4714
74 Ireland 29800 7.3474
75 Israel 19700 6.5339
76 Italy 26800 2.4561
77 Jamaica 3800 3.9704
78 Japan 28000 3.1873
79 Jordan 4300 1.4935
80 Kazakhstan 7000 6.8208
81 Kenya 1000 8.1484
82 Kiribati 800 3.7891
83 Korea, South 17700 5.6397
84 Kyrgyzstan 1600 3.7891
85 Kuwait 18100 20.4595
86 Laos 1700 1.8710
87 Latvia 10100 9.8016
88 Lebanon 4800 13.7537
89 Lesotho 3000 -10.9101
90 Liberia 1000 -10.9101
91 Libya 6400 12.6804
92 Lithuania 11200 6.8849
93 Luxembourg 55100 6.5884
94 Macau 19400 6.5580
95 Macedonia 6700 3.8407
96 Madagascar 800 3.7891
97 Malawi 600 4.9115
98 Malaysia 9000 8.1484
99 Maldives 3900 0.0000
100 Mali 900 4.9115
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101 Malta 17700 4.6130
102 Mauritania 1800 0.0000
103 Mauritius 11400 0.7180
104 Mexico 9000 5.6277
105 Moldova 1800 3.4011
106 Mongolia 1800 8.2732
107 Morocco 4000 -0.8512
108 Mozambique 1200 -4.6816
109 Myanmar 1900 0.0000
110 Namibia 7100 -5.0582
111 Nepal 1400 -3.9397
112 Netherlands 28600 5.1244
113 New Zealand 21600 3.9804
114 Nicaragua 2200 6.4440
115 Niger 800 -2.2009
116 Nigeria 800 18.3647
117 Norway 37700 6.6896
118 Oman 13400 6.0852
119 Pakistan 2100 3.6237
120 Panama 6300 6.1248
121 Paraguay 4600 -2.3024
122 Peru 5200 6.5291
123 Philippines 4600 -5.3851
124 PNG 2200 4.7119
125 Poland 11000 6.6646
126 Portugal 18000 3.2438
127 Qatar 21500 23.3958
128 Romania 6900 8.2461
129 Russia 8900 8.5993
130 Rwanda 1300 -4.2785
131 Saint Vincent & the Grenadines 2900 3.6694
132 Samoa 5600 -15.0809
133 Sao Tome and Principe 1200 0.0000
134 Saudi Arabia 11800 9.8200
135 Senegal 1600 1.0155
136 Seychelles 7800 15.3773
137 Sierra Leone 500 8.1484
138 Singapore 23700 12.8306
139 Slovakia 13300 6.8568
140 Slovenia 18300 6.8937
141 Solomon Islands 1700 -15.9346
142 Somalia 500 3.0853
143 South Africa 10700 -0.1564
144 Spain 22000 7.3663
145 Sri Lanka 3700 1.7256
146 Sudan 1900 4.6802
147 Suriname 3500 14.2890
148 Swaziland 4900 -0.3431
149 Sweden 26800 5.4748
150 Switzerland 32800 3.2765
151 Syria 3300 4.5103
152 Taiwan 23400 4.1118
153 Tajikistan 1000 8.1484
154 Tanzania 600 10.6302
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155 Thailand 7400 1.3078
156 Timor-Leste 500 25.9921
157 Togo 1500 -8.1614
158 Tonga 2200 0.0000
159 Trinidad and Tobago 9600 14.5596
160 Tunisia 6900 1.3994
161 Turkey 6700 5.8056
162 Turkmenistan 5700 8.3059
163 UAE 23200 15.5425
164 Uganda 1400 -3.9397
165 UK 27700 4.1236
166 Ukraine 5300 4.4950
167 Uruguay 12600 -2.6874
168 USA 37800 3.3263
169 Uzbekistan 1700 4.3908
170 Vanuatu 2900 0.0000
171 Venezuela 4800 17.7592
172 Vietnam 2500 0.6558
173 Yemen 800 20.0937
174 Zambia 800 9.7757
175 Zimbabwe 1900 -19.9485
Source: CIA Word Fact Book (2008).
176
B.7 Violent Deaths in 2004, per 100,000 population
Country TrafficAccidents Poisonings Falls Fires Drowning Other Subtotal
Afghanistan 36.7 4.4 5.6 5.3 10.3 17.1 79.4
Albania 2.5 1.3 0.7 0.3 1.2 47.4 53.4
Algeria 17.2 3.1 2.4 3.9 3.7 10.8 41.1
Angola 58.0 9.1 5.2 11.6 17.9 28.9 130.7
Argentina 11.5 0.5 1.0 1.3 2.5 17.0 33.8
Armenia 10.6 2.4 1.4 1.6 2.2 14.2 32.4
Australia 8.6 4.2 3.3 0.5 1.2 10.1 27.9
Austria 10.4 1.0 11.4 0.7 1.0 6.4 30.9
Azerbaijan 5.4 1.2 0.3 4.7 0.5 7.9 20.0
Bahrain 12.0 0.1 0.9 0.0 0.9 14.0 27.9
Bangladesh 13.4 4.6 5.8 10.9 5.8 15.5 56.0
Barbados 6.6 0.0 3.0 0.2 4.0 5.6 19.4
Belarus 17.2 39.8 7.4 8.3 17.2 30.5 120.4
Belgium 13.5 1.4 11.1 1.0 0.6 5.6 33.2
Belize 32.1 0.0 1.5 0.0 7.0 10.9 51.5
Benin 31.5 4.7 3.1 7.4 7.7 28.3 82.7
Bhutan 14.5 6.0 7.9 12.4 6.2 19.2 66.2
Bolivia 17.7 0.9 0.5 1.5 6.4 36.9 63.9
Bosnia & Herzegovina 4.3 0.5 0.4 0.5 6.8 15.9 28.4
Botswana 16.3 3.8 1.6 3.6 6.5 14.1 45.9
Brazil 19.8 0.2 3.4 0.8 4.4 11.5 40.1
Bulgaria 12.1 2.0 3.6 1.4 2.4 9.3 30.8
Burkina Faso 40.3 6.1 3.7 9.3 9.9 36.1 105.4
Burundi 27.2 5.0 2.4 5.8 10.3 12.9 63.6
Cambodia 20.0 0.7 3.1 0.8 9.7 5.9 40.2
Cameroon 32.0 5.2 3.5 7.3 7.7 29.7 85.4
Canada 8.7 2.9 5.2 0.8 0.9 9.3 27.8
Cape Verde 9.6 0.4 0.9 1.7 1.2 16.2 30.0
CAR 34.6 7.0 3.2 6.7 12.8 14.9 79.2
Chad 35.0 5.3 3.5 8.2 8.6 31.3 91.9
Chile 14.8 1.0 2.0 1.8 3.2 9.4 32.2
China 19.2 5.4 7.4 1.0 8.7 10.7 52.4
Colombia 18.5 0.3 3.2 0.5 3.2 10.6 36.3
Congo 23.3 4.6 2.1 5.0 9.0 10.9 54.9
Congo D. Rep. 37.1 11.3 3.0 7.1 14.1 20.6 93.2
Costa Rica 18.1 0.4 2.4 0.2 4.2 10.3 35.6
Côte d´Ivoire 37.7 7.6 3.3 6.8 14.4 15.6 85.4
Croatia 12.8 1.7 11.9 1.3 2.4 8.5 38.6
Cuba 13.1 0.3 14.9 0.8 2.6 10.0 41.7
Cyprus 26.9 0.2 0.6 1.2 4.4 0.8 34.1
Czech Republic 10.0 3.1 17.2 0.6 2.1 13.2 46.2
Denmark 8.6 2.5 30.6 1.2 0.9 3.1 46.9
Djibouti 33.2 3.9 5.0 4.2 9.6 15.8 71.7
Dominican Republic 24.1 0.3 0.2 0.7 0.4 10.8 36.5
Ecuador 14.6 1.9 3.6 1.4 4.3 23.5 49.3
Egypt 12.3 1.9 2.1 0.7 4.4 5.7 27.1
El Salvador 29.8 0.2 2.9 0.7 5.1 2.1 40.8
Equatorial Guinea 38.6 5.1 3.6 7.7 7.5 44.2 106.7
Eritrea 22.1 4.3 1.9 4.7 8.7 18.1 59.8
Estonia 15.4 32.2 10.8 12.8 10.5 42.0 123.7
Ethiopia 26.1 3.5 2.3 5.4 5.3 19.3 61.9
Finland 8.6 11.1 20.3 1.0 2.8 8.6 52.4
France 13.9 1.2 16.8 0.8 1.0 18.5 52.2
Gabon 26.3 5.1 3.3 5.4 5.6 25.6 71.3
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Gambia 30.1 5.0 3.2 6.6 7.0 27.7 79.6
Georgia 6.1 1.0 0.3 1.9 1.3 10.1 20.7
Germany 8.6 0.7 8.9 0.6 0.6 5.0 24.4
Ghana 26.4 4.2 2.8 5.8 6.2 24.0 69.4
Greece 19.6 2.4 4.8 1.0 3.8 4.8 36.4
Guatemala 6.5 0.4 4.0 0.2 1.2 19.1 31.4
Guinea 34.9 5.7 3.4 7.0 7.6 19.5 78.1
Guinea-Bissau 34.9 4.3 3.0 6.6 6.8 41.0 96.6
Guyana 10.5 0.6 12.5 0.9 4.7 29.2 58.4
Haiti 8.0 0.4 1.5 2.6 0.2 3.2 15.9
Honduras 15.0 0.7 0.9 0.7 3.6 11.6 32.5
Hungary 16.0 0.9 28.7 1.7 2.2 8.4 57.9
Iceland 7.2 3.3 5.1 0.6 0.8 8.2 25.2
India 18.0 7.3 8.8 14.0 6.6 21.6 76.3
Indonesia 23.9 3.3 5.5 6.0 4.8 7.0 50.5
Iran 59.5 2.6 5.7 8.6 3.3 11.6 91.3
Iraq 52.7 4.1 5.9 8.4 6.5 19.2 96.8
Ireland 10.1 0.9 9.9 1.3 1.5 3.4 27.1
Israel 7.8 0.2 1.8 0.5 0.2 9.3 19.8
Italy 13.3 0.5 17.0 0.6 0.6 4.0 36.0
Jamaica 2.0 0.4 1.6 1.0 1.8 3.2 10.0
Japan 8.7 0.5 5.0 1.2 4.6 12.5 32.5
Jordan 28.6 0.7 2.5 1.4 1.0 16.9 51.1
Kazakhstan 16.0 58.3 3.2 4.5 9.8 8.4 100.2
Kenya 22.4 2.7 2.1 4.8 4.5 15.8 52.3
Kuwait 15.5 0.6 1.8 1.1 0.8 4.1 23.9
Kyrgyzstan 12.5 13.3 4.1 1.3 9.1 14.3 54.6
Laos 22.2 5.9 9.0 13.7 11.7 21.2 83.7
Latvia 25.0 15.5 19.3 9.1 13.7 27.6 110.2
Lebanon 41.2 3.0 4.6 6.1 3.5 13.2 71.6
Lesotho 23.6 4.9 2.6 5.0 8.4 17.8 62.3
Liberia 48.1 7.7 4.3 10.6 11.9 28.5 111.1
Libya 17.6 1.7 2.2 3.1 2.4 9.1 36.1
Lithuania 20.4 19.3 14.3 5.0 13.2 24.6 96.8
Luxembourg 14.0 4.7 8.6 0.9 0.6 14.7 43.5
Macedonia 5.4 0.8 3.3 0.6 1.2 15.4 26.7
Madagascar 30.4 4.7 3.1 7.1 7.4 27.9 80.6
Malawi 27.3 1.0 2.6 5.9 16.4 19.8 73.0
Malaysia 14.4 0.7 3.0 0.3 3.4 5.7 27.5
Mali 38.8 5.8 3.6 8.8 12.0 33.0 102.0
Malta 4.4 1.7 10.6 0.3 2.2 3.0 22.2
Mauritania 38.2 6.3 3.8 8.1 8.9 34.6 99.9
Mauritius 15.0 0.2 2.4 2.9 2.9 3.4 26.8
Mexico 12.0 0.9 2.3 0.6 2.7 18.6 37.1
Moldova 15.7 11.8 4.7 2.7 8.5 25.9 69.3
Mongolia 42.9 2.5 6.1 2.3 5.9 7.2 66.9
Morocco 19.0 1.9 2.4 2.3 3.5 7.0 36.1
Mozambique 13.8 1.7 1.7 3.3 3.4 8.4 32.3
Myanmar 16.6 3.9 6.6 8.3 6.9 13.2 55.5
Namibia 22.9 0.9 2.2 4.5 2.9 8.8 42.2
Nepal 15.3 3.9 5.6 8.4 7.2 14.7 55.1
Netherlands 6.4 0.7 4.6 0.4 0.7 7.7 20.5
New Zealand 12.7 0.2 6.8 0.6 1.7 4.4 26.4
Nicaragua 16.0 0.9 0.4 0.5 4.1 12.6 34.5
Niger 43.1 6.4 3.8 9.8 13.5 36.6 113.2
Nigeria 26.7 8.6 3.5 8.0 16.7 17.1 80.6
Norway 7.3 1.3 20.9 1.2 1.5 7.0 39.2
Oman 12.0 0.6 3.0 0.3 3.9 9.8 29.6
Pakistan 11.8 4.1 6.8 10.8 5.4 15.1 54.0
Panama 14.1 0.4 3.1 0.6 5.0 7.2 30.4
Paraguay 9.1 0.4 0.7 1.5 2.5 12.6 26.8
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Peru 15.5 0.7 0.5 1.1 5.0 32.0 54.8
Philippines 10.0 0.4 2.3 0.2 4.6 4.6 22.1
PNG 15.3 3.5 4.9 7.9 7.3 14.2 53.1
Poland 15.6 4.2 10.0 1.1 2.9 8.8 42.6
Portugal 17.1 0.6 6.3 1.2 0.4 6.7 32.3
Qatar 21.4 0.0 1.3 0.0 2.3 2.5 27.5
Romania 12.4 5.3 6.7 2.1 5.4 14.2 46.1
Russia 30.9 46.5 11.1 9.4 12.5 48.4 158.8
Rwanda 29.9 1.2 2.5 6.1 13.9 16.2 69.8
Saudi Arabia 24.0 1.3 5.5 0.6 6.7 19.5 57.6
Senegal 31.1 5.4 2.9 7.1 7.6 27.3 81.4
Sierra Leone 64.3 11.3 5.6 11.6 15.1 39.9 147.8
Singapore 5.3 0.1 3.7 0.2 0.4 0.9 10.6
Slovakia 1.1 2.9 8.6 0.6 3.2 23.1 39.5
Slovenia 14.2 1.9 17.8 0.8 1.5 9.4 45.6
Somalia 38.4 2.1 3.5 8.7 8.7 18.3 79.7
South Africa 30.3 1.2 2.8 4.8 3.1 10.8 53.0
South Korea 22.4 1.0 7.0 1.5 3.2 12.0 47.1
Spain 15.8 1.6 3.5 0.5 1.4 7.0 29.8
Sri Lanka 8.6 1.1 3.6 1.5 4.7 16.2 35.7
Sudan 30.8 1.9 2.9 5.7 6.1 13.3 60.7
Suriname 22.1 0.0 6.6 1.5 10.5 12.5 53.2
Swaziland 22.5 3.5 1.9 6.3 8.0 18.2 60.4
Sweden 6.3 2.6 5.8 1.1 1.3 15.6 32.7
Switzerland 6.0 0.2 12.7 0.4 0.9 5.9 26.1
Syria 13.1 1.0 0.8 3.4 1.8 14.8 34.9
Tajikistan 4.1 3.0 1.0 1.3 4.5 17.9 31.8
Tanzania 27.9 6.0 2.3 5.4 9.6 16.1 67.3
Thailand 30.1 0.7 3.8 0.6 5.0 11.9 52.1
Togo 31.8 5.1 3.2 7.3 7.7 28.9 84.0
Trinidad &Tobago 12.6 0.3 3.5 0.7 4.7 4.2 26.0
Tunisia 31.3 2.5 3.6 4.3 3.1 10.3 55.1
Turkey 8.9 0.8 1.5 0.9 1.0 15.9 29.0
Turkmenistan 9.4 3.3 1.6 8.2 7.4 14.9 44.8
UAE 50.6 0.5 4.0 1.0 5.7 0.2 62.0
Uganda 27.5 9.5 2.4 6.3 7.3 13.8 66.8
Ukraine 12.8 33.9 6.4 4.5 10.4 31.5 99.5
UK 6.5 2.0 9.6 0.8 0.4 4.2 23.5
Uruguay 10.5 1.0 0.8 1.4 3.7 20.3 37.7
USA 15.5 4.6 5.0 1.3 1.3 8.9 36.6
Uzbekistan 8.5 2.3 1.2 1.7 4.4 13.1 31.2
Venezuela 27.3 0.4 3.3 0.4 2.6 6.6 40.6
Viet Nam 15.4 3.2 6.0 4.2 5.2 11.0 45.0
Yemen 39.1 3.7 4.9 5.3 8.4 15.4 76.8
Zambia 13.3 2.4 1.6 3.2 5.2 10.1 35.8
Zimbabwe 15.2 3.4 2.0 2.9 5.8 6.5 35.8
Source: WHO (2004; all forms of Violent Death, expected suicide).
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Cont. B.7 Violent Deaths in 2004, per 100,000 population
Country Self-Inflicted Violence War Malnutrition Subtotal Total
Afghanistan 6.5 4.0 25.7 45.4 81.6 161.0
Albania 2.6 6.0 0.1 1.8 10.5 63.9
Algeria 2.9 12.0 16.1 3.2 34.2 75.3
Angola 8.1 39.6 12.5 69.4 129.6 260.3
Argentina 10.2 8.8 0.0 4.9 23.9 57.7
Armenia 3.4 3.7 0.2 0.8 8.1 40.5
Australia 11.3 1.5 0.0 1.2 14.0 41.9
Austria 18.2 0.9 0.0 0.1 19.2 50.1
Azerbaijan 4.4 2.9 0.1 4.1 11.5 31.5
Bahrain 4.4 1.1 0.0 0.7 6.2 34.1
Bangladesh 12.2 7.4 0.1 9.8 29.5 85.5
Barbados 4.2 8.5 0.0 3.6 16.3 35.7
Belarus 38.2 13.0 0.0 0.4 51.6 172.0
Belgium 20.9 1.7 0.0 1.8 24.4 57.6
Belize 2.3 12.0 0.0 18.9 33.2 84.7
Benin 4.3 10.0 0.0 26.0 40.3 123.0
Bhutan 13.5 4.4 0.0 14.6 32.5 98.7
Bolivia 2.0 4.0 0.0 19.7 25.7 89.6
Bosnia & Herzegovina 13.9 2.0 1.1 0.7 17.7 46.1
Botswana 5.0 6.2 0.0 3.0 14.2 60.1
Brazil 5.0 32.6 0.0 8.9 46.5 86.6
Bulgaria 16.9 3.0 0.0 1.1 21.0 51.8
Burkina Faso 5.2 13.1 0.0 36.5 54.8 160.2
Burundi 6.9 18.0 124.6 15.8 165.3 228.9
Cambodia 4.2 17.1 1.1 24.6 47.0 87.2
Cameroon 4.7 10.8 0.0 13.6 29.1 114.5
Canada 11.8 1.5 0.0 1.7 15.0 42.8
Cape Verde 3.3 2.2 0.0 7.5 13.0 43.0
CAR 9.4 23.5 12.2 14.4 59.5 138.7
Chad 4.8 11.6 1.4 26.6 44.4 136.3
Chile 11.2 5.5 0.0 3.8 20.5 52.7
China 20.9 3.0 0.0 0.6 24.5 76.9
Colombia 6.1 72.4 19.0 7.1 104.6 140.9
Congo 6.3 16.2 35.6 6.2 64.3 119.2
Congo D. Rep. 4.8 21.3 86.0 20.3 132.4 225.6
Costa Rica 7.7 6.5 0.0 0.8 15.0 50.6
Côte d´Ivoire 10.9 27.4 23.5 11.6 73.4 158.8
Croatia 19.9 1.9 0.2 0.2 22.2 60.8
Cuba 15.2 5.3 0.0 0.7 21.2 62.9
Cyprus 0.7 0.2 0.0 3.4 4.3 38.4
Czech Republic 16.2 1.3 0.0 0.2 17.7 63.9
Denmark 13.4 1.0 0.0 4.2 18.6 65.5
Djibouti 4.9 3.5 0.2 9.8 18.4 90.1
Dominican Republic 2.9 10.2 0.0 11.7 24.8 61.3
Ecuador 5.9 23.1 0.0 10.9 39.9 89.2
Egypt 1.5 1.2 0.0 4.1 6.8 33.9
El Salvador 8.7 38.4 0.2 11.3 58.6 99.4
Equatorial Guinea 5.2 13.0 0.0 21.8 40.0 146.7
Eritrea 5.9 7.6 28.7 9.0 51.2 111.0
Estonia 28.7 15.4 0.2 0.5 44.8 168.5
Ethiopia 3.5 20.5 0.4 31.0 55.4 117.3
Finland 23.4 3.2 0.0 0.4 27.0 79.4
France 15.9 0.7 0.0 4.5 21.1 73.3
Gabon 4.5 9.3 0.0 8.2 22.0 93.3
Gambia 4.5 10.0 0.0 19.6 34.1 113.7
Georgia 3.3 3.8 0.9 0.2 8.2 28.9
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Germany 13.9 0.7 0.0 0.9 15.5 39.9
Ghana 4.0 9.2 0.0 7.0 20.2 89.6
Greece 3.5 1.2 0.1 0.2 5.0 41.4
Guatemala 2.3 37.1 0.0 16.9 56.3 87.7
Guinea 5.1 23.8 11.7 19.3 59.9 138.0
Guinea-Bissau 4.7 12.1 0.4 42.2 59.4 156.0
Guyana 20.4 9.9 0.0 26.6 56.9 115.3
Haiti 0.7 10.2 0.0 61.9 72.8 88.7
Honduras 8.1 13.4 0.0 18.5 40.0 72.5
Hungary 28.2 2.4 0.0 0.3 30.9 88.8
Iceland 11.8 0.6 0.0 0.6 13.0 38.2
India 17.4 5.5 0.5 12.3 35.7 112.0
Indonesia 11.3 9.4 3.8 10.1 34.6 85.1
Iran 8.2 3.8 0.1 3.9 16.0 107.3
Iraq 6.9 2.9 7.6 24.4 41.8 138.6
Ireland 11.7 1.0 0.0 1.2 13.9 41.0
Israel 4.8 0.7 6.6 1.6 13.7 33.5
Italy 6.8 1.1 0.0 2.0 9.9 45.9
Jamaica 0.1 0.5 0.0 11.0 11.6 21.6
Japan 24.6 0.6 0.0 1.8 27.0 59.5
Jordan 17.2 2.9 0.1 1.8 22.0 73.1
Kazakhstan 37.1 19.7 0.0 1.6 58.4 158.6
Kenya 5.9 14.9 3.8 8.0 32.6 84.9
Kuwait 1.8 1.4 1.1 31.1 35.4 59.3
Kyrgyzstan 14.8 8.9 0.0 0.9 24.6 79.2
Laos 21.2 5.7 1.0 36.0 63.9 147.6
Latvia 30.5 12.6 0.1 0.6 43.8 154.0
Lebanon 6.1 2.6 5.8 2.4 16.9 88.5
Lesotho 6.6 7.5 0.0 11.5 25.6 87.9
Liberia 6.7 32.8 59.6 62.1 161.2 272.3
Libya 3.9 2.5 0.0 1.3 7.7 43.8
Lithuania 45.5 10.7 0.0 0.3 56.5 153.3
Luxembourg 16.2 1.7 0.0 0.9 18.8 62.3
Macedonia 7.4 3.0 39.3 0.3 50.0 76.7
Madagascar 4.3 9.9 0.0 22.1 36.3 116.9
Malawi 7.0 8.9 0.0 34.1 50.0 123.0
Malaysia 6.6 8.7 0.0 3.8 19.1 46.6
Mali 5.1 12.7 0.0 83.4 101.2 203.2
Malta 6.3 1.5 0.0 0.3 8.1 30.3
Mauritania 5.5 12.8 0.1 9.5 27.9 127.8
Mauritius 11.9 2.6 0.0 2.0 16.5 43.3
Mexico 3.9 10.2 0.0 12.0 26.1 63.2
Moldova 18.3 12.3 0.0 0.2 30.8 100.1
Mongolia 12.3 3.5 0.0 0.6 16.4 83.3
Morocco 2.3 1.1 0.0 1.7 5.1 41.2
Mozambique 3.6 8.8 5.2 29.3 46.9 79.2
Myanmar 10.6 16.7 8.8 20.1 56.2 111.7
Namibia 6.7 27.0 1.6 9.8 45.1 87.3
Nepal 10.3 14.8 5.0 20.2 50.3 105.4
Netherlands 8.9 1.1 0.0 1.8 11.8 32.3
New Zealand 12.2 1.2 0.0 0.6 14.0 40.4
Nicaragua 11.9 11.4 0.1 11.6 35.0 69.5
Niger 5.7 14.2 0.0 25.5 45.4 158.6
Nigeria 4.9 23.1 2.6 15.1 45.7 126.3
Norway 11.3 1.1 0.0 0.8 13.2 52.4
Oman 4.0 2.1 0.0 0.2 6.3 35.9
Pakistan 10.5 3.7 3.3 14.4 31.9 85.9
Panama 5.0 9.7 0.0 8.4 23.1 53.5
Paraguay 3.8 16.9 0.0 4.0 24.7 51.5
Peru 1.8 3.6 0.0 13.2 18.6 73.4
Philippines 1.7 21.1 3.5 6.1 32.4 54.5
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PNG 10.0 15.6 0.0 29.6 55.2 108.3
Poland 17.3 1.8 0.0 0.5 19.6 62.2
Portugal 6.7 1.4 0.0 1.3 9.4 41.7
Qatar 4.5 1.1 0.0 0.4 6.0 33.5
Romania 12.5 3.6 0.0 0.4 16.5 62.6
Russia 41.0 32.9 11.9 0.9 86.7 245.5
Rwanda 7.0 20.0 6.0 27.9 60.9 130.7
Saudi Arabia 5.8 3.0 0.0 1.0 9.8 67.4
Senegal 4.4 11.0 6.8 5.6 27.8 109.2
Sierra Leone 10.1 50.3 7.1 71.3 138.8 286.6
Singapore 10.3 0.8 0.0 0.1 11.2 21.8
Slovakia 13.9 2.2 0.0 0.2 16.3 55.8
Slovenia 29.5 0.8 0.0 0.8 31.1 76.7
Somalia 7.6 33.1 72.2 22.9 135.8 215.5
South Africa 10.5 43.2 0.0 12.1 65.8 118.8
South Korea 18.2 1.8 0.0 1.2 21.2 68.3
Spain 8.3 1.0 0.0 1.5 10.8 40.6
Sri Lanka 31.9 7.9 5.0 7.0 51.8 87.5
Sudan 7.1 30.4 46.4 12.5 96.4 157.1
Suriname 18.1 4.2 0.0 10.9 33.2 86.4
Swaziland 4.5 6.0 0.0 32.5 43.0 103.4
Sweden 12.8 1.0 0.0 2.1 15.9 48.6
Switzerland 17.9 0.9 0.0 1.1 19.9 46.0
Syria 0.6 2.7 0.0 1.9 5.2 40.1
Tajikistan 5.1 6.4 9.4 6.2 27.1 58.9
Tanzania 2.3 24.0 0.3 26.8 53.4 120.7
Thailand 11.1 9.4 1.0 4.1 25.6 77.7
Togo 4.5 10.5 0.0 4.7 19.7 103.7
Trinidad & Tobago 14.8 8.8 0.0 6.9 30.5 56.5
Tunisia 4.4 1.9 0.0 1.8 8.1 63.2
Turkey 6.7 3.4 0.2 1.8 12.1 41.1
Turkmenistan 12.5 10.2 0.0 2.2 24.9 69.7
UAE 3.8 1.0 0.0 1.9 6.7 68.7
Uganda 2.0 20.8 26.5 17.5 66.8 133.6
Ukraine 35.8 15.5 0.0 0.6 51.9 151.4
UK 8.5 1.1 0.0 0.8 10.4 33.9
Uruguay 17.0 5.6 0.0 4.5 27.1 64.8
USA 10.3 5.4 0.0 2.5 18.2 54.8
Uzbekistan 9.0 3.7 0.1 1.3 14.1 45.3
Venezuela 6.2 35.2 0.0 3.8 45.2 85.8
Viet Nam 11.0 4.2 0.0 3.3 18.5 63.5
Yemen 4.9 2.1 0.1 11.9 19.0 95.8
Zambia 3.4 3.7 0.0 21.1 28.2 64.0
Zimbabwe 4.9 11.3 23.1 26.8 66.1 101.9
Source: WHO (2004; all forms of Violent Death, expected suicide).
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B.8 Satisfaction with Life index (2006)
No. Country SWL 2006
1 Albania 153.33
2 Algeria 173.33
3 Angola 160
4 Argentina 226.67
5 Armenia 123.33
6 Australia 243.33
7 Austria 260
8 Azerbaijan 163.33
9 Bahrain 240
10 Bangladesh 190
11 Belarus 133.33
12 Belgium 243.33
13 Benin 180
14 Bolivia 183.33
15 Bosnia and Herzegovina 170
16 Botswana 180
17 Brazil 210
18 Bhutan 253.33
19 Bulgaria 143.33
20 Burkina Faso 156.67
21 Burundi 100
22 Cambodia 186.67
23 Cameroon 170
24 Canada 253.33
25 CAR 163.33
26 Chad 150
27 Chile 216.67
28 China, People's Republic of 210
29 Colombia 240
30 Congo 110
31 Costa Rica 250
32 Cote d'Ivoire 150
33 Croatia 196.67
34 Cuba 210
35 Czech Republic 213.33
36 Denmark 273.4
37 Djibouti 160
38 Dominican Republic 233.33
39 Ecuador 186.67
40 Egypt 160
41 El Salvador 220
42 Equatorial Guinea 173.33
43 Eritrea 146.67
44 Estonia 170
45 Ethiopia 156.67
46 Finland 256.67
47 France 220
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48 Gabon 206.67
49 Gambia 190
50 Georgia 136.67
51 Germany 240
52 Ghana 206.67
53 Greece 210
54 Guatemala 233.33
55 Guinea 170
56 Guinea-Bissau 180
57 Guyana 240
58 Haiti 183.33
59 Honduras 240
60 Hungary 190
61 Iceland 260
62 India 180
63 Indonesia 220
64 Iran 200
65 Ireland 253.33
66 Israel 223.33
67 Italy 230
68 Jamaica 233.33
69 Japan 206.67
70 Jordan 170
71 Kazakhstan 193.33
72 Kenya 186.67
73 Korea, Republic of (South 193.33
74 Kuwait 240
75 Kyrgyzstan 220
76 Laos 180
77 Latvia 156.67
78 Lebanon 186.67
79 Libya 190
80 Lithuania 156.67
81 Luxembourg 253.33
82 Macedonia 163.33
83 Madagascar 193.33
84 Malawi 153.33
85 Malaysia 246.67
86 Mali 176.67
87 Malta 250
88 Mexico 230
89 Moldova 116.67
90 Morocco 186.67
91 Mongolia 223.33
92 Mozambique 180
93 Myanmar 176.67
94 Namibia 216.67
95 Netherlands, The 250
96 New Zealand 246.67
97 Nicaragua 210
98 Niger 150
99 Nigeria 183.33
100 Norway 246.67
101 Oman 243.33
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102 Pakistan 143.33
103 Panama 240
104 Paraguay 216.67
105 Peru 186.67
106 Philippines, The 213.33
107 PNG 210
108 Poland 196.67
109 Portugal 203.33
110 Qatar 233.33
111 Romania 173.33
112 Russia 143.33
113 Rwanda 146.67
114 Saudi Arabia 243.33
115 Senegal 186.67
116 Sierra Leone 166.67
117 Singapore 230
118 Slovak Republic 180
119 Slovenia 220
120 South Africa 190
121 Spain 233.33
122 Sri Lanka 203.33
123 Sudan 120
124 Sweden 256.67
125 Switzerland 273.33
126 Syria 170
127 Taiwan 220
128 Tajikistan 203.33
129 Tanzania 183.33
130 Thailand 216.67
131 Togo 163.33
132 Tunisia 213.33
133 Turkey 176.67
134 Turkmenistan 133.33
135 UAE 246.67
136 Uganda 156.67
137 Ukraine 120
138 United Kingdom 236.67
139 United States 246.67
140 Uruguay 210
141 Uzbekistan 213.33
142 Venezuela 246.67
143 Vietnam 203.33
144 Yemen 206.67
145 Zambia 163.33
146 Zimbabwe 110
Source: White, A. (2007)
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B.9 Freedom from Corruption and Business Freedom
(2007)
No Country Freedom fromCorruption 2007
Business Freedom
2007
1 Albania 24 64.1
2 Algeria 28 73.7
3 Angola 20 35.3
4 Argentina 28 63.9
5 Armenia 29 80.8
6 Australia 88 89.1
7 Austria 87 81.7
8 Azerbaijan 22 58.0
9 Bangladesh 17 59.1
10 Belarus 26 55.7
11 Belgium 74 92.6
12 Belize 37 77.4
13 Benin 29 48.5
14 Bolivia 25 59.9
15 Bosnia and Herzegovina 29 55.4
16 Botswana 59 66.1
17 Brazil 37 54.2
18 Bulgaria 40 70.3
19 Burkina Faso 34 43.8
20 Burundi 23 49.6
21 Cambodia 23 43.5
22 Cameroon 22 41.0
23 Canada 84 96.8
24 Cape Verde 30 55.7
25 Central African Republic 30 41.1
26 Chad 17 49.0
27 Chile 73 68.2
28 China, People's Republic of 32 46.9
29 Colombia 40 71.8
30 Congo, Republic of 23 47.3
31 Costa Rica 42 59.0
32 Croatia 34 54.2
33 Czech Republic 43 61.1
34 Denmark 95 94.8
35 Djibouti 30 38.3
36 Dominican Republic 30 56.7
37 Ecuador 25 58.8
38 Egypt 34 40.9
186
39 El Salvador 42 60.2
40 Equatorial Guinea 19 48.2
41 Estonia 64 79.9
42 Ethiopia 22 59.4
43 Fiji 40 70.4
44 Finland 96 95.3
45 France 75 87.2
46 Gabon 29 53.3
47 Gambia, The 27 59.4
48 Georgia 23 80.8
49 Germany 82 88.9
50 Ghana 40 54.9
51 Greece 43 69.7
52 Guatemala 25 52.3
53 Guinea 30 40.9
54 Guinea Bissau 10 27.2
55 Guyana 25 57.0
56 Haiti 18 38.6
57 Honduras 26 56.1
58 Hong Kong 83 88.4
59 Hungary 50 70.2
60 Iceland 97 94.9
61 India 29 50.8
62 Indonesia 22 48.2
63 Iran 29 55.4
64 Ireland 74 92.1
65 Israel 63 69.4
66 Italy 50 77.0
67 Jamaica 36 82.0
68 Japan 73 91.2
69 Jordan 57 54.9
70 Kazakhstan 26 58.5
71 Kenya 21 64.5
72 Korea, Republic of (South Korea) 50 84.3
73 Kuwait 47 70.7
74 Kyrgyz Republic 23 59.9
75 Laos 33 52.1
76 Latvia 42 74.5
77 Lebanon 31 56.6
78 Lesotho 34 68.2
79 Lithuania 48 84.3
80 Macedonia 27 60.1
81 Madagascar 28 51.2
82 Malawi 28 54.4
83 Malaysia 51 67.6
84 Mali 29 38.1
85 Mauritania 30 37.5
86 Mauritius 42 73.3
87 Mexico 35 83.5
88 Moldova 29 68.1
89 Mongolia 30 70.8
90 Morocco 32 74.6
91 Mozambique 28 48.2
92 Namibia 43 75.7
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93 Nepal 25 60.7
94 Netherlands, The 86 88.4
95 New Zealand 96 99.9
96 Nicaragua 26 56.4
97 Niger 24 38.4
98 Nigeria 19 58.6
99 Norway 89 91.1
100 Oman 63 56.6
101 Pakistan 21 71.6
102 Panama 35 72.7
103 Paraguay 21 49.3
104 Peru 35 65.2
105 Philippines, The 25 53.4
106 Poland 34 55.3
107 Portugal 65 78.6
108 Romania 30 73.2
109 Russia 24 62.0
110 Rwanda 21 51.0
111 Saudi Arabia 34 53.0
112 Senegal 32 56.4
113 Sierra Leone 24 50.5
114 Singapore 94 96.7
115 Slovak Republic 43 70.7
116 Slovenia 61 72.9
117 South Africa 45 70.4
118 Spain 70 78.0
119 Sri Lanka 32 69.2
120 Suriname 32 42.0
121 Swaziland 27 70.4
122 Sweden 92 94.2
123 Switzerland 91 84.1
124 Syria 34 58.4
125 Taiwan 59 71.6
126 Tajikistan 21 39.2
127 Tanzania 29 45.8
128 Thailand 38 73.0
129 Togo 30 37.5
130 Trinidad and Tobago 38 62.7
131 Tunisia 49 78.9
132 Turkey 35 67.4
133 Uganda 25 57.5
134 Ukraine 26 43.6
135 United Arab Emirates 62 49.3
136 United Kingdom 86 91.2
137 United States 76 91.4
138 Uruguay 59 62.2
139 Uzbekistan 22 65.2
140 Venezuela 23 50.4
141 Vietnam 26 59.6
142 Yemen 27 53.5
143 Zambia 26 63.6
144 Zimbabwe 26 42.0
Source: Heritage Foundation (2007).
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B.10 CPI, Freedom from Corruption Index, Business
Freedom Index, Starting Business, and Growth (2008)
No. Country CPI
Freedom
from
Corruption
Business
Freedom
Starting
Business
GDP per
Capita (PPP) Growth
1 Afghanistan 15.00 - - - 800 7.5
2 Albania 34.00 26 55.6 36 6,400 6.0
3 Algeria 32.00 31 72.7 24 7,100 3.4
4 Angola 19.00 22 36.5 119 9,100 15.1
5 Argentina 29.00 29 63.2 31 14,500 6.6
6 Armenia 29.00 29 81.3 18 6,600 9.4
7 Australia 87.00 87 89.3 2 39,300 2.5
8 Austria 81.00 86 80.6 28 39,600 2.1
9 Azerbaijan 19.00 24 61.6 30 9,500 15.6
10 Bahamas, The - 70 80.0 - - -
11 Bahrain 54.00 57 80.0 - 37,200 7.0
12 Bangladesh 21.00 20 55.3 74 1,500 5.9
13 Barbados 70.00 67 90.0 - 20,200 2.8
14 Belarus 20.00 21 58.6 48 12,000 8.1
15 Belgium 73.00 73 93.7 4 38,300 1.5
16 Belize 29.00 35 76.3 44 8,500 2.4
17 Benin 31.00 25 47.7 31 1,500 5.0
18 Bhutan 52.00 - - - 4,800 7.8
19 Bolivia 30.00 27 58.6 50 4,700 4.8
20 Bosnia and Herzegovina 32.00 29 56.1 54 6,600 5.5
21 Botswana 58.00 56 68.7 108 15,800 5.2
22 Brazil 35.00 33 53.6 152 10,300 5.2
23 Bulgaria 36.00 40 67.5 32 13,200 6.0
24 Burkina Faso 35.00 32 49.8 18 1,300 5.1
25 Burma (Myanmar) - 19 20.0 - - -
26 Burundi 19.00 24 35.5 43 400 6.0
27 Cambodia 18.00 21 43.0 86 2,100 7.0
28 Cameroon 23.00 23 39.9 37 2,400 4.0
29 Canada 87.00 85 96.7 3 40,200 0.7
30 Cape Verde 51.00 40 55.1 52 4,200 7.0
31 Central African Republic 20.00 24 40.7 14 700 4.0
32 Chad 16.00 20 34.6 75 1,600 1.7
33 Chile 69.00 73 67.5 27 15,400 4.0
34 China 36.00 33 50.0 35 6,100 9.8
35 Colombia 38.00 39 72.5 42 9,000 3.8
36 Congo 19.00 - - - 3,800 10.2
37 Congo, Republic of 17.00 22 45.3 37 300 6.2
38 Costa Rica 51.00 41 59.7 77 11,900 3.4
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39 Côte d´Ivoire 20.00 - - - 1,700 2.5
40 Croatia 44.00 34 58.1 40 16,900 4.6
41 Cuba 43.00 35 10.0 - 12,700 5.3
42 Cyprus 64.00 56 70.0 - 29,200 3.6
43 Czech Republic 52.00 48 63.9 17 26,800 4.5
44 Denmark 93.00 95 99.9 6 38,900 0.3
45 Djibouti 30.00 30 37.5 37 3,800 6.0
46 Dominican Republic 30.00 28 62.2 22 8,800 5.5
47 Ecuador 20.00 23 58.1 65 7,700 3.4
48 Egypt 28.00 33 59.7 9 5,500 7.0
49 El Salvador 39.00 40 58.6 26 6,400 4.4
50 Equatorial Guinea 17.00 21 47.1 136 30,200 11.5
51 Eritrea 26.00 - - - 700 2
52 Estonia 66.00 67 84.5 7 21,900 -1.5
53 Ethiopia 26.00 24 58.3 16 800 8.5
54 Fiji - 40 69.7 46 - -
55 Finland 90.00 96 95.2 14 38,400 2.4
56 France 69.00 74 87.1 7 32,700 0.9
57 Gabon 31.00 30 52.8 58 14,900 4.5
58 Gambia, The 19.00 25 57.1 32 1,200 4.5
59 Georgia 39.00 28 85.0 11 5,000 6.7
60 Germany 79.00 80 88.9 18 34,800 1.7
61 Ghana 39.00 33 53.1 42 1,500 6.3
62 Greece 47.00 44 69.5 38 32,800 2.8
63 Guatemala 31.00 26 54.1 26 5,400 3.9
64 Guinea 16.00 19 44.9 41 1,100 1.8
65 Guinea Bissau 19.00 10 24.8 233 600 3.9
66 Guyana 26.00 25 56.4 44 4,000 4.8
67 Haiti 14.00 18 35.7 202 1,400 2.3
68 Honduras 26.00 25 59.5 21 3,700 2.3
69 Hong Kong - 83 88.2 11 - -
70 Hungary 51.00 52 73.9 16 20,500 2.0
71 Iceland 89.00 96 94.5 5 42,600 2.0
72 India 34.00 33 50.0 33 2,900 7.3
73 Indonesia 26.00 24 48.8 105 3,900 5.9
74 Iran 23.00 27 55.0 47 13,100 6.4
75 Iraq 13.00 - - - 4,000 6.6
76 Ireland 77.00 74 92.2 13 47,800 -0.7
77 Israel 60.00 59 68.4 34 28,900 4.2
78 Italy 48.00 49 76.8 13 31,000 0.0
79 Ivory Coast - 21 47.0 - - -
80 Jamaica 31.00 37 82.0 8 7,700 0.8
81 Japan 73.00 76 88.1 23 35,300 0.7
82 Jordan 51.00 53 55.4 14 5,000 4.5
83 Kazakhstan 22.00 26 56.5 21 12,000 5.0
84 Kenya 21.00 22 65.3 44 1,800 4.1
85 Korea, North - 10 0.0 - - -
86 Korea, South - 51 84.0 17 - -
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87 Kuwait 43.00 48 68.5 35 60,800 8.1
88 Kyrgyz Republic 18.00 22 60.4 21 2,200 6.0
89 Laos 20.00 26 60.8 103 2,100 6.5
90 Latvia 50.00 47 74.3 16 18,500 -0.4
91 Lebanon 30.00 36 55.4 46 11,100 4.4
92 Lesotho 32.00 32 56.9 73 1,600 5.9
93 Liberia 24.00 - - - 500 9.4
94 Libya 26.00 27 20.0 - 14,900 7.3
95 Lithuania 46.00 48 83.2 26 18,400 5.1
96 Luxembourg 83.00 86 76.9 26 85,100 4.0
97 Macedonia 36.00 27 65.1 15 9,200 4.8
98 Madagascar 34.00 31 56.0 7 1,100 7.0
99 Malawi 28.00 27 52.1 37 800 7.0
100 Malaysia 51.00 50 69.0 24 15,700 5.5
101 Mali 31.00 28 41.9 26 1,200 4.0
102 Malta 58.00 64 70.0 - 24,200 3.0
103 Mauritania 28.00 31 38.9 65 1,900 4.0
104 Mauritius 55.00 51 81.6 7 12,400 5.8
105 Mexico 36.00 33 82.6 27 14,400 2.0
106 Moldova 29.00 32 68.5 23 2,500 5.7
107 Mongolia 30.00 28 71.1 20 3,300 9.9
108 Morocco 35.00 32 75.8 12 4,000 5.3
109 Mozambique 26.00 28 53.0 29 900 6.9
110 Myanmar 13.00 - - - 1,200 0.9
111 Namibia 45.00 41 73.8 99 5,500 3.9
112 Nepal 27.00 25 60.0 31 1,000 4.0
113 Netherlands, The 89.00 87 88.0 10 41,300 2.1
114 New Zealand 93.00 96 99.9 12 28,500 0.6
115 Nicaragua 25.00 26 56.4 39 3,000 2.0
116 Niger 28.00 23 36.0 23 700 4.5
117 Nigeria 27.00 22 52.6 34 2,200 6.2
118 Norway 79.00 88 89.1 10 57,500 2.8
119 Oman 55.00 54 55.8 34 20,400 6.2
120 Pakistan 25.00 22 70.8 24 2,600 4.7
121 Panama 34.00 31 72.8 19 11,900 8.3
122 Paraguay 24.00 26 57.6 35 4,300 4.7
123 Peru 36.00 33 64.5 72 8,500 9.0
124 Philippines, The 23.00 25 53.0 58 3,400 4.5
125 PNG 20.00 - - - 2,300 6.3
126 Poland 46.00 37 54.1 31 17,800 5.3
127 Portugal 61.00 66 79.6 7 22,000 0.9
128 Qatar 65.00 60 60.0 - 101,000 11.8
129 Romania 38.00 31 74.1 14 12,500 8.0
130 Russia 21.00 25 52.8 29 15,800 6.0
131 Rwanda 30.00 25 51.8 16 900 6.0
132 Saudi Arabia 35.00 33 72.5 15 21,300 6.0
133 Senegal 34.00 33 54.5 58 1,800 4.8
134 Sierra Leone 19.00 22 49.4 26 700 6.0
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135 Singapore 92.00 94 97.8 5 52,900 3.0
136 Slovak Republic 50.00 47 69.3 25 22,600 7.0
137 Slovenia 67.00 64 73.0 60 30,800 4.5
138 Somalia 10.00 - - - 600 2.6
139 South Africa 49.00 46 71.2 31 10,400 3.7
140 South Korea 56.00 - - - 27,100 4.3
141 Spain 65.00 68 77.5 47 34,100 1.3
142 Sri Lanka 32.00 31 71.5 39 4,400 5.4
143 Sudan 16.00 - - - 2,200 5.3
144 Suriname 36.00 30 41.7 694 8,900 5.4
145 Swaziland 36.00 25 69.0 61 5,100 2.0
146 Sweden 93.00 92 94.8 15 39,600 0.9
147 Switzerland 90.00 91 83.9 20 40,900 2.0
148 Syria 21.00 29 52.9 43 4,900 2.4
149 Taiwan - 59 70.7 48 - -
150 Tajikistan 20.00 22 43.4 49 1,800 4.5
151 Tanzania 30.00 29 47.9 29 1,400 7.1
152 Thailand 35.00 36 72.1 33 8,700 4.8
153 Togo 27.00 24 36.0 53 900 3.2
154 Trinidad and Tobago 36.00 32 64.1 43 28,400 5.8
155 Tunisia 44.00 46 79.2 11 8,000 4.7
156 Turkey 46.00 38 67.9 6 12,900 4.5
157 Turkmenistan 18.00 22 30.0 - 5,800 7.5
158 Uganda 26.00 27 56.3 28 1,100 6.4
159 Ukraine 25.00 28 44.3 27 7,800 5.3
160 United Arab Emirates 59.00 62 47.9 62 40,400 8.5
161 United Kingdom 77.00 86 90.8 13 37,400 1.1
162 Uruguay 69.00 - - - 12,300 8.5
163 United States 73.00 73 91.7 6 48,000 1.4
164 Uruguay - 64 59.8 44 - -
165 Uzbekistan 18.00 21 67.8 15 2,700 8.3
166 Venezuela 19.00 23 51.4 141 14,000 5.7
167 Vietnam 27.00 26 60.0 50 2,900 6.3
168 Yemen 23.00 26 53.7 63 2,600 3.2
169 Zambia 28.00 26 62.4 33 1,500 6.2
170 Zimbabwe 18.00 24 41.0 96 200 -6.2
Source: CIA World Fact Book (2008); Heritage Foundation (2008) and TI (2008).
